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Discourse in Action
From emails relating to adoption over the internet to discussions in the airline
cockpit, the spoken or written texts we produce can have significant social
consequences. The area of mediated discourse analysis considers the actions
individuals take with texts – and the consequences of those actions.
Discourse in Action brings together the leading scholars from around the world 
in the area of mediated discourse analysis and reveals ways in which its theory and
methodology can be used in research into contemporary social situations. Each
chapter explores real situations and draws on real data to show how the analysis 
of concrete social actions broadens our understanding of discourse. Taken together,
the chapters provide a comprehensive overview to the field and offer a range of
current studies that address some of the most important questions facing students
and researchers in linguistics, education, communication studies, and other fields.
Contributors: Laurent Filliettaz, Rodney H. Jones, Gunther Kress, Theo van
Leeuwen, Jay Lemke, Paul McIlvenny, Maurice Nevile, Sigrid Norris, Pirkko
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Sigrid Norris and Rodney H. Jones
‘Discourse in action’ – as any mediational means – has a history: for the past several
years, a group of scholars has been trying to work out ways to move discourse
analysis beyond the analysis of texts to consider questions about the actions people
take with them, as well as with other cultural tools, and the social consequences
these actions have. The approach that has developed out of these efforts is called
mediated discourse analysis (MDA). It is a wide-ranging and eclectic perspective
that is both socially engaged and theoretically grounded, bringing together recent
advances in discourse analysis, linguistic anthropology, psychology, and socio-
linguistics, and embracing questions about action, agency, communities, culture,
and time. Among the social issues that MDA has thus far been used to address 
are workplace training, immigration, national identity, globalization, and AIDS
prevention.
Those working in this exciting new area have shared ideas with one another
formally and informally in papers, at conferences, in private conversations, and
through correspondence. We now feel it is time to bring together some of 
these ideas in an edited volume that will help to articulate the commonalities 
of our goals as well as to highlight the diversity of contexts within which this
perspective has been applied. This volume seeks to introduce the framework of
MDA in a comprehensive way, while integrating work by a variety of scholars 
who are either working in the framework of MDA, and/or who have influenced
MDA. Those represented are not limited to scholars who consider themselves
mediated discourse analysts.
Discourse in Action is meant to allow students and scholars (who may not
necessarily be familiar with this approach to discourse) to discover the vast variety
of disciplinary approaches possible and the complexity involved when speaking of
mediated discourse analysis.
We have conceived of this book as an edited volume of a different kind: it is 
a textbook that is divided into five parts, each of which delineates a concept of
MDA. The first chapter of each part is written by the editors, giving a short
synopsis of the concept. It is here that the reader can find definitions, information
on the historical development of the terms, and the theoretical underpinnings of 
the concepts. To make it easy for readers to locate important terminology, we
place these in textboxes at the beginning of these chapters. At the end of each
part, we provide discussion questions and mini project ideas to point students 
and teachers in practical directions for the use of Discourse in Action.
We hope that this book will be useful to students and researchers who are
interested in broad theoretical issues facing discourse analysis and sociolinguistics,
as well as those who are concerned with how discourse analysis can be made more
immediately relevant to today’s pressing social issues.
While understanding social issues is the ultimate goal of a mediated discourse
approach, we cannot emphasize enough the benefit of a clear theoretical outline
(mediated discourse theory) and a workable methodological framework (nexus
analysis). Therefore, instead of dividing the theoretical/methodological and the
practical, we have decided to create a book that pays equal attention to theory,
methodology, and social issues. With this volume we hope to provide discourse
analysts, linguists, educationists, and communications scholars, as well as others,
with a range of current work that addresses some of the most important questions
facing these disciplines. Simultaneously, we hope to encourage scholars to look
beyond their own disciplinary boundaries in seeking answers to social issues that
they are addressing.
We would like to thank all of the contributors to this volume for their efforts
and patience, our families for supporting us throughout, and Tom Bartlett for































































































































1 Discourse as action/
discourse in action
Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
In a park in China, a man stands behind a tree holding a stack of AIDS prevention
pamphlets. Another man passes, briefly looks at the first man and then continues
on his way, Then a third man comes by, this time allowing his gaze to linger a
little longer, at which point the first man smiles, takes a few steps forward and
offers one of the pamphlets.
( Jones, 2001b, 2002b)
In a living room in Germany a divorced woman kneels on the floor among
scattered pieces of computer equipment and wires and squints at a sheet of written
instructions trying to match the physical objects with the drawings and
descriptions on the sheet. Suddenly she looks up and remarks to her friend sitting
across the room: ‘He never let me do anything like this.’
(Norris, 2002a, this volume)
In a coffee shop in San Diego two linguists settle down with their drinks to take
a break from the intellectual rigor of an academic conference. After a few minutes
of casual conversation, the discussion turns to the writing on the paper cups they
are drinking from, which leads to an exchange of ideas about discourse analysis
which find their way into a paper one of the linguists will present at a future
conference.
(R. Scollon, 2001a)
What these three seemingly disparate strips of social interaction have in common
is that they are all mediated through some kind of written text: an AIDS prevention
pamphlet, an instruction sheet, the writing on a paper cup. In each instance these
texts are used as tools to take one or more social action(s) and to claim and impute
certain social identities. Their use goes far beyond the discourse that they contain,
beyond the purposes of giving someone information about AIDS prevention,
teaching someone how to set up a personal computer or advertising the










































users to each other in a complex nexus of practices, connecting these moments
to policies and discourses of public health and personal attraction, gender politics
and family politics, corporate capitalism and the discourse of academia.
Were we to analyze just the discourse, the written texts: the dos and don’ts of
condom use; the location of the USB port; the fact that the cup is made from 100
percent recycled paper; or the spoken words – the offers, the reminiscences, the
debates – we would in fact understand very little about what is going on in these
social situations, nor would we understand what these pieces of discourse actually
mean. The reason is that the ‘meaning’ does not so much reside in the discourse
itself, but rather resides in the actions that people take with it.
This book is about the relationship between discourse and action, taking mediated
discourse analysis (MDA) as its theoretical and methodological framework.
Mediated discourse analysis was developed as an alternative to approaches to
discourse that see social action as secondary, and approaches to social analysis that
see discourse as secondary (R. Scollon, 2001a). By not privileging discourse 
or social action but, rather, seeing discourse as one of many available tools with
which people take action, either along with discourse or separate from it, MDA
strives to preserve the complexity of the social situation. It provides a way of
understanding how all of the objects and all of the language and all of the actions
taken with these various mediational means intersect at a nexus of multiple social
practices and the trajectories of multiple histories and storylines that reproduce
social identities and social groups.
The principles of mediated discourse theory were first laid out by Scollon in
the late 1990s (R. Scollon, 1997, 1998) and have subsequently been developed
by a number of discourse analysts in a constellation of separate research projects
and collaborations over the past ten years in Asia, North America and Europe (see,
for example, Al Zidjaly, 2002, 2004; Boswood, 2000; de Saint-Georges and
Norris, 1999; Johnson, 2002; Jones, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b; Jones
and Candlin, 2003; Jones et al., 1997; Norris, 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b;
Randolph, 2000; R. Scollon, 1997, 1998, 2001a, 2001b; R. Scollon et al., 1999;
S. Scollon, 2001, 2003; Scollon and Scollon, 2003, 2004). It has been applied to
understanding such diverse issues as AIDS prevention, national identity, childhood
literacy practices, gender identity and buying a cup of coffee.
The focus of mediated discourse analysis is not discourse per se, but the whole
intersection of social practices of which discourse is a part. It explores, among
other things, how, at that nexus, discourse becomes a tool for claims and
imputations of social identity. At the same time, it does not see the tree in the
park, the scattered computer components or the decor of the coffee shop in 
the examples given above as ‘context,’ nor does it see the written and spoken
discourse as ‘texts’ in a more traditional sense. Instead, it turns its focus to the










































4 Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
components or written texts. MDA takes as its unit of analysis the action, more
specifically, the mediated action, which is the real time moment when mediational
means, social actors and the sociocultural environment intersect.
This focus on the mediated action as the unit of analysis comes primarily from
the work of American psychologist James Wertsch and his colleagues (Penuel 
and Wertsch, 1995; Wertsch, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998; Wertsch et al.,
1995) who themselves take it from the work of Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky
(1978, 1987).
Wertsch and his colleagues call their perspective ‘the sociocultural approach 
to mind’ (see also Bruner, 1990; Cole, 1990; Lantolf, 2000). It emphasizes that
all actions are mediated through ‘cultural tools’ (Wertsch, 1998): objects, tech-
nologies, practices, identities, social institutions, communities, and also language
and other semiotic systems. All of these tools come with histories that have shaped
the kinds of things that can be done with them and the kinds of things that cannot:
that is, they embody certain affordances and constraints. These affordances and
constraints, however, are not deterministic of what social actors do with them
but, rather, create a tension as actors appropriate them into their habitus
(Bourdieu, 1977) and deploy them purposefully in social situations.
Understanding social life involves not just understanding the tools available 
for mediated actions nor the intentions, goals, plans or habits of social actors, but
also, and more importantly, involves understanding the ‘tension between the
mediational means as provided in the sociocultural setting and the unique
contextualized use of these means in carrying out particular concrete actions’
(Wertsch 1994: 205).
Chief among these mediational means are what Wertsch calls voices: the words,
phrases, narratives and ‘ways of speaking’ (Gumperz and Hymes, 1986) that we
borrow from the sociocultural environment to interact with others and construct
our accounts of these interactions. For Wertsch, nearly all actions are mediated
through voices, even apparently silent actions, as even private thought involves
language (Vygotsky, 1987) and private behavior, prior social learning.
Wertsch derives the concept of voices from the work of the Soviet literary critic
Mikhail Bakhtin (1981a, 1986), who insists that we never speak in a voice that is
purely our own, but instead ‘borrow’ and ‘ventriloquate’ the voices of others: we
‘rent’ meaning and then give it back to the community according to the protocols
it establishes (Clark and Holquist, 1984). Every utterance is heteroglossic, in that it
may contain many different voices at once, and dialogic, as each voice exists in
response to, or in ‘dialogue’ with, other voices.
While every word we speak, every practice we perform and every identity we
claim is always ‘half someone else’s’ (Bakhtin, 1981a: 293), these words, practices
and identities are also ‘half our own.’ When we borrow them, we change them,










































Discourse as action/discourse in action 5
in our own ‘accents.’ Thus, not only is the way we take action transformed by
the tools we use, but these tools themselves are transformed by the actions they
are appropriated to perform.
While sociocultural practice theory provides the broad outlines of a perspective
on the relationship between discourse and action, it stops short of developing a
coherent theory of discourse and a clear way to analyze it as it is deployed within
complex semiotic aggregates (Scollon and Scollon, 2003) with other non-linguistic
mediational means. In developing the tools to do this, MDA has drawn upon and
integrated a number of traditions in linguistics, some of which have in the past
been regarded as more contradictory than complementary, but all of which share
with MDA the same question: How can we make the study of discourse account
for its complex role in situated social action?
Discourse as action
The response to this question from many traditions in North American and
European linguistics has been to point out that discourse is action, that saying
something or writing something is a form of doing something, and mediated
discourse analysis, in many ways, shares this ‘discourse as action’ perspective.
Perhaps the most important development in modern linguistics, at least from the
point of view of MDA, has been the increased focus in the last fifty years on
language not as an abstract code but as a set of tools through which people realize
particular social functions, and of discourse not as a matter of words, sentences
or texts, but as a matter of social action.
One of the most famous articulations of such a perspective comes from
Wittgenstein (1972), who sees language as a series of ‘games’ through which
people construct what he calls ‘forms of life,’ particular ways of being in relation
to others and their surroundings. For Wittgenstein, speaking or writing is always
a creative performance, determined on the one hand by the ‘rules’ of the particular
language game being played and, on the other, by the unique strategies of
individual players in particular situations. Like Wertsch after him, Wittgenstein
uses the metaphor of the ‘tool kit’ to illustrate this dynamic:
Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a
screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, nails and screws. The function of words is as
diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are
similarities.) Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words
when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their











































6 Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
Another major advance in seeing discourse as a kind of social action came from
Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). In speech act theory, utterances are analyzed in
terms of the material effect they are intended to bring about on the world. They
carry ‘force,’ which is interpreted according to various conditions present in 
the context.
This focus on how the meaning of discourse derives from its use is also a
prominent feature of contemporary approaches to grammar, in particular the
systemic functional grammar of Halliday (1973, 1978), who insists that ‘language is
as it is because of its function in the social structure’ (Halliday, 1973: 65).
Halliday’s approach is an attempt to link the micro-sociological level of language
use to the macro-sociological level, or, as he puts it, to link language to ‘the social
structure, the values, the systems of knowledge, all the deepest and most pervasive
patterns of the culture’ (Halliday, 1973: 45).
This emphasis on action can also be seen in anthropological perspectives on
linguistics, particularly the ethnography of communication (Hymes, 1986; Saville-
Troike, 1989), which focuses on discourse as part of a constellation of con-
textualized behaviors which members of cultures use to demonstrate that they are
legitimate members. The notion of ‘communicative competence’ makes the words
one says inseparable from the actions one takes, the place where these actions
occur, and a whole host of other factors.
At what is often viewed as the opposite methodological pole, action has also
been a concern of ethnomethodologists (Garfinkle, 1967) and conversation analysts
(Goodwin, 1981; Heritage, 1989; Sacks et al., 1974; ten Have, 1999) who have
sought to understand how social actors construct the ‘doings’ and ‘beings’ of
everyday life through language. According to ten Have (1999: 6), such approaches
re-conceive the problem of social order as ‘a practical problem of social action.’
Interactional sociolinguists (Davies and Harré, 1990; Gumperz, 1982b; Schiffrin,
1994; Tannen, 1984) have also contributed both theoretically and methodolog-
ically to this focus on language as a matter of social action. By examining the ways
people manage their identities in the course of interaction making use of the
‘expressive equipment’ (Goffman, 1959) provided by their culture, they highlight
the contingent and context-specific nature of discourse in relation to social action.
The primary concern of interactional sociolinguistics, as R. Scollon (2001a: 163)
puts it, is how ‘social actors who are acting in real time are able to strategize their
own actions within a negotiative process with other social actors to achieve 
their desired social meanings, including their identities, footings, alignments with
others and their positionings of themselves and others.’ All of these issues are also
central to MDA.
Another tradition whose view of discourse in relation to social action has










































Discourse as action/discourse in action 7
and Hamilton, 1998; Gee, 1996; Heath, 1983; Scollon and Scollon, 1981; Street,
1984). Scholars in this area share a view of literacy as a mediational means through
which people take actions in the world by which they show their identity and their
membership in particular groups. Literacy is not a matter of an individual cognitive
skill, but rather a matter of performing certain kinds of social actions, and thus
reproducing the social practices and power relations around which these actions
are organized.
One of the most ambitious attempts in linguistics to explicate the link between
discourse and social action can be seen in critical discourse analysis (CDA)
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995; Fairclough 
and Wodak, 1997; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 1996), which takes as one of its 
central precepts that discourse is a form of social action. According to Fairclough
(1992), the project of CDA is to explore how discourse is implicated in social
practice by examining the ways texts simultaneously represent reality, enact 
social relations of power and establish social identities. Discourse is seen as ‘joint
action’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Shotter, 1993) which draws upon
conventions that naturalize particular forms of knowledge and ideologies. Parti-
cularly important in CDA is a focus on the ‘hybridity’ characteristic of all social
uses of discourse and the analysis of how, through ‘conjunctures’ (Chouliaraki and
Fairclough, 1999: 38) of text types and ways of speaking, speakers and writers
perform strategic acts of domination and resistance.
Discourse in action
While MDA borrows insights and analytical tools from all of the above traditions,
the framework it proposes differs from them in a number of important ways, ways
that can perhaps best be summed up by transforming the slogan discourse as action
into discourse in action.
Before saying what we mean by that, it is important to be clear what we do not
mean. We do not mean ‘taking into consideration the context’ in which discourse
occurs simply as a way of understanding the ‘text’ better. To treat the actions,
environments and circumstances in which discourse occurs as ‘context’ very much
misses the point of mediated discourse analysis (Filliettaz this volume; Jones
2004a), for it draws attention to different aspects of the social situation based on
the analyst’s interests rather than on the terms of the situation itself.
We also do not mean to suggest that discourse is simply an ingredient in action
– that discourse is in action in the same way carrots are in a pot of stew. This view
obscures the complex ways actions are taken through discourse and the ways
discourse works its way into actions – sometimes through being ‘resemiotized’
(Iedema, 2001, 2003) as social practices, or ‘frozen’ (Norris, 2002b, 2004b) in










































8 Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
We suggest that the relationship between discourse and action is dynamic and
contingent, located at a nexus of social practices, social identities and social goals.
This relationship is manifested in the tension between the kinds of actions that
discourse and other cultural tools make possible and the ways people purposefully
mix these tools in response to their immediate circumstances. MDA sees discourse
as ‘cycling’ through social actions: verbal and textual tools working their way into
practices, material objects, and the built environments in which we interact. Those
same practices, objects and environments then reproduce spoken and written
texts. In this regard, MDA shares with CDA a concern with hybridity, with the
ways multiple ‘voices’ interact in interdiscursive dialogicality (Scollon and Scollon,
2003). However, whereas the project of CDA starts with the idea that ‘discourse
opens a window on social problems’ (R. Scollon, 2001b), MDA seeks to open this
window wider – broadening the ‘circumference’ of discourse analysis (R. Scollon,
2001b) to include things like objects, gestures, non-verbal sounds and built
environments. A renewed interest in sociolinguistics in devising ways of analyzing
such ‘non-linguistic’ mediational means and their use in situated interaction (see,
for example, Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996; Norris, 2004a, 2004b; van Leeuwen,
1999) has enriched the work of mediated discourse analysis, as is amply evident
in this volume.
It is in the question of exactly how discourse is a matter of social action, 
then, that MDA diverges from other approaches. MDA problematizes the 
relationship between discourse and action, noting that it is not always possible 
to ‘read’ social actions from discourse or to expect certain forms of discourse to 
inevitably accompany certain actions (Jones, 2001b). Sometimes the ideational
content of the discourse has very little to do with the way it is being used to take
social action.
Therefore, rather than approaching the question of how discourse is a matter
of social action through the discourse, MDA approaches it through the action. The
first question it asks is, ‘What is/are the action/s that is/are being taken here?’
and only after answering this question does it go on to ask, ‘What is the role of
discourse in this/those action/s?’ (R. Scollon, 2001a).
In answering the second question, MDA makes use of many of the analytical
tools developed by scholars in these other traditions. From conversation analysis
and interactional sociolinguists MDA takes tools with which to trace the ongoing
series of identity claims and imputations that people perform as they appropriate
texts and other cultural tools into their interaction and the practical process 
of ‘sense-making’ that they employ ( Jones, 2002b; Jones and Candlin, 2003; 
R. Scollon, 1998). From the ethnography of communication it takes its ethno-
graphic approach to the collection of data and a concern with ‘competences,’ ways
of appropriating and using tools that show one to be a legitimate member of a










































Discourse as action/discourse in action 9
And from critical discourse analysis and the new literacy studies it takes ideas about
how to link actions to larger structures of social organization which Gee (1996,
1999) calls Discourses (with a capital D),1 the ‘cultural toolkits’ from which the
tools of social interaction are appropriated and from which they take their meaning
(Jones, 2001b). Gee (1996: 128) defines Discourses as the recurrent and systematic
‘ways of talking, listening . . . acting, interacting, believing, valuing and using
tools and objects, in particular settings, at particular times, so as to display and
recognize a particular social identity.’ The social actor, in this perspective, is
simultaneously an individual acting within a unique social context and ‘the meeting
point of many, sometimes conflicting, socially and historically defined Discourses’
(Gee, 1996: 132).
Mediated discourse analysis attempts to understand how broad social concerns
interact with the common moments of our everyday lives: to explain how
discourse (with a small d), along with other mediational means, reproduces and
transforms Discourses; and how Discourses create, reproduce and transform the
actions that individual social actors (or groups) can take at any given moment. We
take as a route to understanding this relationship the study of social practices,
which is the logical outcome of a focus on action, not social practice used in its
abstract, non-count form (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), but rather the
concrete practices that we repeat every day to enact our social identities. Both
micro-sociological questions of the situated doings of everyday life, and macro-
sociological questions of power and ideology are grounded in the study of social
practices (R. Scollon, 2001b). The place to look for struggles of power and
ideology, according to MDA, is not, however, in any one of these practices, but
in the way multiple practices converge to influence concrete social actions.
This emphasis on action rather than discourse is, for mediated discourse
analysis, not just a theoretical perspective, but also something of a moral
imperative. Like scholars in CDA, those working in MDA are committed to a
project not just of studying social interaction but of taking social action. MDA is
a project to promote social change, which gives yet another meaning to the slogan
discourse in action.
Its practitioners have been traditionally concerned with making their work
address problems in the world that cry out for solution (R. Scollon, 2002c). They
have studied not just food and commerce, sexual politics and AIDS prevention,
but also the restructuring of identities in areas undergoing political change (de
Saint-Georges and Norris, 1999; Jones et al., 1997; R. Scollon et al., 1999), the
ways individuals and groups interact with and within bureaucratic structures like
the US Census Bureau and the US Department of Immigration ( Johnson, 2002;
Pan and S. Scollon, 2004), how unemployed youths appropriate social practices
and build identities in government training programs (de Saint-Georges, 2001),










































10 Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
available in their sociocultural contexts (Al Zidjaly, 2004), how macro-political
events can affect the micro-politics of our everyday interactions (S. Scollon,
2003), and how marginalized groups appropriate and adapt tools from dominant
discourses to strategize their access to social resources ( Jones, 2002b).
Central to mediated discourse analysis, then, is the desire to effect positive
change by focusing on projects that help people to see beyond abstract notions of
power and to start noticing the moment to moment workings of power in their
everyday actions. Approaches that uproot social problems from their sociocultural
contexts, that uproot words from the bodies that are speaking them (R. Scollon,
2002), that uproot behaviors, attitudes or beliefs from the sociocultural contexts
of their formation and the historical bodies of those who perform them, that
uproot our present lives from their histories, are approaches that have limited
power to bring about positive social change.
Mediated discourse analysts take the position that to understand the power
relations and ideological forces in our societies, it is necessary to start with the
everyday actions that go into creating them. The most pressing social problems in
the world must be understood not as a matter of the dealings of large institutions
(governments, corporations) and abstract ideas ( justice, democracy) but, rather,
as a matter of our individual actions within the semiotic aggregates (Scollon and
Scollon, 2003) that institutions and ideologies produce.
The place to begin understanding questions of global economic practices, for
example, is in the concrete act of handing money to another person in exchange
for a particular good or a service in a particular place. Understanding gender
relations can begin with looking at how a divorced woman uses the various pieces
of her sociocultural world, from computer components to home decor, to create
a new nexus of practice and construct a new identity. Understanding the effect 
of Chinese government discourse about AIDS on the knowledge or behavior of
Chinese gay men, might start not with an analysis of larger questions of law,
morality or public policy but, rather, with the concrete action of one man handing
another an AIDS prevention pamphlet in a public park. That is not to say that the
study of the macro-sociological environment is not important – in fact, it is
essential, and MDA often includes the analysis of media texts, public opinion
surveys and other means of understanding the broader discursive environment in
which individuals act. But, really understanding these broader Discourses must
begin with understanding the ‘real time’ concrete actions they are used to take.
Introducing mediated discourse analysis
In order to provide the reader with both an overview of the main concepts of











































Discourse as action/discourse in action 11
• Mediated action
• Mediational means/cultural tools
• Practice
• Sites of engagement
• Agency
Each part is accompanied by a short introduction reviewing the key concepts
authors use in their chapters and highlighting the theoretical or methodological
problems they are addressing. At the end of each part there are discussion
questions and suggested projects for students. The last chapter provides a practical
outline on how to conduct a study using the principles of mediated discourse
analysis, including: how to choose a nexus of practice to study; how to narrow
the focus to the relevant actions and the relevant mediational means; how to
collect data using participant observation and other methods that will yield a multi-
faceted view of the nexus of practice. The chapters themselves, for the most part,
illustrate their theoretical arguments with reference to actual studies, and it is here
that the reader can see true examples of the ethnographic methodology of MDA.
Mediated discourse analysis, as described above, thus, does not conceive of
itself so much as a separate ‘school’ or discipline or theory, but rather as a nexus
of practice (R. Scollon, 2001a) at which different research traditions converge.
And, like every other nexus of practice, MDA is characterized by contingency and
unfinalizability. MDA is, as Scollon (2001b) writes, an approach that constantly
‘seeks to examine the limits of its own theory and method.’ This contingency and
reflexivity is evident in the chapters of this volume, each of which aims not just
to explain a key aspect of MDA, but to examine it, problematize it, expand on it,
reconfigure it, and to suggest new directions in which it might be developed.
Many of the scholars represented would not necessarily label themselves
‘mediated discourse analysts.’ They come from the fields of CDA, conversation
analysis, education, multimodal discourse analysis, sociocultural psychology, as
well as MDA. All of them, however, have greatly influenced MDA with their own
work and have been influenced by it. This range of representation shows the
breadth and interdisciplinary spirit of MDA theory. The audience we imagine in
assembling this collection of scholars includes those in a variety of disciplines
(communication and cultural studies, linguistics, psychology, social work and
sociology among them) interested in exploring ways of bridging the gap between
theory and practice and between a larger macro-sociological perspective and a
more delicate analysis of the micro-sociology of everyday life, and scholars who
are interested in finding ways to make their work relevant to the important social
problems they see around them. In this sense, this volume is not intended as a
definitive introduction to MDA so much as an invitation for other scholars to










































12 Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
The book begins by introducing and exploring the basic unit of analysis 
of mediated discourse analysis: the mediated action. In this section, Ron Scollon
reconsiders the mediated action, and how, when, and where it actually occurs. He
argues that all mediated actions occur simultaneously on various timescales, each
with its own rhythm, and that to really understand actions, analysts need to take
into account this ‘layered simultaneity’ (Blommaert, 2004). Then, Maurice Nevile
further explores the issues of timing and trajectories of mediated actions, as well
as the ways actions function in the process of collaborative meaning making,
through the analysis of the complex sequencing of actions involved in landing a
commercial aircraft.
In Part II, the mediational means itself is discussed, both in terms of its mode of
existence and the way it functions as a link between individual actions and social
structures and discourses. James Wertsch begins this discussion with a detailed
analysis of Vygotsky’s theory of mediation, pointing out differences between the
way mediation works with physical tools and the way it occurs with psychological
tools such as ‘inner speech.’ Then, Paul McIlvenny and Pirkko Raudaskoski discuss
how mediational means like new communication technologies can transform the
ways identities and social practices are constructed in the context of international
adoption. Finally, Theo van Leeuwen examines the affordances and constraints
inherent in the structure of texts with particular emphasis on multimodal genres.
Social practices are the topic of Part III. Here, Laurent Filliettaz explores the
relationship between action, gesture, discourse and rhythm in order to show how
contextualization is best conceived of as both a pre-constructed entity and as a
moment-by-moment achievement of recognizable social practices. After that, Jay
Lemke discusses how place and pace figure in the social practices that have
developed around a particular computer game. Finally, Shawn Rowe, in his study
of the way children interact around a science museum exhibit, explores how
people strategically invoke and mix various social practices through the creation
of hybrid activity spaces.
Part IV is devoted to the site of engagement and continues to develop the concern
with timescales and trajectories introduced in the first part. In the first chapter of
this section, Rodney H. Jones considers the relationship between sites of engagement
and real time and space, with particular emphasis on the complex spatial and
temporal contours of computer-mediated communication. After that, Ingrid 
de Saint-Georges considers how ethnographic fieldwork itself creates sites of
engagement, or, what she calls, ‘time-space stations’ through the anticipatory and
narrative discourses of the participants and researcher.
Part V deals with one of the most important, but thus far least examined
questions in MDA: the question of agency. Who exactly is it that is performing the
mediated action? Is agency a matter of the individual consciousness or a matter 










































Discourse as action/discourse in action 13
mediational means and social practices? Suzie Scollon takes up the issue of agency
in relation to the ways Chinese immigrants in the US interact with the bureaucratic
regulations of the federal census. Agency, she argues, is not a matter of individual
will but, rather, something that is distributed across multiple individuals and
groups and resemiotized in physical tools like census forms. Sigrid Norris, in the
last chapter of this part, contrasts the ways a married and a divorced woman use
discourse and other mediational means to construct a sense of agency or control
over their lives, and how this process is related to larger discourses of gender
relations and power.
All of these chapters, on the one hand, show the diversity of theory and method
that has contributed to the development of mediated discourse analysis. On the
other hand, they also highlight the themes common to MDA: a concern with action
before discourse, a preoccupation with finding ways to integrate macro-
sociological analysis with the fine-grained analysis of situated social interaction,
and a desire to apply the tools of discourse analysis to understanding and solving
pressing social problems. Hopefully they will serve not just to inform readers
about the possibilities of this new approach to discourse, but also inspire them to
think about the theoretical principles we are presenting, to challenge them to make
their own contributions to the understanding of how discourse is a matter of social
action. Most of all, it is hoped that the approach outlined here will inspire readers
to reflect in a new way on their own real-time, concrete actions and understand
how they might be related to larger issues of power, equity and justice. As 
R. Scollon (2002: para. 12) reminds us, the ultimate aim of mediated discourse
analysis, or any other intellectual pursuit, is not just to help us understand other
people’s actions, but to help us understand the potential of our own everyday
actions to create positive social change.
Note
1 Gee distinguishes ‘capital D Discourse’ from ‘small d discourse’ (language in use), and











































































































































































Mediated action: Unit of analysis.
A mediated action focuses on two elements: the agent
and the mediational means, emphasizing an inherent
irreducible tension between the two.
The concept of mediated action must always remain
problematized.
The focus of analysis is always on social actors as
they are acting because these are the moments 
in social life when the Discourses which we are
interested in are instantiated in the social world as
social action.
The focus of mediated discourse analysis is the
mediated action – within a dialogical chain of such
social actions as well as within a hierarchy of
simultaneously occurring practices.
Lower-level action: The smallest interactional meaning unit.
Higher-level action: Bracketed by an opening/closing and made up of a
multiplicity of chained lower-level actions.
Often we find several embedded and/or overarching
higher-level actions.
Frozen action: Higher-level actions, which are entailed in material
objects.
The unit of analysis for mediated discourse analysis is the mediated action. The
concept of a mediated action was proposed by Wertsch (1991) and is largely based
on Vygotskyian psychology. Wertsch (1998) discusses in detail the irreducible
tension between actor and mediational means, saying that ‘[the] analysis of medi-
ated action focuses on two elements: agent and mediational means’ (Wertsch,
1998: 25). This constant tension, then, is expressed in the unit of analysis as an
agent acting with or through a mediational means. A mediated action is thus never
carried out by an actor alone, but is always and only possible if both elements of
agent and mediational means are co-present.
R. Scollon takes on the notion of mediated action and emphasizes that, for ‘[t]he
concept [of mediated action] to remain useful, [it] must always remain prob-
lematized’ (R. Scollon, 1998: 11). Thus, the concept of mediated action is always
contingent, and, for it to be useful as a unit of analysis, it must be constantly
interrogated. R. Scollon (2001a) emphasizes that ‘the focus is on social actors as
they are acting because these are the moments in social life when the Discourses
which we are interested in are instantiated in the social world as social action’ 
(R. Scollon, 2001a: 3). Here, he also builds on Wertsch (1998), who points out
that sometimes, when analyzing a mediated action, the agent may be of greater
influence, while at other times, the mediational means may take on priority within
the action itself. R. Scollon (2001a) argues further that ‘[t]he mediated action
(within a dialogical chain of such social actions as well as within a hierarchy of
simultaneously occurring practices) is the focus of mediated discourse analysis.’
This dual focus on social actors and actions taken, including the mediational means
through which the actions are performed, allows analysis of the actions in their
complexity. Reducing this complexity in any way is something we are trying to
avoid in mediated discourse analysis.
R. Scollon (2001a) develops the framework of mediated discourse analysis
further, broadening the complexities to integrate the macro and the micro, calling
for a nexus analysis. Here, he highlights the facts that mediated actions form – and
are a part of – chains of dialogic actions. All social action, as R. Scollon (2001a:
6) states, ‘is based in tacit, normally non-conscious actions. “Practice” is the term
most commonly used to refer to action-in-the-world.’ R. Scollon follows the
notions found in Nishida (1958), Bateson (1972) and Bourdieu (1977, 1990),
‘taking practice as the milieu of social action’ (R. Scollon, 2001a: 6).
Norris (2004b: 11), looking at multimodal interaction, divides mediated actions
into lower-level actions, as the smallest interactional meaning units; higher-level
actions, as actions that are bracketed by an opening/closing and made up of a
multiplicity of chained lower-level actions; and frozen actions, which are entailed
in material objects.
As can be seen in this brief introduction, defining and mapping the contours of










































18 Sigrid Norris and Rodney H. Jones
constantly strive to build a better understanding of this central concept. In the
following two chapters, R. Scollon and Nevile build on the notions that we have
discussed so far. In Chapter 3, R. Scollon illustrates that actions are rhythmically
entrained to at least six different (but integrated) pace-makers (Zeitgeber), prob-
lematizing the mediated action and some common concepts of time. Then, in
Chapter 4, Nevile looks at interaction in an airline cockpit and demonstrates how
the pilots create and act on understandings of organization of actions in larger and











































Introducing mediated action 19
3 The rhythmic integration of
action and discourse: work,
the body and the earth
Ron Scollon
What is it that’s going on here?
(Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis, 1974a: 8)
The facts of human natural history that throw light on our problem, are difficult for us to
find out, for our talk passes them by, it is occupied with other things. (In the same way we
tell someone: ‘Go into the shop and buy . . .’ – not ‘Put your left foot in front of your right
foot etc. etc. then put coins down on the counter, etc. etc.’)
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology, 1980: 83)
What after all is action?
Mediated discourse analysis (MDA) has strategized its work by focusing on 
the mediated action, that is a social actor taking an action through the use of 
some mediational means (Wertsch, 1991). This is a way of positioning the focus 
at a point that is neither the individual (the social actor) nor the society (the
mediational means) but the point at which these are brought concretely into
engagement. Within MDA, discourse is seen as a kind of mediated action. Dis-
course is language in use, but we do not mean language ‘in general’ or abstractly;
we mean some particular word, sentence, phrase, intonation, or perhaps a genre
that is appropriated by a social actor to accomplish a specific action at a specific
place and in a concrete moment. In this view discourse is not just the action, not
just the language; it is the bit of language as it is used in taking an action.
The focus on action in MDA which gives us this view of language (and, of
course, other semiotic systems) as mediational means has been useful but it has
not been without problems. The two problems that I will address in this chapter
are, first, that actions are always complex, never simple, and, second, that the










































As the epigrams from Goffman (1974) and Wittgenstein both suggest and as
Norris (2004b) discusses in detail, action may be viewed at ‘higher’ and ‘lower’
levels – we are going shopping or we are walking or we are stepping or we are
lifting a foot and placing it ahead of the other, leaning forward onto that foot while
lifting the other. Which is the appropriate level at which to assign the word
‘action?’ And what then is happening at the levels below and above the level we’ve
called attention to? Of course we have the useful tri-stratal proposal of Leont’ev
(1978) of action-activity-activity system which certainly addresses some of this
problem. But we still must deal with how we talk about action, both as participants
in social actions and as analysts. Our common language of action tends to blind
us to other levels or types of action.
The second problem may be even more difficult to work out for MDA because
it has been argued convincingly by many that language (i.e. discursive action) relates
to action (i.e. non-discursive action) in several ways. Language may be the action
itself, as in pragmatics (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969); it may complement action, 
as shown in gesture research (McNeill, 1992; Goodwin, 1981) as well as prag-
matics (Filliettaz, 2004b); it may follow action, as much research on narrative has
shown (Schiffrin, 1996, 2000; Johnstone, 1990) as have the discursive psychologists
(Harré, 1998; Wetherell, 2003); it may anticipate the action (de Saint-Georges,
2004; S. Scollon, 2001), be irrelevant to action as a secondary involvement (Goff-
man, 1959; Filliettaz, 2004b), or even obstruct action (Gu, 2002).
Most troubling but also interesting are the cases where the discourse, or in this
case it might be better to say language, is either irrelevant to the action or at such
a distance from the action that it isn’t easily located (Yelyseieva Tovares, 2003),
or the cases where the discourse is somehow resemiotized (Iedema, 2003) into
objects or internalized into practice and so not overtly present in the action as
language at all.
My purpose in this chapter can hardly be to solve these thorny issues. My goal
is the more modest one of trying to sketch out the dimensions of the problems 
of the entrainments of action in time and space in a wider circumference 
(Burke, 1950; Scollon and Scollon, 2004) so that subsequent research will have a
somewhat more systematic framework for addressing them.
The floor-nailer
On July 23, 2003 Rex Luxton, my brother-in-law, and I laid a northern pine floor
in a small bedroom in our house in Alaska. Figure 3.1 is a picture of a moment in
that stream of action.
In Figure 3.1 the pine floor planks have been cut and roughly laid out in several
ranks ahead of the nailing, which is proceeding in the photo from left to right.










































The rhythmic integration of action and discourse 21
weight by standing on it. Rex is swinging the mallet against the floor-nailer, a
small hand-operated machine designed to do just this one job. The photo has
arrested his hand in mid-swing.
At the narrowest level (the cardiac-respiratory level) this hammering moves
with a steady, rhythmic beat which I can replicate using line conventions:
bam – bam – BAM – (rest),
<shift – the – floor-nailer>,
bam – bam – BAM – (rest),
<shift – the – floor-nailer>,












































This regular rhythmic pulsation allows the smooth integration of Ron’s movement
along the plank being held in place. He moves to his right in time with the 
shift of the floor-nailer to the right. The floor goes down quickly and smoothly.
It is important to notice that neither of the team speaks to the other as this is
happening.
Dorothy comes to the door and asks, ‘Rex, do you want me to bring you some
coffee or are you guys going to take a break?’ Rex answers, ‘When we get these
next two rows down, we’ll come down for a break.’ And with this burst of talk
we anticipate closing out one stretch of work (measuring and snapping a
centerline, gluing and face-nailing the first two rows, and cutting and laying about
20 rows).
Rex asks, ‘How many’s that?’ We count. ‘I get 24.’ He says, ‘The same’ after
a pause as he looks across the room. We’re about a third of the way across the
floor. ‘Will we be done by lunch?’ I answer, ‘Those last three or four will go a
lot slower.’ He suggests, ‘Afternoon break.’
So with this bit of talk we tie up one segment of a few hours of work and 
sketch out a schedule for the rest: a coffee break, another stint of work up to lunch
and then finishing up in the few hours right after lunch. In this way we organize
the 24-hour daily cycle (the circadian cycle) into a sequence of events at the level
of the intermediate metabolic cycles; coffee, lunch, and afternoon break are
interspersed with 2–3-hour periods of work on the floor.
Rex and Dorothy were on their summer camping vacation (the solar cycle:
camping in Alaska occurs in the warm summer months of the annual cycle).
Within that cycle, they were visiting us for a week in Haines where they were
waiting for the Alaska State Ferry to take them and their camper south via the
Inside Passage to the terminal at Bellingham, Washington. This portion of their
summer was a working visit which included on the first day helping us load the
flooring into a storage place in the basement of the house and then on the second
day started with the flooring of the small bedroom. This week included laying
three other floors.
And, finally, there are a host of entropic cycles. The flooring materials were
northern pine which was recently milled in the Yukon Territory. When it was
delivered we were told that it was best to not leave it just loosely stacked for any
great length of time because as the wood began to absorb moisture in the damper
climate of Haines (on the Pacific Ocean) it could begin to warp and it would be
harder to work with. No specific cycle of moisture absorption was given, but we
wanted to get the floors down when the wood was at its straightest.
That was one entropic cycle that was central in this action cycle. Another was
human fatigue. The floor-nailer works with a 4lb mallet. There were physical











































The rhythmic integration of action and discourse 23
The action that was arrested in Figure 3.1 was a layered simultaneity1
(Blommaert, 2004) in which the regular pulsations (bam – bam – BAM – (rest))
of the hammering were layered within metabolic cycles of eating and working.
Those cycles were layered, in turn, within a cycle of six days of work which
included not only flooring but quite a few other jobs. Those six days of work were
encompassed within a summer vacation. And throughout these projects we bent
and broke nails, we splintered floor planks, we drank coffee and tea, ate meals
and in hundreds of other ways entrained our actions to the materials we used.
Rhythmic pace-makers (Zeitgeber)
This example illustrates what I mean when I say that actions are rhythmically
entrained to at least six different (but integrated) pace-makers (Zeitgeber):
• The cardiac-respiratory cycle: pulsations of the heart and of breathing
• The metabolic cycle: ebbs and flows of ingestion, digestion, and elimination,
pain cycles, drowsiness cycles
• The circadian cycle: 24-hour revolution of the earth about its axis
• The lunar cycle: 28-day revolution of the moon about the earth
• The solar cycle: 365-day revolution of the earth about the sun
• Entropic cycles: formation and decay of material substances
The first two of these are anatomical or human-biological pace-makers. Hammer-
ing, sawing, walking, lifting, speaking, writing by hand or with a machine give
short rhythms of the cardiac-respiratory system (fractions of a second to a few
seconds). Within a metabolic cycle a stint of work, a conversation, a meeting, a trip
to the store, a sporting event, or a meal, center on a cycle of a few hours at the
most. This cycle is constrained by the needs of eating and digestion or the length
of time we can sustain continuous physical or mental effort.
The next three cycles we might call geosemiotic cycles because they are
entrained to the earth and its relationships to the moon and the sun. Most of our
activities from a day of work to a vacation hike are timed to fall within the 
24-hour cycle of waking and sleeping which, even in the polar latitudes, brackets
our lives into 24-hour segments. Our lives are further entrained to the lunar cycle
both physically (the rising and falling of tides so crucial to fishermen; menstrual
cycles; rising and falling crime rates in urban centers) and through the longstanding
conventions of monthly pay periods and billing cycles (mortgages, credit cards,
or utilities). And, third, the annual cycles of seasons are geared into such projects
as urban planning, roadworks, school cycles, or job rotations.
The sixth cycle has to do not only with the material tools we use to undertake











































and signs, books and buildings) but with our bodies themselves as material entities.
These cycles are as many as the materials we use to carry out our lives; highly
volatile glues and solvents evaporate within seconds but our plastic soda bottles
threaten to outlast the planet. The entropy cycle of each substance contributes a
cycle of its own to the conduct of the actions of our daily lives.
In writing so far I have used the concept of ‘entrainment’ to speak of the
relationship between an action and one of these cycles. It is important here to 
be clear about what I mean by this. While there is substantial research on the
physiological and anatomical entrainments of the human body to the circadian 
(24-hour) cycles (Moore-Ede et al., 1982), we know considerably less about cycles
with both shorter and longer periodicities. Here, then, I follow Lemke (2000b),
who argues that the relationships between higher- and lower-level timescales is
one in which higher levels constrain (but do not predict or cause) the units of the
lower levels. In this sense I would argue that, for example, the solar cycle with
the rotation of seasons sets constraints within rather broad ‘moments.’
Replacing the windows in an Alaskan house is an activity, an action sequence,
that is better done in the summer than in the winter because of the exposure to
the weather that this entails. Within that constraint, the action of opening up the
gap in an exterior wall could happen in June, July or August, on a Tuesday or a
Saturday, at 8:00 am or at 3:00 pm. Nevertheless, if we shift down to the circadian
cycle, it is better to do the job at 8:00 am than at 3:00 pm because the job comes
down to one that is constrained by the circadian sleep–wake cycle and by the
metabolic cycle. It takes about 5 hours to open up the gap, place in the new
window, and seal it up against the weather. That work/material cycle is more
easily accommodated if it is inserted conveniently between two meal breaks.
In this way, when I write of entrainment between actions and cycles, what I
mean to say is that the periodicity of the cycle sets constraints on actions that can
be taken within that cycle. I do not mean to say that there is any fixed linkage
between an action in a larger cycle (replacing the window) and an action in a
smaller cycle (trimming back the excess wallboard ends). Also, I do not mean to
say that an action that is entrained to a longer cycle would take a length of time
to accomplish that equals the periodicity of the longer cycle. It is good to do the
windows in the summer but it does not take all summer to do the job.
Blommaert (2004) alerts us to the ideological power of reducing such
constraints and entrainments to simple metonyms. He refers to this process as
synchronization. An example of this would be to say that Rex’s summer vacation
was (nothing but) his six days of working on our new floors; or that the summer
of 2003 was all about Rex laying floors in our reconstruction project; that laying
wood floors is nothing but hammering on the floor-nailer; or that learning to use
the floor-nailer is all there is to being able to lay a wood floor. To reduce the










































The rhythmic integration of action and discourse 25
them is to reduce the fundamental complexity of action to unitary meanings.2 Such
reductionism is disabling to the richer analysis we hope to achieve with mediated
discourse analysis. As Wittgenstein pointed out in the opening epigram, such
reductions are blinding to both social actors and to analysts of action. They often
serve an ideological discursive-rhetorical strategy as well as to hide the more
complex operations behind a few highlighted actions.
With these clarifications we can turn to Figure 3.2, which shows these multiple
cycles circulating through a moment of action.
These cycles are integrated somewhat like the integrated gears in a vehicle’s
transmission system, the differential gearbox. In a vehicle, the differential allows
the drive shaft, which is turning at one speed, to transmit its power to separate
driving wheels which revolve at different speeds while turning corners. Analo-














































these cycles are, in turn, integrated with each other. Thus I suggest that all agency
is differential in this sense of the word. Most commonly our analysis of the actions
of social actors has strategically (or conventionally) isolated just one of these
rhythmic cycles for attention; we speak of ‘taking a step’ or of ‘taking a walk’ but
not often do we speak of taking a walk as taking a sequence of steps. This suggests
that mediated discourse analysis needs to break away from the common discourses
of human action in its analyses to examine in each case the full range of rhythmic
cycles within which an action is integrated.
Spatial spheres
Perhaps it is a miracle that in working on 2,000 square feet of flooring two people,
both amateurs at this work, did not have an occasion in which the standing person
stepped on the kneeling floor-nailer nor did we have an occasion on which the 
4lb mallet landed on the foot or shin of the person standing to provide the weight
to keep the planks snug while they were being nailed. This close integration of
the actions of two people with tools and materials within a confined space points
to a second set of spatial entrainments that, ultimately, are inseparable from the
temporal entrainments I have just discussed.
Edward T. Hall (1959) introduced the idea that as social beings when we
communicate face-to-face, or side-by-side as in this example, we do so from
within semiotically meaningful ‘bubbles’ of space. While Hall’s writing and much
of the writing following from his work has focused on the sociocultural meanings
of these spaces and distances, it was the geographer Hägerstrand (1978) who began
to work out how our fundamental ubiation, to revive a venerable old word, as
bodies in the world (Scollon, 2004) is central to any analysis of how we act.
It would be important on another occasion to investigate the human spheres of
action (ubiations) entailed, for example, when the body is in action without a
material tool, in action with an inactive tool such as reading a book, or a highly
active tool such as cutting with a saw or pounding with a hammer. For my purposes
here, however, I can only provide a sketch of the way in which spatial consid-
erations interact with the rhythmic cycles I have described above. Perhaps there
are three of these:
• bounded spaces such as the rooms of houses, garden fences or concert stages
constrain the actions that may be taken within them. Laying the floor in a
large room afforded space for two people to work along with a small stack
of flooring strips, a chop saw, multiple hammers and prybars, the floor-nailer
and boxes of cut scrap ends of flooring strips. The small bathroom attached
to the sauna had to be done by one person and all the other materials had to










































The rhythmic integration of action and discourse 27
• permeable spaces are afforded by opening doors and windows. By opening the
window in the bedroom we were able to position the chop saw with the
inactive zones of the ends of longer boards extended outside of the house.
Conversely, when sanding the flooring the airspace had to be closed to keep
dust from spreading throughout the house.
• unbounded spaces such as outdoor impromptu shops or functionally unbounded
spaces such as airplane hangars or warehouses allow actions to take place
without undue consideration of boundaries.
There are many interactions between these ubiations or spatial considerations
and the temporal cycles I have introduced before them, though I do not have the
space to explicate. To give just one example, I open the window to dispose of 
the inactive zone of the board I want to cut or I put the table saw and chop saw
outside the house by the back door. This comes up against both circadian and solar
time cycle constraints. There is a bed and breakfast within 20 feet of my outside
workspace. On the circadian cycle this constrains my work to hours that allow a
reasonable sleeping and waking cycle for the guests. On the solar cycle, opening
up windows to work, or working outside, can only be done on fair weather
summer days. In this case the circadian cycles and the solar cycles produce
effectively bounded spaces for the work actions I would want to take.
The problem of point of view
Like many studies of action, I began with a moment of action (Figure 3.1: bam –
bam – BAM – (rest)) and worked outward to see how this action was a point of
circulation of other cycles of longer periodicity. This can be a restrictive and
ultimately disabling strategy for analysis, however. As one opens up the cycles it
seems quite straightforward to see this moment within the defining compass of
the longer cycles as if they had emanated out of this moment like ripples from a
pebble tossed into a still pond.
Life, however, is never a still pond. If we come to this moment of action from
the point of view of many other cycles that are circulating through the moment we
might see it very differently. Is this a moment in the cycle of restoration work on the
house? That restoration work began a year before this when we had the roof replaced
and is not yet completed as I write the first draft of this chapter in November 
some four months later. In a wider cycle it could be thought of as a moment in the
life cycle of the house built by O’Dell in 1912, remodeled many times over by a
sequence of owners, and now, yet again undergoing these material changes.
But this action is also a moment in the cycle of Dorothy and Rex’s summer 
vacation of two months. Or should we see it as a moment in the cycle of the rela-











































Or is it a moment in the cycle of the floor-nailer and mallet rented from Haines
Home Building? How many people and floors in this community are linked
through the use of this one small machine? Or, more broadly, is it a moment in
the business cycle of sales and rentals that go to make up this company? Even more
broadly it could be seen as a moment in the annual economic cycle of summer
building projects that make up much of the annual income of the community.
The number of cycles that circulate through this action of floor nailing is very
large and not, in principle, limitable. I make this latter point because just now as
I am using this as an example in writing a book chapter I am retroactively
circulating an academic discourse through this moment. While it might be obvious
that all of these cycles may be important, it is not obvious how limits may be
placed on our understanding of these cycles of discourse and action which circulate
through any moment of action. This leads me then to re-address my central
problem: how are action and discourse integrated given this much more complex
notion of action?
At the outset I noted that discourse (or language) may be the action itself, may
complement action, may follow action or precede it, or may be irrelevant to or
obstructive of action. I believe this is true for any of the cycles or spatial spheres
within which we consider action. But we also now have some limited amount of
research that begins to show us how we can address these problems. Narrative
studies make it clear that retrospective accounts of either action (Labov, 1972) or
histories (Wertsch, 1997) are powerful anticipatory discourses that set limits on
what is a possible or meaningful future action. In an important ethnographic study
of work and workplaces, de Saint-Georges (2004) has noted that anticipatory
discourse in the form of schedules, plans or projections for projects are important
contraints on the actions of worker/trainees, and retrospective discourse tends to
take the form of evaluations. In her research it was clear that on the job itself there
is relatively little talk, with long stretches of work or listening to the radio. This
is much the same as I have found in my data concerning these restoration projects
from flooring to replacing windows. Also, Filliettaz (this volume) has shown how
discourse at any moment works to frame both prior and subsequent actions in
cycles that lie outside of the ongoing moment of interaction.
If we open up the scope of what we consider to be discourse we find that
discourse permeates our actions at all levels in the form of what Iedema calls
resemiotizations (Iedema, 2003), Bernstein (1990) calls recontextualizations, or
Silverstein and Urban (1996) refer to as entextualizations; Vygotskians would
refer to internalizations (Scollon and Scollon, 2004). Don Bollinger (1990) lays
hardwood floors professionally. He resemiotizes his practical experience as a book
on how to lay, sand and finish floors. Suzie takes this book out of the Haines public
library and, thinking that we might ourselves put in a tongue and groove floor,










































The rhythmic integration of action and discourse 29
materials with our friends at Haines Home Building and Supply. In those conversa-
tions words, phrases, technical terms and ideas from Bollinger’s book come into
our daily speech. That leads, through several telephone calls and faxed price lists
to our agreement to buy 2,000 square feet of northern pine milled in the Yukon,
Canada.
Note that by the time the wood is brought into the house and stacked it is no
longer (for us) just so many pieces of tongue and groove wood. It is plank flooring
which we compare with the photographs in Bollinger’s book. When the wood is
delivered, Brad, from whom we’ve bought the wood and who delivers it to us,
takes 20 minutes to go over with me how to lay the floor. As he speaks I compare
in my mind what I’ve read in Bollinger’s book and raise questions at points of
difference. In this way spoken and written discourses come into dialogue and
become progressively internalized as potential practice. I have yet to lay a piece
of wood. For one thing we have no floor-nailer, a machine that both Bollinger and
Brad have said is an essential tool for the job. Is there one in Haines? Asking around
in the three possible stores we find that there is one and we can rent it.
By the time we come to the task of laying the floor we have gone through some
weeks of talk and text, telephone calls and faxes, specifications and price lists,
floor measurements and discussions of possible finishes. This all becomes resemi-
otized as neat stacks of plank tongue and groove flooring in the basement, a floor
that is measured and which has a chalk centerline snapped onto it. By the time 
we start to face-nail (a term now internalized as part of our linguistic practice,
first learned in making a tongue and groove sauna 15 years earlier and revived in
reading Bollinger) the first row, much discourse has been internalized or resemi-
otized as practice. As we nail the first rows and then begin to use the floor-nailer
in Figure 3.1 we do not speak; much of the discourse has by now been sunk
through these anticipations and resemiotizations into practice. Overt discourse as
discourse in complement with the action emerges only at points where it seems
to one of us that we’ve strayed from our anticipations or our (obviously rather
limited) knowledge and practice doesn’t cover the case.
These resemiotizations produce cycles of action and discourse that circulate
through any moment of action as practice, as tool, and also as more overt
discourses such as text and talk. It is in this sense, I argue, that all action is
differential and this layered simultaneity of multiple cycles of discourse is both a
challenge and a powerful opportunity for us to enrich our thinking about discourse
and action within the framework of mediated discourse analysis.
Notes
1 Blommaert (2004) has developed his idea of ‘layered simultaneity’ from Braudel’s idea











































durée) by an analysis of the intermediate cycles (such as political regimes) within which
are the yet shorter-term cycles (événement) of events (see, for example, Braudel 1981)
and from Wallerstein’s writings on the development of the world system (see
Wallerstein, 1983). In the analysis I am developing here I would situate Braudel’s event
cycle at the lunar cycle level and his intermediate cycle at the solar cycle level. I do not
doubt that Braudel’s longue durée could be entrained to longer planetary cycles but I
have not taken on that question here.
2 As I have noted earlier, it is a further such metonymy to reduce multiple and intersecting
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4 You always have to land:
accomplishing the sequential
organization of actions to
land an airliner
Maurice Nevile
As a cautionary saying in aviation circles puts it, you never have to take off, but
you always have to land. In this chapter I draw on insights and methods of
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (EM/CA: see Hutchby and Wooffitt,
1998; ten Have, 1999) to consider processes of talk-in-interaction in the airline
cockpit as pilots collaborate to develop necessary understandings and perform
actions to land their plane.1 The airline cockpit is a task-oriented high-technology
work setting where it is critically important to perform activities and complete
actions in strict sequence. That is, one activity or action becomes appropriate, or
even possible, only when some other activity or action has been completed, and is
understood to be so by both pilots. The pilots routinely orient to and achieve this
sequential organization of their work, moment-to-moment, by drawing upon and
coordinating a range of available resources. That is, talk-in-interaction for actions
in the airline cockpit is mediated by textual materials such as formal procedures,
wordings and checklists, information available from visual displays, aural alerts and
other sounds, and non-talk activities such as moving levers and pushing buttons.
Mediated actions in the cockpit involve not just the use of, but the situated and
temporal realization of, these resources in ways that are constitutive of the work
of airline pilots. I will focus here on two features: the use of prosody to construct
and distinguish between action sequences, and a particular orientation for precise
timing of non-talk activities relative to talk – a readiness for action.
This chapter is therefore an EM/CA take on matters significant to MDA, such
as the role and coordination of various communicative modes and levels of action
(Norris, 2004b; this volume) and the emergence, trajectory and evolution of
actions and systems over time (R. Scollon, 1998, this volume; Lemke, 2000b). In
particular, what I see in and make of the data is guided most immediately by
interest in EM/CA in the sequential order in naturally occurring human social
interaction, in micro analysis of how participants collaborate to organize their
contributions by projecting and recognizing what is being done, and so what is a










































EM/CA has much to offer MDA (R. Scollon, 1998, 1999). In EM/CA, espe-
cially after Goodwin (1981), there has been a steadily growing interest in the
sequential organization of means, other than talk, by which participants accom-
plish social actions in interaction, including gesture, body positioning and
movement, gaze, and the location and use of objects and physical features of the
setting (e.g. ten Have and Psathas, 1995). This interest has turned to interaction
in complex sociotechnical work settings (e.g. Button, 1993; Goodwin, 1995,
1996; Heath and Luff, 2000), and has informed studies of human cognition, and
cognition for work, as situated, embodied and socially shared understandings,
evolving over time (Resnick et al., 1991, 1997). This is ‘knowing’ as it arises 
and is used locally, dynamically, in temporally unfolding naturally occurring
interaction, what Goodwin (1996: 399) refers to as ‘the interactive organization
of knowledge.’ In particular, my interest here furthers work on situated cognition
in the airline cockpit (Hutchins, 1995b; Hutchins and Klausen, 1996; Hutchins
and Palen, 1997).
‘Flaps ten thanks’: the data
I use naturally occurring data, a transcription from a video recording of pilots at
work landing a scheduled passenger flight. I produced the recording by arrange-
ment with a leading Australian regional airline2 as part of a larger research 
project on routine talk-in-interaction in the airline cockpit (Nevile, 2004). The
transcription here reflects the concern of EM/CA to include many more details 
than the participants’ words, such as precise measures of silence, prosodic 
features (e.g. pitch variation, sound lengthenings), and participants’ non-talk activ-
ities (e.g. body position and movement, interaction with objects). Transcription
notation is given at the end of the chapter.
To a non-aviation audience, the transcription may appear bewildering, perhaps
nonsensical, because of the specialist nature of the actions and terminology. On
the other hand, to a pilot the data might look so simple and straightforward as to
be uninteresting, taken for granted. Yet, it is precisely this simplicity and taken-
for-grantedness in which I am interested, the pilots’ organization and under-
standing of their work as routine and unremarkable. Exactly what do the pilots
say and do, and how and when do they do so, to collaborate to complete a number
of actions in sequence to land their airliner as an entirely routine accomplishment?
What is it, beyond the knowledge and skills imparted by professional manuals and
training programs, that constitutes competent practice for an airline pilot? These
are not trivial questions, and as simple as the segment might look to some, many
flights have come to grief because something went wrong, was not done
appropriately, or went unnoticed, at just the point in the flight corresponding to










































You always have to land 33
landing without the landing gear (wheel assemblies) correctly lowered (BASI,
1996; FSF, 1997).
Here is the full data segment. The PF is the ‘Pilot-Flying,’ the pilot in control
of the plane and responsible for making the input and decisions that imme-
diately affect its handling and performance. The PNF is the ‘Pilot-Not-Flying,’
whose duties include assisting the PF. The segment begins as the plane is just 
a few minutes from landing, as the PF calls for the wing flaps to be set at 10
degrees. Wing flaps are moveable surfaces that are extended to make the 
wings larger to increase their lift at the lower speeds for landing and takeoff. The
segment concludes as the plane touches down. I use the fictitious destination 
Smalltown (line 32) to conceal the identity of the flight and so preserve the pilots’
anonymity:
(1) (37.7)
(2) PF: flaps ten thanks::,
(3) (5.6)
(4) PNF: -kay: you’ve got flaps ten.
(5) (39.3)
(6) PF: gear down thanks,
(7) (13.0)
(8) PNF: a:nd down four greens.
(9) (9.5)
(10) PF: flaps twentyfi:ve ERP go-around º thanksº .
(11) (6.0)
(12) PNF flaps: (.) twentyfive,
(13) (3.4)
(14) PF: checks thanks,
(15) PNF: okay gear,
(16) (0.9)
(17) PF: down. >four< greens,




(22) PF: twentyfive set,
(23) (0.3)

















































(30) PNF: a:nd landing clearance.
(31) (0.2)
(32) PF: not required (0.3) in (0.3) Smalltown.
(33) PNF: check’s complete.
(34) (52.6)




(39) ((sounds indicating plane has landed))
I’ll summarize what happens in the data. The segment can be logically broken
into three parts, coinciding with three larger action sequences as the pilots work
to land the plane: preparing the plane for landing; conducting the landing
checklist; and descending through the 500-feet altitude mark. Each larger action
sequence is composed of smaller action sequences. First, from lines 2 to 12, the
pilots perform actions to prepare the plane for landing, by setting the wing flaps
to a required position (lines 2–4), then by lowering the landing gear (lines 6–8),
and finally by re-setting the wing flaps (lines 10–12) and choosing an engine power
setting (‘ERP go-around’, line 10). For each action the ‘Pilot-Flying’ (PF) talks
to call for the action, the ‘Pilot-Not-Flying’ (PNF) performs the required non-
talk activity (e.g. moving a lever), and then the PNF talks to claim the action as
complete. For example, to lower the landing gear the PF says ‘gear down thanks,’
(line 6), the PNF then moves the lever to lower the gear and monitors the
instrument panel for four green lights to illuminate, indicating that all is well (the
gear is down and locked in place), then claims that the gear is down with ‘a:nd
down four greens’ (line 8).
In the second part of the segment, the pilots conduct the landing checklist (lines
14–33), initiated by the PF’s call of ‘checks thanks,’ (line 14), and finished when
the PNF calls ‘check’s complete’ (line 33). We know the pilots understand this
to be the end of the checklist because there is no further talk or action with respect
to the checklist, but what follows is a 52.6 second period without talk as the plane
continues its descent to the runway.
In the third and smallest part of the segment (lines 35–37) the plane descends
through the altitude of 500 feet, a critical point in the descent and approach. The
action for the pilots here is to acknowledge verbally that this point has been
reached, and to confirm that the approach is progressing as it should and that it is
appropriate to continue.
Figure 4.1 shows the same data segment but simplified schematically to show










































You always have to land 35
Organizing larger and smaller sequences of action:
prosodic signaling of incompletion and completion
Interaction in the airline cockpit is directed and constrained by formal manuals
that outline procedures, wordings and checklists (also available in cockpit dis-
plays) that specify the actions pilots must perform and their relative ordering. 
All of the actions and almost all of the talk in the segment here are mediated 
by these textual materials. My interest here (Figure 4.1) is in the processes of
interaction by which this mediation is realized, by these pilots here and now, and
specifically in how the pilots create and act on understandings of organization of
actions into larger and smaller sequences, as higher- and lower-level actions
(Norris, 2004b). One way these pilots accomplish the sequential organization of
their work is through prosodic features of their talk, specifically, using either rising











































2 PF:  flaps ten thanks::,  Extending wing flaps to '10'             
4 PNF:  -kay: you’ve got flaps ten.         
        Preparing
6 PF:  gear down thanks, Lowering landing gear         the plane
8 PNF:  a:nd down four greens.         for landing
        
10 PF:  flaps twentyfi:ve ERP go-around         
 ºthanksº. Extending wing flaps to '25'    
12 PNF:  flaps: (.) twentyfive,         
                               
14 PF:  checks thanks, Calling for landing checklist    
(opening checklist)
15 PNF:  okay gear,        Conducting
17 PF:  down. >four< greens, 1st checklist item the
18 PNF:  down. four greens, landing
checklist
20 PNF:  flaps,
22 PF:  twentyfive set, 2nd checklist item
24 PNF:  twentyfive set,
26 PNF:  ERP, 3rd checklist item
28 PF:  go around,
30 PNF:  a:nd landing clearance. 4th checklist item
32 PF:  not required (0.3) in….. 
33 PNF:  check's complete. Calling checklist as complete
    (closing checklist)
35 PNF:  a:nd five hundred, Passing 500 feet
37 PF:  checked. altitude mark









A number of EM/CA researchers consider the role of prosody for the
organization of interaction (see e.g. Couper-Kuhlen and Selting, 1996; Selting and
Couper-Kuhlen, 2001), and some show how flat or slight rising pitch at end of
turn is one way by which participants signal forms of incompletion, that some talk
or other form of contribution may or should be coming next, possibly to produce
some sort of completeness of talk or action or understanding, or at least that 
such completion is called for. Selting (2001: 246) calls this ‘continuing prosody.’
While such talk is hearably incomplete and can project something to follow, falling
turn-ending pitch can signal completion and that nothing is projected to follow.
Prosody is a resource that pilots may draw upon as they sequence their talk and
actions.
I will look first at the simplest example, the last part of the segment as the plane
descends through the critical altitude 500 feet (lines 35–37). The required
procedure here is for the PNF to monitor his altitude display and call out when
the 500-feet altitude is being passed. The PF is required to then check the display
on his side of the cockpit and say ‘check’/’checked’ to confirm the altitude. This
is what happens:
(34) (52.6)




(39) ((sounds indicating plane has landed))
The required procedures do not ask for the PNF to use rising turn-ending pitch,
but this is what he actually does, as shown in the transcription by the ‘,’ (‘a:nd
five hundred,’ line 35). The slight rising pitch projects incompleteness, and can
be heard as signaling that something else is required to follow. On the other hand,
the PF’s response, completing the action of checking the altitude, is said with
falling terminal pitch (‘checked.’, line 37). We know this is heard and understood
as completing the action, unproblematically, because there is no further talk of
the altitude, and some 57.8 seconds of silence pass before the plane touches down.
I will now look at the first two smaller actions to prepare the plane for landing
(lines 2–8). The PF ends his turns, calling for some non-talk activity and talk from
the PNF, with slight rising pitch, producing what can be heard as incomplete talk,
projecting the need for some next thing. He says ‘flaps ten thanks::,’ (line 2), and
‘gear down thanks,’ (line 6). In response, producing the talk that claims the actions
to be completed, the PNF ends his turns with falling pitch. That is, the PNF says
‘-kay: you’ve got flaps ten.’ (line 4), ‘a:nd down four greens.’ (line 8). The
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members of a sequence of turns at talk for each action, one signaling incompletion,
and the other completion.
However, this neat prosodic pattern is broken for the third action, setting the
flaps to twentyfive, when the PF initiates the action with falling turn-ending
intonation (‘flaps twentyfi:ve ERP go-around º thanksº .’, line 10), and the PNF
ends his turn in response with slight rising pitch (‘flaps: (.) twentyfive,’, line 12).
That is, the PF, initiating this action, uses completing intonation, and the PNF,
finishing the action, uses intonation that can be heard as projecting something to
follow. Why might this be so, what might this prosody allow the pilots to do?
Recall that this is the third and last action sequence in the larger action sequence
to prepare the plane for landing. The PF’s turn-ending falling pitch may therefore
be orienting to this finality, and certainly it can be heard this way by the PNF.
That is, the PF’s prosody can present this called-for action as the last action, as
completing a known sequence of three actions. Why then might the PNF use slight
rising turn-ending pitch in response, producing talk that can be heard as projecting
more to follow? The PNF may be orienting to shared knowledge that the comple-
tion of these three smaller actions makes relevant a next larger action, the landing
checklist. That is, the PNF’s hearably incomplete talk can be heard as projecting,
even prompting, the landing checklist, which is initiated by the PF only some 3.4
seconds later.
So, prosodic features of the pilots’ talk can be heard as accomplishing the
sequential organization of action at more than one level, that is, for sequences of
talk for specific smaller actions, and also beyond single smaller actions to complete
a larger sequence of actions or to project a relevant next larger sequence of actions.
We can note a similar feature as the pilots conduct the landing checklist (lines
14–33). The checklist consists of a large action sequence composed of ‘challenge/
response’ type smaller sequences of talk, where the PNF calls each item to be
checked (the challenge) and then each pilot has a turn at response to claim the
item as checked. The PF initiates the checklist, opening the new sequence with
slight rising intonation (‘checks thanks,’, line 14), but what is most interesting to
note is that, as they progress through each item in the checklist, both pilots use
slight rising turn-ending pitch. This rising pitch allows the pilots to present each
turn at talk in the smaller sequence as incomplete and projecting something to
follow; however, in the case of the third (final) turn in these mini-sequences of
talk what is projected is in fact the next checklist item, the next mini-sequence
of talk and checking activity within the larger action sequence of the checklist. For
example, this is the sequence to check the landing gear:
(15) PNF: okay gear,
(16) (0.9)
(17) PF: down. >four< greens,












































Here, the PNF’s turn at line 15 projects visual checking activity by both pilots,
and the turns at talk (17–18), which will claim that checking activity to have been
done. The PF’s turn at line 17 projects the PNF’s checking and subsequent talk
(at line 18). The PNF’s talk at line 18 is the last talk for this item, completing the
item; however, by using rising pitch the PNF’s talk is able to project the next item
and action sequence for the checklist (‘flaps,’, line 20). That is, what is to follow
is not something for this checklist item, but the next checklist item, so the talk to
complete one mini-sequence also projects the initiation of the next mini-sequence.
In this way, as the pilots complete mini-sequences of talk and activity for each
item in the checklist, the PNF is able to present the larger sequence of the checklist
itself as ongoing, open, as yet-to-be-completed. Each checklist item, each mini-
sequence, is therefore presented as just one small part of an as-yet-incomplete
whole. The PNF uses this aspect of prosody to maintain the larger action sequence
(the checklist) across a series of smaller action sequences (each item) which,
together, constitute that larger sequence.
As before, this apparently neat prosodic patterning is broken, though again in
ways that seem interactionally significant for the pilots’ creation and understanding
of the sequential organization of their work. Here is how the checklist ends:
(29) (1.0)
(30) PNF: a:nd landing clearance.
(31) (0.2)
(32) PF: not required (0.3) in (0.3) Smalltown.
(33) PNF: check’s complete.
(34) (52.6)
As the PNF calls for the last item in the checklist, the landing clearance, for the
first time he uses falling turn-ending pitch (indicated by ‘.’) when calling for an
item (‘a:nd landing clearance.’, line 30). This falling end pitch is one way the PNF
can signal the ‘lastness’ of this item, that while this talk may be heard as projecting
something from the PF to complete the item, this is the last time the PNF’s talk
will do so. The PNF is able to signal the impending end of the checklist sequence
as a whole by using pitch which can be heard as completing something. Note, too,
that this turn is the first item call to be prefaced by ‘and’, making further salient
its status as the last in a list. In response, for the first time too, the PF’s talk to
complete an item is also produced with falling turn-ending pitch (‘not required
(0.3) in (0.3) Smalltown.’, line 32), presenting his understanding of complete-
ness, that there is no next item to project, that the larger action sequence of the
checklist as a whole is completed. The talk that explicitly ends the checklist, the
PNF’s ‘check’s complete.’ (line 33), is also said with falling terminal pitch. Falling
pitch is one way these pilots show their understanding that this item, this talk, this
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So, after a series of mini-sequences of turns where each turn at talk was ended
with slight rising and hearably incomplete pitch, the final three turns of the larger
action sequence (lines 30, 32 and 33) are all ended with falling pitch. It seems that
prosody, specifically the choice of rising or falling turn-ending pitch, is a resource
that these pilots draw on to develop and demonstrate their evolving under-
standings of a larger or higher action sequence, formed by progress through a series
of smaller or lower sequences of action, as in progress or as ending. This is one way
that pilots develop their moment-to-moment understandings of what they are
doing, of where they are up to and what is next.
What is interesting for EM/CA studies of prosody (see Selting, 2001) is how
the ‘continuing prosody’ identified here projects completion of a sequence, not a
turn. It occurs where the turn is pragmatically complete but the sequence of which
it is a part is not complete, or the smaller sequence is complete but the larger
sequence of which that sequence is a part is not complete. So this continuing
prosody, pitch that is left hanging, occurs with turns that are not themselves
somehow incomplete, and are not fragments. It projects more-to-come, but does
not occur mid-turn, projecting further talk by the speaker (i.e. turn-holding
pitch). Rather, it occurs at turn’s end, projecting furthering talk by the recipient.
The continuing prosody therefore acts here like a kind of a prompt, much like the
turn ending ‘for’, ‘or’, ‘at’, ‘and’ etc. described by Lerner (in press). It is another
way of ‘doing continuing’ (Selting, 2001: 249).
Organizing talk and non-talk activities: 
a readiness for action
The video recording allows us to consider how non-talk activities mediate the
sequential organization of interaction in the airline cockpit. By including details of
non-talk activities, the transcription reveals their relative timing to talk as the two
communicative modes emerge together to construct a trajectory of actions. We
see evidence of an orientation to a state of readiness for action. One pilot (the PF)
calls for particular actions, and the other pilot (the PNF) responds in a manner
that minimizes delay for his contribution, the non-talk activities for the action and
subsequent talk to claim completion of those activities. That is, the data show a
moment-to-moment readiness by the recipient (the PNF) to interpret particular
talk for its significance for initiating an action sequence and, specifically, for what
it demands of him, as the recipient, as a relevant response. The PNF is ready 
to hear the PF’s talk as a cue for his own next conduct, a cue for him to act in
particular ways.
The part of the segment where non-talk activities are clear on the video is where












































(2) PF: flaps ten thanks::,
(3) (5.6) = (0 > 0.2 > 5.6)
↑
((click sound from movement of flaps lever))
(4) PNF: -kay: you’ve got flaps ten.
(5) (39.3)
(6) PF: gear down thanks,
↑
(6a) PNF: ((raisesleft hand from leg, moves hand towards gear lever))
↑
(6b) PNF: ((lowers gear lever))
(7) (13.0)
(8) PNF: a:nd down four greens.
(9) (9.5)
(10) PF: flaps twentyfi:ve ERP go-around º thanksº .
↑
(10a) PNF: ((left hand on flaps lever, moves hand
to ERP button))
(11) (6.0) = (0 > 0.2 > 6.0)
↑
(11a) PNF: ((pushes ERP button))
(12) PNF flaps: (.) twentyfive,
(13) (3.4)
(14) PF: checks thanks,
I’ll comment generally first. We can see that at this stage of the flight the pilots
understand that the purpose of the PF’s talk is to initiate relevant actions, each
one involving some non-talk activity by the PNF (e.g. moving a lever, pushing a
button), and then some associated talk from the PNF to claim the action as
complete, and so claim to have performed the relevant non-talk activity to make
it so. We know this because it is what the pilots do, and each pilot treats his own
and the other’s contributions as unremarkable. That is, neither pilot does or says
anything to suggest that his own or the other’s contribution was in any way worthy
of mention as surprising or inappropriate. The sequence of talk and activities 
here constitute a form of agreement between the pilots that this is how things are
done to land an airliner. The actions are performed in strict order, with the exact
timing at the discretion of the PF. Separating the different actions called for by
the PF, there are substantial periods without talk: a little over 39 seconds (line
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--
between the PNF’s call of the last action being completed (line 12) and the PF’s
call for the landing checklist to begin (line 14).
The data show that the PNF is oriented to minimizing delay for his contribution
to the conduct of the actions, and that this is an important part of the way the
pilots organize their work as sequenced actions. Procedures dictate that the PNF
cannot begin non-talk activity for some action until the action is called for by the
PF and, indeed, procedures dictate that the PNF cannot wait by resting his hand
on a relevant lever or button. However, what we see is that the timing of the
PNF’s responses is strong evidence that the PNF is, indeed, poised ready to
respond, and that such readiness is characteristic, or even a constituent feature,
of the PNF’s contributions for this stage of the flight, and the sequential organi-
zation of the pilots’ work. The timing is evidence of the PNF’s understanding of
the significance of the PF’s talk for initiating his own contributions in the sequences
of talk and activity for different actions.
I’ll turn to the data. In lines 2 and 3 we see that for the action to set flaps to
position ten, a click sound indicating movement of the flaps lever can be heard
just 0.2 seconds after the PF calls for this action with ‘flaps ten thanks::,’. This
timing strongly suggests that the PNF began moving his hand (towards the lever)
during the PF’s talk calling for the action. This is precisely what the PNF does for
the action to lower the landing gear, for which the video recording is more
revealing. We see that the PNF begins to raise his left hand from his leg, and move
it to the gear lever, immediately after the PF finishes saying ‘gear’ and begins to
say ‘down’ (lines 6, 6a and 6b). The PNF’s hand is in position on the lever, and
lowers the lever, as the PF ends his talk by saying ‘thanks,’. This timing enables
the PNF to complete the activity of moving the lever to lower the gear as the 
PF completes his turn at talk to call for this activity, and immediately after the PF
has said the two critical words for the action, ‘gear down’. So the word ‘gear’ is
trigger enough for the PNF to act on an understanding that the PF is calling 
for the gear to be lowered. The PNF completes the action by producing talk to
claim that the gear is lowered and locked in place. For the action to move the flaps
again, this time to position twenty-five, when the PNF comes into view his left
hand, previously resting on his leg, is already at the flaps lever as the PF ends 
his talk with ‘thanks’ (lines 10 and 10a). Again, the PNF has begun to move his
hand towards the relevant lever, to perform the required activity, as the PF
produces the talk to call for that activity. The PNF is therefore able immediately
to perform the last action, pushing the ERP button (line 11a) to select required
engine power (‘go-around’), just 0.2 of a second into the subsequent 6.0 second
silence after the PF’s talk.
The timing suggests that part of accomplishing the sequentiality of action is a
readiness to perform relevant non-talk activity immediately it is called for, and so











































does not move his hand to the required lever until after the PF has uttered relevant
wording to call for this, but does so immediately such wording appears. Even 
after what in ordinary conversation would be lengthy periods of silence, the PNF
is able to use just the opening word or words of the PF’s talk, not the whole 
turn, as the cue to begin the relevant next contribution, some non-talk activity by
him. The PNF orients to a sense of immediacy in carrying out his contributions,
his talk and non-talk activities, for the called-for actions. In short, what the
segment here shows is that if you are helping to land an airliner, and you are asked
to do something, you do it as soon as you can, even to the point of doing it as it
is asked for.
Conclusion: the use of prosody and timing to construct
and distinguish between action sequences
Much of what pilots say and do to fly and land their plane is required of them,
mediated by formal manuals of procedures and wordings, including checklists.
Actually realizing these requirements in situ, in real time on actual flights, is
further mediated by non-talk activities such as moving levers and pushing 
buttons, and information from visual displays and critical sounds. I have consid-
ered these forms of mediation by examining in micro-detail processes of talk-
in-interaction for pilots’ sequential organization of actions to land their plane. 
I discussed the use of prosody to construct and distinguish between action
sequences, and evidence of a readiness for action, a particular orientation for
precise timing of non-talk activities relative to another’s talk. We have seen how
the sequential organization of actions is accomplished to produce an entirely
smooth and unremarkable landing. The pilots draw on and coordinate various
interactional resources, different communicative modes (Norris, 2004b), to make
relevant and timely contributions and so manage, perform, and understand,
simultaneously, smaller and larger sequences of action. In this way we can begin
to see how professional knowledge and expertise in the airline cockpit is 
enacted as experience. We see precisely how pilots create and live their work as 
pilots’ work.
I do not claim that what we see here is what all pilots always do, but we can
treat the data as informative, as representative of how pilots do their work,
because the pilots themselves treat their contributions as typical, as unremarkable
and unproblematic. Central to analyses in ethnomethodology and conversation
analysis is the focus on seeing how the participants themselves interpret and
understand what is going on. Although pilots may perform thousands of landings
in the course of a working life, each and every landing must be accomplished, as
Anderson et al. (1989: 143) put it, as ‘yet another one, first time through,’ ‘here










































You always have to land 43
Transcription notation
The transcription notation used here is adapted from a system originally developed
by conversation analyst Gail Jefferson. Recent variations of the system can be
found in Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) or ten Have (1999).
PF Pilot-Flying
PNF Pilot-Not-Flying
>four< Talk that is noticeably faster than surrounding talk
a:nd Lengthening of a sound. The longer the sound the greater 
the number of colons used
º thanksº Talk that is quieter than surrounding talk
five Talk that is louder than surrounding talk
. Falling pitch
, Slightly rising pitch, talk that sounds incomplete
(3.4), (0.3) Silence measured in seconds and tenths of seconds
(.) Silence of less than a fifth of a second i.e. less than (0.2)
((click sound)) Description of contextual features e.g. sounds other than 
talk
((moves hand)) (in bold) description of non-talk activity
↑ Arrows point upwards to the precise point in talk or silence 
where non-talk activity or event occurs
Notes
1 I thank Sigrid Norris and Rodney Jones for helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this chapter, and special thanks to Sigrid for suggesting some initial directions. This
paper was completed with funding support from the Faculty of Arts at the Australian
National University, and for this opportunity I thank Adam Shoemaker (Dean) and Ian
Chubb (Vice-Chancellor).
2 For this data I am immensely grateful to Skywest Airlines of Western Australia, and
especially to the captains and crews who welcomed me aboard. I alone am entirely
responsible for all transcriptions, interpretations and findings from the recordings.
3 We can think of the larger or higher-level action sequence as the ‘landing sequence,’
which includes the actions below as well as others (such as controlling speed, and













































questions and mini projects
Questions for discussion
1 Based on the ways Scollon and Nevile use the concept of the mediated
action, how do you think adopting action as the unit of analysis changes
the way we see discourse? What are some of the challenges or
difficulties of approaching discourse in this way?
2 According to Scollon, our common ways of speaking about actions often
blind us to the different levels (or timescales) on which actions take
place. He also suggests that ways of talking about actions often have
ideological underpinnings. Can you think of an example of how the
ways we speak of actions can limit the ways we see them and how this
might have ideological implications?
3 Scollon suggests that our actions are ‘entrained’ to different temporal
cycles. How do these cycles affect the kinds of actions being taken and
the relationship between actions entrained to one cycle and actions
entrained to another? Give examples.
4 Nevile shows how people use various communicative resources as they
work together to organize larger and smaller sequences of action. What
are some of these resources and how are they used to organize actions
along different temporal cycles?
Mini projects
1 Choose a particular everyday action that you carry out and delineate
how all six pace-makers that Scollon describes in his chapter are
integrated within your own performance of that action.
2 Transcribe 20 seconds of videotaped interaction and show how many
sequences and layers of action you can differentiate, following Nevile’s










































































































































































Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
All human actions are carried out through what mediated discourse analysts 
call mediational means. Wertsch (1998) divides mediational means into two types:
‘technical tools,’ consisting of material objects like a pole-vaulter’s pole, a
typewriter keyboard, or a microphone; and what Vygotsky (1981: 137) refers 
to as ‘psychological tools’: ‘language; various systems for counting; mnemonic
techniques; algebraic symbol systems; works of art; writing; schemes, diagrams,
maps, and mechanical drawings; (and) all sorts of conventional signs.’ Wertsch
insists, however, that all mediational means, whether technological or psycho-










































Mediational means: Physical and psychological ‘objects’ that mediate
between agents and their social worlds.
Semiotic means through which mediated actions are
carried out.
A class of objects that can be appropriated within a
practice.
Carriers of social, cultural and historical formations
that amplify certain social actions and limit others.
The dialectical relationship between objects in the
world and social practices associated with these
objects appropriated within the habitus of the user.
‘Objects’ characterized by polyfocality, intertextuality
and interdiscursivity.
material expression in the physical world in the form of written texts and acoustic
signals. At the same time, all mediational means are also essentially psychological
and ‘semiotic;’ that is, they exist simultaneously in the world and in the minds of
their users or, to use Bourdieu’s (1977) term, in their habitus. Just as psychological
tools are made material through texts, utterances, practices, and identities,
material tools are integrated into psychological representations of social practices
in the user’s habitus. In fact, it is only through being appropriated into the habitus
as parts of social practices that objects become mediational means, as they arise as
a codification or materialization of social practices (Scollon, 2001a).
According to Scollon (2001a: 14), ‘mediational means are neither external
objects nor internal psychological constructs alone, but rather represent a dialect-
ical relationship between objective materiality and psychological or intramental
process.’ Rather than being ‘a class of objects in the world,’ he writes, they are
essentially ‘representations of objects . . . as integrated within specific practices
in the habitus.’ Understanding mediational means, therefore, requires taking both
the socio-cultural histories of our habitus and the socio-cultural histories of
mediational means into account.
Mediational means are also carriers of social structures, histories, and ideologies
in as much as they manifest certain patterns of affordances and constraints
concerning the actions that can be taken through their use. All mediational means
amplify certain kinds of actions and limit others. A microphone, for example,
allows its user to make their voice heard over a great distance and by a large
number of people, but it limits their ability to speak privately or intimately with
particular individuals or to conceal potentially embarrassing asides. At the same
time, however, the constraints and affordances embodied in mediational means
are not entirely deterministic of what users can do with them. Mediational 
means are, by their very nature, ‘multifunctional’ and ‘polysemic,’ open to
appropriation into a wide range of practices outside of their normative uses within
– and in combination with – other mediational means (Scollon, 2000). Thus,
limitations imposed by tools can often be overcome through recontextualizing
them or purposefully mixing them with other tools that offer different configur-
ations of constraints and affordances. In this way, while mediational means
transform social actions, social actions also transform mediational means.
A final important concept in considering mediational means concerns their
ontogenesis, or how objects become mediational means through the process of 
what Scollon calls technologization. Technologization is essentially a social process 
by which objects are integrated into recognizable social practices that are used 
to enact recognizable social identities. The technologization of cultural tools,
therefore, is the basis for the creation of communities and institutions ( Jones,
2001). Technologization subsequently gives rise to standardization (Scollon, 2000),










































50 Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
that not only does their use signal ‘membership,’ but failure to use them or their
‘misuse’ provokes social disapproval.
In the following three chapters Wertsch, McIlvenny and Raudaskoski, and van
Leeuwen approach the concept of mediational means from different angles.
In Chapter 6 Wertsch explores the complex relationship between tools in the
world and tools as they are appropriated into practices within the habitus of users.
Building on the work of Vygotsky (1986), he develops the concepts of explicit and
implicit mediation; that is, mediation that occurs using material tools and mediation
that occurs using representations within the habitus of users.
In Chapter 7 McIlvenny and Raudaskoski take up the examination of the tension
between the ideological projects embedded in mediational means and the agendas
that users bring to their use. They explore the use of the internet in the practices
of transnational adoption, enumerating the various mediational means available 
to prospective parents and to adoption authorities, demonstrating how actors 
mix and adapt these tools to fit particular purposes and how the affordances and
constraints embodied in the tools and in the circumstances of their use have
consequences for the kinds of identities and relationships made possible.
The study of mediational means demands the development of a multi-
modal approach to semiotics, and it is to this that van Leeuwen’s contribution 
in Chapter 8 turns. Exploring the ways traditional strategies for analyzing genres
can be applied to multimodal texts, van Leeuwen points out how the ‘reading










































Introducing mediational means/cultural tools 51
6 Vygotsky’s two approaches
to mediation
JamesV. Wertsch
Tracing the intellectual ancestry of mediated discourse analysis is both fascinating
and challenging.1 Indeed, there may be almost as many genealogies as there are
individuals who set out to trace them. There are, however, a few figures whose
place in this story is undisputed, and Lev Semënovich Vygotsky (1896–1934) is
one of them. While not employing all the key terms found in contemporary
writings, Vygotsky did address many of the issues raised by this field of study. A
useful way to start when trying to understand how he fits into today’s discussions
is to examine his interpretation of its two basic terms: ‘mediation’ and ‘discourse.’
Vygotsky’s claims about mediation (‘oposredstvovanie’) were explicit and ran
throughout his writings. Indeed, it has been argued that Vygotsky’s most unique
and important contributions came in connection with this issue (Wertsch, 1985b,
1991). As evidenced at several points in his writings, he seems to have recognized
this himself. In a lecture he gave near the end of his life, for example, he began
by saying that, ‘A central fact of our psychology is the fact of mediation’
(Vygotsky, 1982: 166).
But this is not something that surfaced only at the end of Vygotsky’s career. 
His focus on mediation, especially as it concerns ‘signs,’ or ‘psychological tools’ –
as opposed to ‘technical tools’ – is evident throughout his writings. For example,
in a 1930 report on ‘The Instrumental Method in Psychology,’ he described
psychological tools as ‘artificial formations . . . [that] are social, not organic or
individual’ (Vygotsky, 1981: 137) and went on to include under this heading:
‘language; various systems for counting; mnemonic techniques; algebraic symbol
systems; works of art; writing; schemes, diagrams, maps, and mechanical
drawings; all sorts of conventional signs’ (Vygotsky, 1981: 137).
Whereas Vygotsky clearly qualifies as a progenitor of mediated discourse
analysis with regard to mediation, the link with the notion of discourse is some-
what less direct. There is no single Russian term that obviously translates into
English as ‘discourse,’ at least at the time Vygotsky was writing (‘diskurs’ is a recent










































his focus on what we today call discourse is obvious on several counts. As was the
case for many other scholars of his day in Europe and the Soviet Union, Vygotsky’s
primary analytic focus was on speech (‘rech’’), or the use of language, as opposed
to the linguistic code in isolation from communicative action. This focus was 
the point of explicit formulation by some of Vygotsky’s contemporaries such 
as Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1981a) but, more important, it was part of 
the general framework that guided scholars of language and communication in 
his context.
The emphasis Vygotsky gave to this point – as well as the problems we have
sometimes had in appreciating this emphasis in the West – can be seen in the
curious story of the title of his best-known book in English, Thought and Language.
This was first published in 1962 by MIT Press and was a much abridged version 
of the Russian Myshlenie i Rech’, which appeared in 1934 (153 pages in English vs.
318 pages in Russian). It is possible to translate the Russian term ‘myshlenie’ as
‘thought,’ but its preferred rendering would be ‘thinking,’ especially in Vygotsky’s
writings. Another noun in Russian, ‘mysl’,’ shares the same root with ‘myshlenie’
and readily translates as ‘thought.’ Indeed, Vygotsky used ‘mysl’’ in the title of
Chapter 7 of Myshlenie I Rech’, where it usually – and appropriately – is translated
as ‘thought.’ Rendering both Russian terms as ‘thought’ reduces the possibility of
recognizing the contrast Vygotsky often made when using them. This contrast
consists of the fact that the meaning of ‘myshlenie’ emphasizes the notion of an
activity or process, whereas ‘mysl’’ does not, instead having more of a connotation
of entity.
While it may be understandable how two terms sharing the same root in Russian
could be rendered in English as ‘thought,’ things stand somewhat differently 
when it comes to the term ‘language’ in the English translation of Vygotsky’s 1934
classic. The Russian equivalent of ‘language’ is ‘yazyk,’ a term that can also be
translated as ‘tongue.’ This noun shares nothing in common with ‘rech’,’ the term
in Vygotsky’s title that has been translated as ‘language.’ Instead, ‘rech’’ is clearly
to be translated as ‘speech,’ ‘speaking,’ or even ‘discourse.’
Perhaps even more so than in the case of ‘thought,’ then, the emphasis that
Vygotsky placed on action and process is missing in the use of ‘language’ in the
English title Thought and Language. It is only in Norris Minick’s complete 1987
translation of Vygotsky’s volume that the terms ‘thinking’ and ‘speech’ are used
in the title. This is not to question the quality of the translation in general of any
of the MIT editions. Virtually every translator that has been involved has been
accurate in using ‘speech’ and ‘thinking’ in the main body of the work.
So why the tendency to use ‘thought’ instead of ‘thinking’ and ‘language’
instead of ‘speech’ in the title of Vygotsky’s most important book? And is it, after
all, so misleading? I believe that the answers to these questions are to be found in










































Vygotsky’s two approaches to mediation 53
sort of emphasis on utterance, as opposed to sentence, and on ‘metalinguistics,’
as opposed to linguistics, as Bakhtin went to such lengths to set out, was not part
of the Western, or at least US, mainstream study of language in 1962 when
Vygotsky’s book first appeared in English. As a result, I suspect that the focus 
on process was lost as part of an attempt to draw more readers to this text. This
suspicion stems from experiences I have had with publishers as they sought to find
titles that would appeal to American readers by using existing professional
terminology.
However, the vibrant context provided by today’s scholarly communities 
in mediated discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and associated fields
make it possible to revisit Vygotsky’s writings from a new perspective. And it is
likely that if Myshlenie i Rech’ were being translated now, the title might be some-
thing like Thinking and Discourse, a rendering that, in my view, always would have
been closer to the spirit of the original. With this as background, I wish to turn
to an explication of the central concept of mediation in Vygotsky’s writings.
Vygotsky’s two perspectives on mediation
During the last decade of his life – the period during which he worked as a
psychologist and lived primarily in Moscow – Vygotsky focused on different
aspects of mediation. From this period of frenetic activity one can find countless
lectures and publications that touch on the issue in one way or another, and it
might appear that a set of disparate, even contradictory ideas emerged. I believe,
however, that order can be found in this by drawing a distinction between two
basic kinds of mediation.
The distinction I have in mind has as much to do with the varying disciplinary
lenses through which Vygotsky approached the world as with actual objective
differences between forms of mediation. He was busy during this period speaking
to psychologists, teachers, and professionals concerned with handicapped popula-
tions, and in doing so he employed a professional language of the psychology and
physiology of his day, a form of speaking that qualifies as what Bakhtin (1986)
called a ‘social language.’ At the same time, however, Vygotsky continued to
employ the theoretical framework and social language he had acquired in his 
early study of semiotics, poetics, and literary theory. These two social languages
need not be viewed as entirely distinct or ‘mutually unintelligible,’ but in many
instances they led Vygotsky to take somewhat different perspectives on issues such
as mediation. The result was two perspectives on mediation.
When employing the first of these social languages, Vygotsky spoke in the idiom
of psychology, especially what we would today view as a form of behaviorism, or
perhaps cognitivism, to come up with an account of what might be called ‘explicit










































54 James V. Wertsch
explicit in the sense that an individual or another person who is directing this
individual overtly and intentionally introduces a ‘stimulus means’ into an ongoing
stream of activity. And second, it is explicit in the sense that the materiality of 
the stimulus means, or psychological tools, involved tends to be obvious and 
non-transitory.
In contemporary research, various forms of explicit mediation have been
studied in analyses of ‘distributed cognition’ (Hutchins, 1995a; Salomon, 1993).
Hutchins (1995b) examines human agents’ uses of various ‘sociotechnical systems’
to organize their memory and cognitive processes. For example, in an analysis of
‘how a cockpit remembers its speeds,’ he makes an explicit call for cognitive
science to go beyond its focus on isolated individuals and to take into account the
role of cultural tools such as airplane gauges and instruments in human mental
functioning. While this instance seems quite removed from some of the forms of
explicit mediation Vygotsky studied, it clearly qualifies under this heading.
Standing in contrast to explicit mediation is ‘implicit mediation,’ which tends
to be less obvious and hence more difficult to detect. The distinction does not
apply in an ironclad or simple way when trying to sort out kinds of mediation.
Indeed, the issue often has more to do with the theoretical notions Vygotsky
employed than with objective difference between forms of mediation themselves.
Under the heading of what I am calling implicit mediation I particularly have
in mind Vygotsky’s discussions of the role of social and inner speech in mediating
human consciousness. Because of the ephemeral and fleeting nature of these forms
of mediation, they are often ‘transparent’ (or invisible) to the casual observer and
are hence less easily taken as objects of conscious reflection or manipulation.
Furthermore, implicit mediation in the form of social and inner speech involves a
cultural tool that is an inherent part of many forms of human action and hence
does not need to be artificially and intentionally introduced into it.
The distinction between explicit and implicit mediation makes it possible to
disambiguate what otherwise might appear to be a very mixed, if not confused set
of ideas in Vygotsky’s writings. Without it, one can easily end up arguing at cross
purposes when discussing his ideas with others because the two forms of media-
tion operate in different ways and have different implications for how we can
understand and intervene in human social and mental processes.
Explicit mediation
Comments about what I am calling explicit mediation can be found at many points
in the writings of Vygotsky and of his students and colleagues. For example, it
provided the foundation of his method for studying the development of concepts
(e.g. Vygotsky, 1987: Chapters 5 and 6), as well as for studying memory










































Vygotsky’s two approaches to mediation 55
in research he conducted in Vygotsky’s laboratory (cf. Leont’ev, 1932; Vygotsky,
1978: 38–51).
In general, the notion of intentional, explicit mediation falls under the heading
of what Vygotsky called the ‘functional method of dual stimulation,’ a notion he
outlined in Chapter 5 of Thinking and Speech on ‘An Experimental Study of Concept
Development.’ There, he wrote:
In using this method, we study the development and activity of the higher
mental functions with the aid of two sets of stimuli. These two sets of stimuli
fulfill different roles vis-à-vis the subject’s behavior. One set of stimuli fulfills
the function of the object on which the subject’s activity is directed. The
second function as signs that facilitate the organization of this activity.
(Vygotsky, 1987: 127)
In studies involving dual stimulation Vygotsky’s basic procedure was to
encourage subjects to use a set of artificial stimuli, or signs, signs that were overtly
introduced into a subject’s activity by an experimenter. For example, in the
Forbidden Colors Task, subjects engaged in a task requiring them to remember a
list of color terms. They were given a set of colored cards and told that these cards
could help them remember what color terms they had already used. In this case,
the first set of stimuli, which ‘fulfill the function of the object on which the
subject’s activity is directed,’ was the set of color terms used by the subjects as
they responded to the experimenter’s questions. The second set of stimuli that
were to function ‘as signs that facilitate the organization of this activity’ were the
colored cards introduced by the experimenter.
These colored cards were explicitly introduced by the experimenter as a second
set of stimuli (i.e. ‘signs’) into an ongoing task setting that already involved the
first set of stimuli, and the basic aim of the study was to document how children
use these signs more effectively with age. Most 5- and 6-year-olds did not seem
to realize that the signs being offered by the experimenter had anything to do with
their performance on the task, whereas 10- to 13-year-olds clearly did. The
developmental path involved is one that moves from a point where the stimuli had
very little meaning and hence efficacy to a point where subjects came to appreciate
their significance for organizing their performance.
The fact that understanding these results involves understanding how the stimuli
took on more and more meaning with age suggests that we are not speaking of
stimuli in any strict sense at all. After all, the language of stimuli and responses –
at least in the Western behaviorist tradition – is intended to make it possible to
avoid issues such as meaning and mind. So why did Vygotsky formulate his ideas
in this manner? It seems to me that at least part of the answer to this lies in the











































56 James V. Wertsch
Implicit mediation
Claims and assumptions about what I am calling implicit mediation emerge at
numerous points throughout Vygotsky’s writings, but perhaps the most elaborated
version can be found in Chapter 7 of Thinking and Speech, a text he completed near
the end of his life. The title of this chapter is ‘Thought and Word’ (‘Mysl’ i Slovo’).
(Following the practices used by translators of some of Bakhtin’s works (Holquist
and Emerson, 1981), this chapter title could also be rendered as ‘Thought and
Discourse’.)
The two terms in this chapter title represent two poles of an opposition in
Vygotsky’s view. He formulated this opposition in order to highlight a conceptual
problem he saw in much of the existing literature on thinking and speech. This
was the problem that in ‘nearly all studies of thinking and speech . . . [there is a]
tendency to view thought and word as two independent and isolated elements’
(Vygotsky, 1987: 243–244). His account of verbal thinking – an account in which
opposition, tension, and dialectic characterized the relationship between the two
terms – was an attempt to overcome this problem.
In his critique of the kind of false and misleading isolation of thought and word
that he saw in the research of his day, Vygotsky proposed taking ‘word meaning’
as a unit of analysis, something that allows us to recognize that it is ‘a phenomenon
of both speech and intellect’ (Vygotsky, 1987: 244). Throughout this chapter
Vygotsky emphasized the need to focus on the dialectic between thought and
word, or discourse. He viewed this dialectic as a sort of developmental struggle
and asserted that this was ‘the primary result of this work [and] . . . the conceptual
center of our investigation’ (Vygotsky, 1987: 245). In his view, ‘The discovery
that word meaning changes and develops is our new and fundamental contribution
to the theory of thinking and speech’ (Vygotsky, 1987: 245).
Vygotsky saw this claim about the developmental relationship between thought
and word as applying to ‘microgenetic,’ as well as ontogenetic processes, a point
that is reflected in his assertion that word meaning ‘changes during the child’s
development and with different modes of functioning of thought’ (Vygotsky, 1987:
249). Regardless of which ‘genetic domain’ (Wertsch, 1985) is at issue, the general
picture Vygotsky presented was one in which thought is posited to be an inchoate,
‘fused, unpartitioned whole’ (Vygotsky, 1987: 251) that comes into contact with
words, which involve generalization and discrete, sequential representation.
With regard to the latter realm, Vygotsky posited ‘two planes of speech’ and
argued that ‘the inner, meaningful, semantic aspect of speech is associated with 
different laws of movement than its external, auditory aspect’ (Vygotsky, 1987:
250). This provided the foundation for an account of inner speech that was used by
Luria (1975), Akhutina (1975), and others in their analyses of ‘dynamic aphasia.’
The general line of reasoning is one in which inner speech, with its peculiar 










































Vygotsky’s two approaches to mediation 57
organization of external, auditory speech, but even so, inner speech imposes the
first round of segmentation and sequential organization on thought as it makes its
way to overt expression.
In Chapter 7 of Thinking and Speech, then, the story line is one in which two
forms of representation collide and mutually transform one another. One form –
‘thought’ (‘mysl’’) – is relatively inchoate, fused, unpartitioned, and nonsequential,
and the other – ‘word,’ or ‘discourse’ (‘slovo’) introduces segmentation and
sequencing. For my purposes, what is important in all this is that the mediation
involved is not explicit, that is, not the object of conscious reflection and not
externally or intentionally introduced. Instead, mediation is something that is
necessarily and automatically built into mental and communicative functioning 
as a result of using language.
When developing this line of reasoning, Vygotsky was heavily indebted to one
of his mentors, Gustav Gustavovich Shpet (1879–1937). In Chapter 7 of Thinking
and Speech Vygotsky did not cite Shpet (although he did cite him in earlier work),
but the reason for this omission is almost certainly political in nature. As outlined
by authors such as Martsinkovskaya (1996), Nemeth (1997), and Zinchenko
(2000), Shpet’s problems with Soviet authorities, problems that would eventually
lead to his brutal interrogation and execution in 1937, were already starting to
emerge in the early 1930s. Recent accounts of Vygotsky’s political acumen by
Cole and Levitin (in press) make it clear that he would have been aware of what
was – and was not – permissible in the atmosphere of the early 1930s in the USSR.
In any event, we know that as a student Vygotsky attended Shpet’s seminars
for two years (Vygodskaya and Lifanova, 1996), and the themes that were
discussed there undoubtedly included those outlined by Shpet in his writings,
especially in his 1927 monograph The Inner Form of the Word: Studies and Variations
on a Humboldtian Theme.
Building on the conceptual groundwork laid by Wilhelm von Humboldt, Shpet
emphasized that:
Language is not completed action, ‘ergon,’ but protracted activity, ‘energeia,’
that is, as Humboldt explained, ‘the perpetually repeated work of the spirit,
directed at making articulate sound the means for expressing thought.’ . . .
Synthesis in this case does not consist of tying together two abstracted units:
pure thought and pure sound, but two members of a unified concrete
structure, two terms of relationship: object oriented sense content . . . and
the external form of its verbal expression-embodiment . . . in sensory
perceptible forms. These forms are transformed through a relation to sense
from natural forms combined in the ‘thing’ to social signification specifically











































58 James V. Wertsch
Shpet’s constant insistence on language as activity is quite consistent with
Vygotsky’s primary focus on speech, as opposed to language. And Shpet’s argu-
ment that the dialectic or synthesis involved is not between pure thought and pure
sound is consistent with Vygotsky’s critique of investigators who mistakenly
viewed ‘thought and word as two independent and isolated elements.’ Instead of
focusing on such elements as if they can be considered separately, Vygotsky, like
Shpet, insisted on examining them as part of a unit of analysis that is inherently
developmental, complex, and dynamic. In Vygotsky’s terms:
This central idea . . . can be expressed in the following general formula: The
relationship of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a movement from
thought to word and from word to thought. Psychological analysis indicates
that this relationship is a developing process which changes as it passes through
a series of stages . . . The movement of thinking from thought to word is a
developmental process.
(Vygotsky, 1987: 250)
Vygotsky’s most detailed comments on how this developmental process occurs
appear in his analysis of inner speech, where his indebtedness to Shpet is clearly
evident. In some instances the parallels are striking, and it appears that Vygotsky
borrowed large segments of Shpet’s ideas wholesale. However, the latter’s analysis
of the inner form of the word (vnutrennyaya forma slova) is not identical to
Vygotsky’s account of inner speech (vnutrennyaya rech’). Shpet was a hermeneutic
phenomenologist dedicated to working out a set of problems whose roots were
in Husserl and Humboldt. Although Vygotsky was clearly aware of the ideas of all
these figures, he often transformed them in the service of research and practice in
schools, clinics, and the psychological laboratory.
A somewhat clearer idea of how Shpet and Vygotsky agreed and disagreed can
be gleaned from the following summary provided by the former of what he had
in mind when analyzing the inner form of the word:
We take the following . . . as a guiding definition [of inner form]: (1) negative
definition: The inner form is not a perceptible sound form, and it is also not
a form of thinking itself, understood abstractly, and it is not a form of an
object that constitutes the thinking content that is a modification of being –
an object that would also be understood abstractly; (2) positive definition:
Instead, the inner form uses a sound form to designate objects and to connect
thoughts according to the demands of concrete thinking. In this process it uses
external form to mark some modification of a thinking or objective content,
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This characterization of the inner form of the word outlines a conceptual space
between external speech on the one hand, and abstract thought or motive on the
other, that in certain respects is strikingly similar to Vygotsky’s account of inner
speech. In particular, the ‘negative definition’ outlines a set of issues that both
authors used as a way to set their claims off from those of other theorists of 
the time. At the same time, however, there remain some important differences
between the two theorists, differences that reflect the divergent theoretical
foundations and research goals. Vygotsky focused on developing an account of basic
mental processes that occur across cultural contexts. Indeed, he and others in his
group of colleagues and students often tended to view cultural differences as
variation related to different stages of development in a universal Enlightenment
project. As I have outlined elsewhere (Wertsch, 1996), Vygotsky often was
ambivalent about this project, but it nonetheless crept into his writings at many
points, including his account of inner speech.
In contrast, Shpet’s account of the inner form of the word was much more
heavily indebted to Humboldt’s Romantic project of understanding cultural
difference. As a result, he tended to focus on how the inner form of the word and
of a language distinguish one group from another. Extending his notions of how
language must be considered as a process rather than object, he argued that, ‘One
can view language not only as a substance, but as a subject, not only as a thing, or
product, but as a production process, as energy’ (Shpet, 1996: 78).
From this perspective, the inner form of a language is not an inert object wait-
ing to be used by active agents, but has a sort of agency itself. This organismic
approach to language lies behind Shpet’s (1996: 79) account of the creation and
maintenance of different speech communities:
The language of a nation, just as the language of any more or less well formed
social formation – a class, profession, work or trade group, the language of
the courtyard or market, and so forth – similar to an individual language, is
a fact of ‘natural’ speech of a national, dialect, and so forth. The special nature
of this is part of the context of general socio-historical conditions of a given
social formation. These define a given form of speech as a ‘thing’ among




As is the case for other theorists whose work was frenetic and generative,
Vygotsky’s style was not to present and stick with simple, concrete definitions 










































60 James V. Wertsch
considerations stemming from theory and practice over his career. And he was
‘polyphonic’ in the sense of speaking to different professional and disciplinary
groups.
The result of all this is that the central concept of mediation has at least two
different interpretations in his writings. These are what I have dubbed ‘explicit’
and ‘implicit’ mediation. The former was often the topic of Vygotsky’s writings
in psychology and pedagogy and involves conscious, externally introduced forms
of mediation such as the color chips used in the ‘Forbidden Colors Task.’ This is
a notion of mediation that continues to play a role in contemporary discussions 
of instructional practice and of distributed cognition.
In contrast, Vygotsky’s treatment of implicit mediation was part of his
discussion of speech, especially inner speech. In this case, the cultural tools used
to mediate human action are not consciously or externally introduced, but follow
from the use of human language. The notion of implicit mediation in Vygotsky’s
writings owes a great deal to the writings of Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, but the
two authors’ analyses diverge on some important points.
The major reason for introducing the distinction between explicit and implicit
mediation is to disambiguate some of the diverse strands of Vygotsky’s conceptual
work. When drawing on him as one of the intellectual progenitors of mediated
discourse analysis, it is increasingly important to differentiate his various claims to
avoid bogus and unnecessary arguments about how he did or did not contribute
to today’s ongoing discussion in this vibrant intellectual enterprise.
Note
1 The writing of this chapter was assisted by a grant from the Spencer Foundation. The
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7 Mediating discourses of
transnational adoption on
the internet
Paul McIlvenny and Pirkko Raudaskoski
Transnational (or intercountry) adoption is a global phenomenon with a diverse
range of practices which are increasingly under scrutiny. Notable differences are
found in practices across both ‘sending’ countries (such as China, Columbia, India,
South Africa and South Korea, and ‘receiving’ countries (such as Denmark,
Finland, the US, the UK, Canada and Australia) (Selman, 2000). In this chapter,
we focus on transnational adoption in Denmark and English-speaking countries,
primarily the US. The Scandinavian countries have signed the Hague Convention
(1993), an international agreement on transnational adoption, and in those
countries the adoption process is thoroughly regulated at all stages by the state. 
A few private agencies exist but they must be fully accredited – for example, by
the Danish Ministry of Justice in Denmark. Countries such as the US have a much
more liberalized ‘market’ with less state regulation, so private sector agencies and
lawyers flourish to facilitate parent-initiated adoptions (Dorow, 2002; Williams,
1994). The result is that quite different discourses are mobilized that are 
often more legalistic, individualistic and parent-centered. In both cases though,
the prospective adopter(s) is/are an intense site of inspection, an intersection 
of a broad range of medical, judicial, educational, psychological and linguistic
practices.
Increasingly, adopters have been using the internet to prepare for and monitor
the adoption process and to publish accounts of their experiences. Our goal in this
chapter is to document some of the ways in which mediational means are appro-
priated or contested in virtual spaces and the social consequences of these
appropriations. Our case study focuses particularly on the discourses of adoption
and the mediated actions of adoptive parents prior to their first contact with 
the adopted child.
Research studies of transnational adoption are increasingly common, but come
predominantly from psychological, psycho-social or social welfare perspectives.
In contrast, we take a discourse studies approach that develops a theoretical and










































approaches to mediation, agency and action. With this approach we trace a host
of discourses and contingent practices that are heterogeneously assembled 
to ‘translate’ a child from one familial ‘place’ or nexus of practice in the world to
another, crossing linguistic, socio-cultural, racial, class and national boundaries.
Transnational adoption is a case in which nature and culture, child and actor, as
well as kinship and belonging, are clearly problematized in nexus of practice
(Howell, 1999). In particular, we focus on the crucial role of the internet and the
set of mediational means it makes available to prospective parents, specifically
their personal web pages and online diaries that anticipate the ‘transnational’
mobility of the ‘waiting’ child.
Mediated discourse analysis, actor-network theory
and virtual ethnography
MDA is a critical response to the dearth of research addressing, among other
things, the relations between discourse, practice, materiality and social action. It
also has the potential to provide a bridge between more sociologically based
theories of online behaviour such as actor-network theory (ANT) and virtual
ethnography and more textualist approaches to discourse, a bridge that promises
to yield a better understanding of ‘how the transformations from practice, action,
and habitus to person, characteristics, and identity is performed through discursive
practices and other practices of technologization and objectivization’ (R. Scollon,
2001b: 158).
ANT has radically transformed our understanding of actors, agency, mediation
and technology, providing a sustained challenge to any conception of ‘the social’
that is populated only by rational human actors (Latour, 1993, 1999). Following
the principle of symmetry, Callon (1991: 134) identifies an ‘intermediary’ as
‘anything passing between actors which defines the relationship between them’
while ‘an actor is an intermediary that puts other intermediaries into circulation’
(Callon, 1991: 141). Combining this performative relational perspective with
MDA’s focus on mediational means in social practices, we find a useful
methodological tool to track the circulation and assemblage of cultural tools across
sites of engagement.1
With our focus on the internet and the participation of adoptive parents, we
are conducting what could also be called a virtual ethnography (Hine, 2000). With
the recent development of the virtual and networked society, virtual ethnography
problematizes the distinction between, on the one hand, ‘the social’ as populated
by bounded locations and homogeneous groups who materially occupy the 
more ‘real’ offline world and, on the other, the immaterial ‘unreal’ online world.
Instead, Hine (2000), Shields (2003) and others reject this dichotomy between










































Mediating discourses of transnational adoption 63
proposes that we refocus on connectivity and develop ‘a sensitivity to the ways in
which place is performed and practised,’ and to the ‘mobility across a hetero-
geneous landscape and the differential engagements which this enables and
requires.’ We should investigate further the making and re-making of space and
time through mediated interactions. The internet, however, offers weak entry 
and exit points into the ‘community,’ and thus makes it difficult to produce an
ethnographically ‘thick’ description. Moreover, it is tricky to uncover the prac-
tices of ‘going online’ when communication practices and mediated actions are
de-contextualized, transient, distributed, asymmetric and mobile. Rather than
selecting a territory, the researcher has to identify a ‘virtual’ nexus of practice and
determine the important nodes and nodal events in the emerging social and discur-
sive network (see Latour, 2003 and his arguments for a sociology of association).
Strathern (1996) recommends that we follow connections in networks and see
where they are cut in practice to limit the infinite extension of those networks –
a methodological move that echoes that of nexus analysis (Scollon and Scollon,
2004). Thus, in this study, we attempt to follow the prospective adoptive parents,
traversing on- and offline, as they navigate through the complex networks and
processes of transnational adoption. At the same time, we map the ways in which
‘the child-to-be-adopted’ (adoptee) is scaled, remediated and resemiotized up
until the first physical contact between the adoptive parent(s) and the child.
Transnational adoption and the internet
Adoption agencies are increasingly using the internet to mediate their institutional
knowledge, practices and contacts with clients, and many prospective adopters
use the internet to garner information, advice and contacts to help them through
the adoption process and the institutional procedures.2 At this stage we are
interested in how adopters construct their websites, network with others locally
and internationally, orient to other sites or sources of information, share advice
and create ‘public goods,’ and narrate publicly their own personal experiences and
problems. In contrast to Slembrouck’s (2003: 105) study of the ‘native point of
view’ in child protection cases, it is clear that prospective adoptive parent(s) often
do make contact with each other and develop certain forms of ‘community’ over
and above the constitution of a group within the field of institutional and
professional practice.
The (minority of ) prospective adopters who start a website at some point in
the adoption process may do it in the so-called pre-pregnancy or pregnancy phases
(Howell, 2003), or it may even appear in the form of a travelogue (or ‘blog’)
during the trip to the sending country to pick up the child. Authors may continue
to update the website, for particular audiences; however, after a period of time










































64 Paul McIlvenny and Pirkko Raudaskoski
websites by the adoptive parents are constructed in ways that afford a variety of
different functions (cf. Karlsson, 2002), for example:
• as a ‘maternal archive’ (Berlant, 1997) or family ‘creation narrative’ (Freid-
lander, 1999), by which the child, at some future date, can ‘discover’ his or
her ‘origin’ story;
• as a ‘pedagogical resource,’ useful for other adoptive parents to ‘learn’ from;
• as a reflexive resource for the author(s);
• as a means to track in limited ways a social network or community of practice
(e.g. to link outside the website to other ‘waiting’ parents, web-rings,
discussion forms, etc.).
The home(page) is not so much a place/space, but consists of regular patterns
of activity and structures in time (Morley, 2000: 16). The practice of keeping
websites, and especially diaries, is part of a patterning, a nexus of practice 
(R. Scollon, 2001b), that also involves reporting on the home’s patterns and
structures. These websites can be ‘revisited’ by prospective adoptive parents, who
enter a territory in which ‘one can speak to the other without providing
background information. No footnotes are needed; from few words, much can be
understood’ (Heller, 1995: 6).
Analysis
The central experience and source of greatest anxiety for many prospective
adopters is the long process of gaining approval from the relevant authorities and,
thereafter, the experience of waiting for the allocation or referral of a specific child
and, if all goes well, for their first physical contact with that child. For those
couples or individuals who can browse the web or create their own websites, the
‘intimate public sphere’ (Anagnost, 2000; Berlant, 1997) of the internet can serve
as a forum for self-reflection on this temporal and affective process. We are
particularly interested in how cultural technologies such as diary journals and
waiting lists – and their diverse cycles, scales and trajectories – are maintained,
anticipated, aligned, translated and circulated by different actors in their virtual
practices and, thus, how different knowledges and agencies (e.g. institutional
versus ‘lay’) are mediated and translated. We are also interested in how social
actors themselves are resemiotized and deployed as cultural tools to enact and
reproduce the practices and identities associated with this ‘waiting.’
Adoption web diary or journal
One can find many personal websites on the internet in which prospective adopters
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production of the diary takes place at a ‘virtual’ site of engagement, in which
various mediational means are used to mediate the action of reporting on the past
day, week or month to an unknown or imagined audience (or community). This
results in a (special) object in the world, a website/diary that can then become a
mediational means for another action. Diary entries are treated by the author and
reader as sequential (and serial) objects (Mulkay, 1986; Silverman, 2001). For
example, each entry is accountable as ‘the next’ in a (dialogic) cumulative series.
Authors orient to the just prior entry as projecting expectations, which are
renegotiated in the current entry. Moreover, the rhythm of the diary entries
provides a kind of ‘common presence’ (see Morley, 2000: 18–19) for those
‘virtual audiences’ who follow as the drama of the diary unfolds.
In the web diaries, the adoptive parents orient to adoption as what one couple
call the ‘unknown territory’ [Dianne and Kasper: DK],3 about which they gather
information about adoption as an institutional and emotional process. When
reporting on the information gathering they engage in, including information
packages and meetings with the adoption agencies, the parents sometimes make
visible their knowledge about the institutional context. For instance, one parent
writes, ‘The book is totally based on the old legislation’ [Janne and Felix: DK].
The web is deemed an important source of information, to such an extent that
some feel that the adoption agencies’ information evenings are redundant. While
they are in the institutional process, the Danish parents often give accounts of the
obligatory courses they have participated in. It is interesting to see what is omitted
from their commentary. Racism, for example, has been accentuated in the oblig-
atory course for prospective adopters, but the parents seem to ignore it in their
web diaries and concentrate, instead, on the emotional side of being infertile, or
they just mention ‘a focus on the children and the problems one can expect to
have’ [Janne and Felix: DK]. What do receive a lot of attention are the video
recordings of selected orphanages that are shown in the course. Their emotional
reactions are reported; for example, ‘It is hard and I notice that I become very
much moved’ [Janne and Felix: DK].
Scaling the ‘child-to-be-adopted’ as a virtual ‘object’ or ‘actor’
In their study of the neonatal care work, Middleton and Brown (2001) argue that
‘what the neonate is – subject or object – is subject to continual negotiation.’ In
particular, this occurs through a phenomenon they call ‘scaling.’ This involves a
shift in how the ‘thing’ – the neonate – is rendered or made actual, which can
limit or enhance the scope of mediated action. We can usefully compare their
scenario with the distributed labor of managing the effective care and consequent
transfer of a child from one environment of (absent or temporary) care to another.










































66 Paul McIlvenny and Pirkko Raudaskoski
while under the care of an orphanage in a sending country is subject to continual
negotiation by social workers, carers, state officials, judges, adoption boards,
agency operators, etc. However, from the perspective of the prospective adopter
much of the work of adoption in the receiving country is to pre-figure the 
‘child-to-be-adopted’ and the ‘adoptive family’ before physical contact is made.
Prospective parents engage, and are engaged by, various institutions, in virtual
affective labor, for example to demonstrate paternal ‘desire’ (Telfer, 1999), all
of which renders the child in particular ways. Doctors who report on the child’s
health, however, render the child in other ways under different constraints (and
prospective parents can do likewise; see Cartwright, 2003). These are all examples
of ‘scaling’ the child. Hence, for instance, the child can be scaled down as a set of
medical symptoms or behavioral indicators on a medical record, or scaled up as a
social child – a complementary addition to a heteronormative family unit, or even
as a representative of a ‘race’ (e.g. ‘Asian adoptees’) or a member of a notional
kinship or national group (e.g. ‘our China girl’). Whichever scaling is negotiated,
the virtual ‘child’ circulates as an ‘intermediary’ with particular forms (or a lack)
of agency.
Another way of understanding this is that over time the ‘child-to-be-adopted’
is resemiotized (Iedema, 2003) or its properties are ‘shifted’ in, up or down. Iedema
states that ‘resemiotization is meant to provide the analytical means for (1) tracing
how semiotics are translated from one into the other as social processes unfold,
as well as for (2) asking why these semiotics (rather than others) are mobilized 
to do certain things at certain times’ (Iedema, 2003: 29). Latour (1999) refers to
‘shifting’ to designate the act of signification through which a text relates different
frames of reference to one another; that is, various actants – humans and non-
humans – manage a shift of properties and an exchange of values between different
representations (and mediational means). We are interested in how the ‘adopted
child’ and the ‘functioning adoptive family’ are ‘scaled,’ shifted,’ co-materialized
and resemiotized over time for practical purposes.
In some online diaries, at first the ‘child’ does not figure overtly at all, but the
adopters’ main interest lies in finding other people in a similar position: ‘We did
not know anybody who had adopted’ [Dianne and Kasper: DK]. A child is
mentioned for the first time in the following (early) diary entry which reports on
the same parents’ emotion (of relief ): ‘It was a very optimistic decision, and it
was a beautiful thought that there with certainty would come a child, after the
long time with uncertain IVF treatments.’ Even though ‘children’ are mentioned
later in this entry, they are scaled up as having a geographical location (the couple
did not want to adopt from Eastern Europe). Often, ‘children’ figure again in
connection with the adoption agencies, but they are almost routine objects of 
the verb ‘mediate.’ Thus, they are scaled up as a ‘business transaction’ that the
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consideration of the sending country, they explain the difficulty they have had in
choosing because their ‘first and foremost’ wish is ( just) ‘a child.’ Their neutral
stance is not absolute, however, since the child does have to come from a partic-
ular ‘sending’ country. In making a choice, the couple resorts to the countries
they have visited before or whose official language they know. What is interesting
is their main concern that the practicalities of the trip are an important factor in
their choice of the sending country, and thus the ‘virtual’ child is implicitly scaled
up as a member of a familiar nation or linguistic community.
The ‘functioning adoptive family’ is, at the beginning of the process, scaled
down by the applicants to some easily measurable and officially identifiable
material features like wages, accommodation, age and health status – necessary
information to volunteer in their application to adopt. But there is also a more
subtle and less easily identifiable side to the ‘functioning adoptive family,’ namely,
the ability for the parent(s) to take care of a child, the marriage relationship, and
other emotional matters – the family scaled up to a social unit. This hybrid nature
of the functioning adoptive family comes to the fore in the ‘social report’ in
Denmark, a report that the family’s social worker writes about them on the basis
of his or her meetings and discussions with the parent(s). The institutional nature
of this hybrid becomes accentuated in the following extract from a diary. The
material nature of the envelope in which the important decision arrived is
described, and a word-for-word quote from the letter is used to emphasize the
legal and official nature of the procedure: ‘A fine big envelope, with the decision
from the committee, and also with the very important social report which “on this
date” is sent to the A.C. International Child Support’ [Janne and Felix: DK].
Waiting: linear chronology, milestones and lists
The printed literature produced by the state, the local authorities, the adoption
agencies and the support groups – among others – shapes adoption as a process
punctuated by a timeline of milestones and associated expectations. Much of this
literature also finds its way in a mediated form onto the adoptive parents’ public
websites. There is a tension, however, between the agency’s provision of general
information for all clients and each client’s demand for more specific information
about what they can expect when they join the adoption process with a particular
agency (for a selected country) and about the progress of their specific case.
Several web diaries witness the sending of the application to the authorities as
the start of a long process. The ‘wait’ begins, and the parents commit themselves
to the institutional and emotional procedures: ‘We send the thick envelope
together: both of us has a hand on the envelope when we let go of it and it falls
down in the posting box. We go home with a strange feeling of happiness,










































68 Paul McIlvenny and Pirkko Raudaskoski
on the period it takes for the adoption committee to approve their application to
be adoptive parents as ‘the long nerve-racking first phase of the waiting time’
[Dianne and Kasper: DK]. The next phase for the adoptive parents is to wait to
be allocated a child from the ‘sending’ country they have chosen, for which
procedures vary. The waiting list kept by the adoption agency, and made public
by some agencies, is one crucial mediational means for adoptive parents in this
phase. Depending on the procedures of the receiving country, the waiting list is
usually a simple stack or queue comprising the anonymized ciphers of those
approved clients who are waiting for the agency to match them with a ‘child-to-
be-adopted’ in the sending country. Case numbers are assigned to every client so
that they can be processed by the agency, but of more interest to us is the practical
reasoning that clients engage in to recover information about their case, as well
as its history relative to others, from information gleaned from the list and other
sources. We are especially interested in the online public waiting lists that parents
can ‘browse’ on the internet at their leisure, which some agencies provide as 
a service to their clients. Online public waiting lists seem to appear only in
Denmark, in both of the two authorized private adoption agencies, AC Denmark:
Adoption Support International and DanAdopt. The lists are updated at regular
intervals, usually monthly. Some adoption support groups or associations re-
mediate and personalize the lists for their own purposes. These lists are an evolving
mediational means – a cultural technology sustained by practices that interface or
‘translate’ between the practices of the adoption agency and their ‘clients’ – which
serves as a resource for mediated action in such virtual spaces.
On the web, the parents express their happiness about moving up the waiting
list, especially when the number is close to or under ten, which for many countries
means that the parents are in a ‘batch of referrals.’ Thus, there is little excitement
in, ‘And so has DanAdopt’s homepage been updated – we have moved to nr. 31
on the waiting list’ [Minna and Rasmus: DK] when compared with, ‘Good news!!
I finally got hold of Suzanne from our agency. She confirmed that we ought to be
in the next batch. Her guess is that within about a month they’ll receive the 
next batch of referrals. It’s getting very exciting!’ [Inger and Tom: DK]. The first
quote also shows the couple’s orientation to the fact that the waiting list is 
being periodically updated. What is also clear is that the ‘natural’ progression is
to go up, not down, and thus a drop is accountable: ‘So DanAdopt’s homepage
has been updated – unfortunately just with somebody extra on the list – before
us. So now we are nr. 37 – it certainly goes the wrong way :-( But we have heard
that there are children on the way to referral, so we wonder if the waiting list will
be updated again next week – and if we so move a bit the right way’ [Minna and
Rasmus: DK].
But are the children waiting too? Some agencies, especially in the US, may
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children.’ Cartwright (2003) argues that this functions initially as a ‘lure,’ to draw
prospective clients into the adoption market and to imagine ‘their’ child or
themselves as parents of children ‘like these.’ Additionally, the term ‘waiting
child’ is ‘often used ideologically in place of orphan or abandoned child. It shifts the
emphasis from the child’s past history and current circumstances to a child’s
implied state of mind, constructing it as a subject who desires a (new) family’
(Cartwright, 2003: fn. 2, p. 105). We add that the present progressive tense indi-
cates that the children are waiting (patiently, as a patient) for an undisclosed event
that will release them from waiting any longer. The child-to-be-adopted is scaled
down and his or her agency is distributed to benevolent others – they become a
mediational means. The implied, unconstrained agent is, of course, the prospec-
tive adopter who can ‘select’ the child and who generously consents to adopt him
or her, and thus end the waiting period. Moreover, the economy of adoption is
reassuringly, for the adopter, assumed to be a buyer’s market, yet a sense of
urgency is maintained (trade sooner rather than later in an economy of desire).
Even though the condition of waiting is displaced onto the child and not the
parent(s), this client-centered discourse elides the institutional labour and gate-
keeping that the parent(s) must traverse before the child will be able to be adopted
and first contact will ‘release’ the child from their state of ‘waiting.’
Telfer (2003: 74–75) argues that the temporal sequences (structured by the
administrative and regulatory structures) are ‘necessary, but by no means sufficient
conditions for the inculcation of key social knowledge that is held to be crucial for
the parenting of a child from “overseas”.’ Telfer also notes that at some point in
the process of adoption parents begin to dare to wonder about the child who might
‘belong’ to them, but there are limits to their sense of agency while ‘being in the
pipeline.’ There is a chronological and projective linearity, yet the outcome is
entirely ambiguous. In our corpus, one can find the pre-figuring of the desired
adoptive child in the repeated promises to ‘the waiting child’ that the event of
exchange/contact is coming or imminent. For instance, the assurance ‘We’ll be
there soon Abbey . . . we’ll be there soon!’ could be seen on the My China Jewel
[US] website even before a specific child was even referred to the couple. The
child is scaled up as an absent member of the family, in stark contrast to the
Scandinavian websites that avoid talking about a forthcoming ‘child.’
Centers of calculation
One can find other representational practices at work, for example statistics and
tables on waiting periods (as well as numbers of children adopted from each
country) constructed by intergovernmental organizations, the state, adoption
agencies, parent-support groups or individuals. One particular parent-run website










































70 Paul McIlvenny and Pirkko Raudaskoski
information sources, tips that are appropriate to ‘Waiting Parents Before and After
Referral.’4 They have links to many practical websites that give checklists and
advice on appropriate tasks and goals for a waiting parent. One of these links points
to the ‘China Adoption Referral and Age Graphs,’5 maintained by Ralph Stirling.
The graphs and charts are usually updated regularly and show the most recent
statistics on the time from sending your dossier to China to receiving a referral.
By gathering data from prior adoption cases directly from the families adopting
children from China who are subscribed to the APC email discussion list 
(a-parents-china@groups.yahoo.com), Sterling can present statistical representa-
tions of the adoption process which are updated weekly.6 The data collected for
statistical use include the important dates for Chinese adoptions (DTC, referral,
travel and birth), the gender of the child, twin status, age requested, city and
province, and adoption agency. The charts that are produced from the database
can be used by parents to determine, among other things, a likely waiting period
and the relative position of their process as a trajectory in relation to prior cases.
Sterling also uses an online web-form interface to elicit appropriate data from the
adopters, which is then entered into a private database. Following Latour (1999),
we can see that Sterling has constructed a ‘center of calculation,’ a site where
inscriptions are combined and make possible a type of calculation, one in which
auditable features of a selection of China adoption cases in the US over a number
of years are stored, collated and presented for public consumption. This website
illustrates the degree to which parents themselves have developed (and shared)
cultural tools to monitor and predict the adoption process in ways that would not
be possible without the help of other adopters.
Conclusion
We have documented some of the ways in which institutional discourses and texts
are appropriated in mediated actions in virtual spaces with social consequences, as
well as how parents themselves construct, share and calibrate mediational means
and ‘cultural tools’ for managing their experience of the lengthy adoption process.
We have shown how the adoptive family and the adoptee are figured as quasi-
objects, as a heterogeneous assemblage of biology, the ‘social’ and culture, and
thus how their origin and agency are performatively distributed across the social
and discursive field. There is a clear difference between the personal websites 
of adopters from the ‘consumption-driven’ US and the European ‘care-driven’
countries. The reasons can be many, but it seems to be the case that the general
adoption policy of the country has an influence on what the adopters will and will
not speak of in the practices and discourses of mediating adoption on the internet.
In order to enhance MDA as a theory and methodology, R. Scollon (2001b)
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agency, representation, multimodal discourse and social structures. In this chapter
we wish to highlight that, additionally, the following areas need attention:
• The need for an analyst to specify and enumerate the mediational means used
to mediate action in a site of engagement provides an important locus that
links materiality, culture and practice, but the range of methodological tools
can be extended in useful ways by reflexively attending to new media audiences
and the practices of scaling and re-mediation (Bolter and Grusin, 1999).
• MDA crucially refocuses our attention on the importance of documenting
how texts (and thus discourse) are engaged and come to have ‘effects’ in actual
practices. However, it tends to have a realist focus on those practices – i.e.
that they must occur in material sites of engagement – and a particular
conception of the human actor as the source of agency. To date there has been
little consideration of non-human actants, virtual practices and the complexity
of virtuality and its impact on mediation itself.
• Nexus analysis has focused upon linear and cyclical notions of time within 
an epistemology of chronological time, but it is crucial to understand how
temporality is attended to and constructed in discursive practices, and how
different temporalities (and scales) are contingently aligned by different
actors.
It is our view that MDA has an opportunity to draw together a variety of
approaches to practices of mediation, the situated use of cultural tools and
technologies, and richer conceptions of ‘the social,’ mediation and network.
Notes
1 New work in MDA, in fact, highlights how people themselves can be mobilized (in
various semiotized forms) as cultural tools to perform mediated actions (Randolph,
2000).
2 Lemke’s (2003) notion of ‘traversal’ is useful here. The whole adoption process could
be seen as a ‘traversal:’ the adoptive parent(s) has/have to make sense of and navigate
a mass of information from official, public and private sources.
3 Examples and quotations from the data corpus are indicated by the code [Adopter:
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Many writings in the area of multimodal discourse analysis explore the ‘grammars’
of different semiotic modes (e.g. O’Toole, 1994; Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996,
2002; van Leeuwen, 1999; Martinec, 1998, 2000, 2001) and this work is by no
means completed. Comparisons between the various ‘grammars’ are especially
needed. We need to know more both about the extent to which different modes
can do the same kind of communicative work and about the extent to which they
differ in their semiotic potential, and we need to know more about the difference
between doing the same kind of communicative work through one mode or
through another. But what is also needed is research on the way different modes
are integrated in multimodal texts.
The work on multimodality cited above takes its cues for the most part from
linguistics, and this approach still has much potential. With regard to the question
of how different modes are integrated in multimodal texts, there is, for instance,
room for a more systematic exploration of the theory of cohesion (e.g. Halliday
and Hasan, 1976; Martin, 1992), as for instance in van Leeuwen’s work on verbal
and visual conjunction (1991) and Martinec’s work on cohesion in action (1998).
Is it possible to speak of ‘lexical cohesion’ between words and images, or of
‘exchange structure’ in musical dialogues, or of ‘referential cohesion’ between the
action, the dialogue and the music of a film? At the same time, when linguistic
methods of cohesion analysis are applied to multimodal texts, they will inevitably
have to be adapted and modified, and cross-fertilised by the disciplines that have
traditionally studied the ‘non-linguistic’ modes of the multimodal mix – art and
design theory, for instance, musicology, and ‘non-verbal communication’.
In this chapter I will depart from the concept of ‘genre’ as it has been developed
in systemic-functional linguistics over the last 30 years or so (e.g. Hasan, 1978;
Martin, 1992; Ventola, 1987). I will not only ask whether genre analysis can be










































we transfer it from the domain of ‘monomodal’, linear texts to multimodal, non-
linear texts, that is, to texts that: (1) foreground visuality, not just by using images,
but also by using composition (layout), typography and colour; and (2) are
deliberately designed to allow multiple ways of reading, multiple uses, regardless
of whether this is achieved through electronic technology or not. In doing so I
will, for the most part, rely on examples that I have already used elsewhere, but
rethink them in the light of the particular questions I pose in this chapter.
Genre
The concept of ‘genre’ is not only used in linguistics, but also in the disciplines
that have traditionally studied modes such as visual communication, musical
communication and action, for instance in film studies, art history and musicology.
In these areas the term does not necessarily have the same meaning, and it is
important to remember this when we do cross-modal work and therefore have to
commune with disciplines that have long experience with modes whose study is
new to linguists. At the broadest level, however, these disciplines, like linguistics,
use the term for ‘types of text’. Where they differ is in the kinds of characteristics
(or combinations of characteristics) they use to describe specific genres. Genres
may, for instance, be characterised on the basis of their content. In film studies
‘Westerns’ would be described in this way, as typically set in a particular time
and place, using certain stock characters and typical plot structures, and so on.
But other film genres might be typified on the basis of their form or the semiotic
modes they employ, for instance the musical, or on the basis of their truth claims,
for instance documentaries versus fiction films. Disciplines also differ in the use
they make of the concept of genre. Often it plays a role in judgements of quality.
The best texts are then considered to be sui generis, typical only of their author,
and ‘genre’ pieces are looked down upon as works in which writers or artists
follow a recipe rather than creating an original work, although this is not
necessarily applied to older works such as the still lives and biblical genre pieces
of old masters like Rembrandt.
In systemic-functional linguistics, genres are characterised in terms of their
functions, in terms of what they do, initially as more or less unavoidable templates
for communicative action, more recently as resources for communicative action that
can be combined in different ways, some clichéd perhaps, others more original.
This reinstates the possibility of agency and innovation, moving away from various
forms of structuralist determinism in which, for instance, story telling was seen
as ‘the ability to generate narratives (messages) from the structure of a code’
(Barthes, 1977: 80), towards a more Bakhtinian conception of genre, in which 
the logic of genre is not an abstract, but a culturally and historically situated 










































74 Theo van Leeuwen
‘the possible generic sources of a given author’ or ‘the artist’s generic contacts’
are, and focus on the ‘interrelationship of tradition and innovation’ (Bakhtin,
1984: 157).
The following brief analysis can serve to rehearse the key characteristics of the
systemic-functional linguistic approach to genre.
Text Stages Some realisations
Don’t have time to make Suggesting the addressee Question; 2nd person 
a fuss of your feet? might have a problem address
↓
Scholl Foot Smooth Offering a solution Name of product
Shower Scrub
↓
Exfoliates and activates Describing the effect of Statements; material clauses 
cell renewal; 24 hr the product or nominalisations with the 
moisturisation product as agent; 3rd person
↓
Scholl Foot Smooth Reinforcing the solution Name of product
Shower Scrub
↓
Because the skin on your Providing a reason for Reason conjunction; 
feet is different and needs why addressee needs statements; relational 
its own special care the product clauses; 2nd and 3rd person
Linear succession of stages
One cornerstone of systemic-functional genre analysis is the idea that genres are
linear concatenations of communicative moves (‘stages’), each of which consti-
tutes a particular communicative act, for instance ‘suggesting that the addressee
might have a problem’, ‘offering a solution’, etc.
Stage boundaries mark shifts in the use of semiotic resources
The boundaries between these stages are marked by shifts in linguistic realisation.
The boundary between ‘suggesting a problem’ and ‘offering a solution,’ for
instance is marked by a change from direct address to indirect address and from
questions to statements. The stages need not consist of one sentence only, as in
the short example above. It is quite possible for a single ‘suggesting a problem’
stage to contain a range of questions, or for a single ‘offering a solution’ stage to
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Each stage is a distinct move in a strategy to reach the overall goal
The example text above is an advertisement and its overall goal is to persuade the
reader to buy the product. Each stage in the generic structure is a step in that
direction. In other words, genres are communicative strategies or procedures, ways
of achieving specific communicative goals. In the example, the product is first made
relevant to the reader (‘if you have this problem you’d better pay attention’). Then
the product is offered as a solution for this problem. And finally this solution is
reinforced in several ways, by sheer repetition as well as by arguments. Of course
the ‘problem-solution’ genre is only one of a number of possible persuasive
strategies – for instance, it would also be possible to simply state what the product
is for and heap praise on it.
Some stages are optional or allow for choice between alternatives
Some stages are ‘optional’ – a slightly shorter version of this ad, say without the
final ‘reason’, would be totally acceptable, as would a version adding more
reasons, and/or a few sentences of effusive praise. But if the ‘problem-solution’
strategy is chosen, the ad must at the very least have one ‘problem’ and one
‘solution’, and advertising’s overriding concern with ensuring ‘recall’ of the brand
name, makes repetition or reinforcement fairly fundamental as well. Such
optionality has been represented in various ways, for instance by means of
flowcharts (Ventola, 1987).
Multimodal stages
In my own first attempts to apply the concept of genre to multimodal analysis, 
I made three assumptions which, in hindsight, were perhaps motivated by a desire
to keep this model intact. As will be seen, this works for some multimodal texts,
but not for all. My assumptions were: (1) that a given stage could be realised by
several alternative modes; (2) that a given stage could itself be multimodal,
realised by several different modes at the same time; and (3) that the relations
between the modes within a stage could be elaborative or extensive. I will discuss
each of these points in turn.
A given stage can be realised by several alternative modes
This idea can be illustrated with another simple example, the recipe, as discussed,
for instance by Eggins (1994). A typical opening stage in a recipe is the ‘entice-
ment’, which aims at whetting the appetite of the readers, so as to persuade them










































76 Theo van Leeuwen
A typical Balkan dish and a glorious way to serve the biggest, most succulent
mushrooms you can find.
But it is equally common to find visually realised enticements, pictures that serve
the same function, and also form the opening stage of a recipe, as in Figure 8.1.
The choice between visual and verbal realisation may depend on a number of
factors, for instance on the medium (recipes in magazines more often feature visual
enticements, perhaps, than recipes in books) or on cultural factors – as Martinec
has shown (2003), the ‘instructions’ (e.g. ‘stir in the grated cheddar cheese’) that
follow the enticement are usually verbal in English recipes while in Japanese
recipes they are often visual.
A given stage can, itself, be multimodal
A Cosmopolitan article on keeping fit opens with a picture of Catherine Zeta-Jones
and the caption ‘Catherine Zeta-Jones keeps fit with a round on the golf course’.
Thus, a stage we might call ‘role model endorsement’ sets the scene for the
suggestions and instructions that will follow. It is a single stage, but it uses both
image and text. The same applies to the headline in Figure 8.2: the dolphin is
realised visually as well as verbally.
The relations between the modes can be elaborative or extensive
In multimodal stages, Halliday’s (1994) concepts of ‘elaboration’ and ‘extension’
can be used to specify the relation between the modes. In the case of ‘elaboration’,
content realised in one mode is restated through another mode in specific ways,
for instance by providing an explanation, or an example, or a summary. This
concept is similar to Roland Barthes’ (1977: 39–41) concept of ‘anchorage,’ with
the proviso that ‘anchorage’ is less inclusive and more specific, focusing only on
the way verbal captions can narrow down the content of images and make it more
specific. Barthes thought that images are more polysemic, more open to multiple
interpretations than language. This is certainly true for many images, but the
opposite can also be the case.
In the case of ‘extension’ one mode adds new, related content to the content
expressed in another mode. Barthes (1977: 41) used the term ‘relay’ here,
defining it as a ‘complementary relationship’ in which word and image are
‘fragments of a more general syntagm’. In the Catherine Zeta-Jones example, 
for instance, the picture shows the ‘agent’ (the person who ‘keeps fit’) and 
the words convey what she does (keeping fit by playing golf ), so that the two




















































































Figure 8.1 Visually realised ‘enticement’
·r 







Hea 2tbspo . eo1linafrying 
pan and coo 4 cub skinless, 
· boneless chic en breasts for 5 
mins. Add 2 crushed cloves 
· garlic, pour over 2 Oxo Chicken 
cubes stirred into 200ml(7floz) 
ho water and crumble over 2 
Oxo Herbs an9 Spic~s Italian 
cubes. Simmerfor2 mins, then 
stirin zestofl (emon and 1 x 
200ml tub half-fat creme fraiche. 
Season ;ind sprinkle over a 
handfulofchopped parsley. 
Cook400g {14oz)tagliatelle 
according to packetinstructions 
and toss together with sauce. 
- ✓ AddsomecrumbledOxo 
cubes to mushrooms, onion or I 
othervegetableswhen pan-
frying, to add great colour and I 
flavourtoyourfinished dish. 
✓Try crumbling an Oxo Lamb I 
cube overa chop, lettheflavour 
sinkinto the meat, then letthe I 
flames do the rest. 
✓ An OxoChicken ~ubeenhances I 
any dish cooked with cream and 
wine, andisdeliciouswith other I 
white meats, such ~ I 
asporkorturkey. 
... - --- -----· 
' 
Figure 8.2, on the other hand, is an example of ‘elaboration’. Here, the picture
adds more detail, ‘specifying’ the verbal message. Needless to say, the two can go
together. The picture of the dolphin also contains an element of ‘extension’, as it
shows a background, a setting. Such a setting could also have been realised
linguistically, through a ‘circumstance of location’, but in this instance it is not.
However, the approach sketched here has limitations. The whole may be 
more than a concatenation of interrelated parts, as, in an earlier article (van
Leeuwen, 2004), I tried to explain with reference to the famous Kitchener poster
(Figure 8.3).
It might be thought that the text merely ‘elaborates’ the image in this poster.
Both form an ‘appeal’, one with words, the other with a look and a gesture. But
the two appeals are very different. The visual appeal is direct and authoritative,
the verbal appeal indirect, a statement rather than a direct ‘command’. And the
two are not concatenated in linear fashion. They fuse, like elements in a chemical
reaction. They become a single appeal that is at once direct and indirect, at once
personal and official. And this fusion is effected by the visual style. There are 
no frame lines to separate image and text, and the visual style provides unity 
and coherence between the drawing and the typography. For this kind of 
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Figure 8.2 ‘Dolphin’ (Cosmopolitan, September 2003: 149)
The dolphin 
YOU'RE: 
■ playful: You love 
having fun in the bedroom and 
enjoy foreplay as much as, if 
not more than, intercourse. 
■ spontaneous: You don't worry 
about tomorrow morning, if 
you're having a good time now. 
■ caring: You enjoy gentle sex 
with cuddles and pillow talk. 
Fantastic foreplay: Happiness 
and joy is your priority, so "harness a 
sense of f un in the bedroom," says 
Cosmo Sex Editor Rachel Morris. 
"Take turns to tell an erot ic story, line 
The analysis of an excerpt from a Cosmopolitan article on sexuality (see p. 81)
describes the stages themselves in terms that are not mode-specific.
‘Characteristics’, for instance, could be displayed visually or described verbally.
The realisations in the third column, on the other hand, are mode-specific. As can
be seen in Figure 8.4, a headline can become a headline because of its position,
its framing, its large and bold typography – as well as because of its truncated
grammar. Again, the boundaries between the stages are not just marked by shifts
in linguistic realisation (e.g. the shift from relational clauses for formulating
general characteristics to imperative clauses for formulating expert advice) but also
non-linguistically. Each ‘characteristic’, for instance, has its own bullet point and
its own colour: the characteristics themselves (‘playful’, ‘spontaneous’ etc.) are
lettered in black, the rest of the text is lettered in pink. The boundary between
the ‘characterisation’ stage as a whole, and the ‘elaboration’ stage is marked, not
only by leaving extra interlineal space between the paragraphs, but also by a
transition from pink to black lettering, and from bold to normal weight. The
generic structure of the text is thus multimodally realised, through layout, colour
and typography, and these different modes fuse in the realisation, rather than that
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Image:
Finger pointed at the viewer
Unsmiling look at the viewer ('demand')
Military uniform and moustache
Text:





Large and heavy 'you'
'Appeal'
Figure 8.3 Kitchener poster
Reading paths
Another complication needs to be added. My first attempts at applying systemic-
functional genre theory to multimodal texts also rested on the principle of the
reading path, which was first worked out in Reading Images (Kress and van
Leeuwen, 1996). Genres, in the systemic-functional genre model, are templates
for communicative activities, linear processes, processes that unfold over time. 
I used the principle of the reading path to reintroduce linearity in the case of











































Nomination of Framed; 
category Illustrated; 
Large bold type in white on
The Dolphin ↓ pink background; 
Nominal group only
YOU’RE Characterisation:
• playful: You love having Characteristic 1 Bold, pink type; 
fun in the bedroom and Each characteristic bullet-pointed; 
enjoy foreplay as much ↓ 2nd person; 
as, if not more than, Mental processes of affect related
intercourse. to sex
• spontaneous: You Characteristic 2
don’t worry about 
tomorrow morning, if ↓
you’re having a good 
time now.
• caring: You enjoy gentle Characteristic 3
sex with cuddles and 
pillow talk. ↓
Elaboration of Additional inter-lineal space
Characteristic 1
Fantastic foreplay: Generalised Starts with characteristic 1 in
Happiness and joy is your restatement bold type; 
priority, so Black type reduced in size; 
↓ Opens with relational clause
‘Harness a sense of fun in Expert mediated Imperative clauses, attributed 
the bedroom’, says Cosmo advice to expert.
Sex Editor Rachel Morris
.... .... ....
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□ 
Reading paths, Kress and I had argued, are created by differential salience, by
the degree to which particular textual elements attract the reader’s or viewer’s
attention over and above other elements. Differential salience can be encoded by
a range of different visual features which can combine in various ways, for instance
size, tonal contrast, colour, etc. As we formulated it at the time:
Composition sets up particular hierarchies of the movement of the hypo-
thetical reader within and across the different elements of the text. Such
reading paths begin with the most salient element, from there move on to the
next most salient element, and so on. Their trajectories are not necessarily
similar to that of the printed page, left-right and top-bottom.
(Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996: 218)
Again, this works for some spatial texts. Some spatial texts do have clearly
encoded reading paths. But with other texts it is difficult to agree on whether any
particular reading path is more plausible than any other. In an earlier article, for
instance, I analysed the text in Figure 8.4 in a way that I still think is reasonably
plausible:
we might hypothesise the following reading path: from image 1 (left page),
via the headline, to image 2, the drawing, and then to image 3 (the photo at
the bottom right of page 2, and (via the photo on the left page?) back to the
headline, the box and the main text.
(van Leeuwen, 1992: 215)
The analysis is visually represented in Figure 8.5.
I concluded that reading path analysis ‘allows an integrated analysis of the
generic structure of the text, for such an analysis stands or falls, of course, with
the possibility of a sequential(ised) reading’ (van Leeuwen, 1992: 215).
But many spatial compositions have several elements that are more or less equal
in salience. The home page of Sony’s website, which Sony did not allow us to
reproduce here (but see Figure 8.6 for a visual representation of the site), is
divided into two main sections. The top section has, on the left, a ‘head and
shoulders’ picture of a glamorous blonde model smiling at the viewer, and on the
right, the words ‘Welcome to the world of Sony’ and below that, somewhat less
salient, the words ‘What’s new’. The bottom section features a symmetrical
display of four rectangular frames with the names and logos of specific products.
The girl is clearly the most salient element of the page, followed by ‘Welcome to
the world of Sony’ and then by ‘What’s New’. We can therefore assume that these
elements are designed to be read in that order. But the rectangles in the bottom
part of the page are more or less equal in salience. Here a specific reading path
can not be assumed – to be precise, 24 reading paths are theoretically possible.
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Figure 8.4 ‘The First Exciting Year’ (from Luck, 1990)
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and a second stage, the words ‘Welcome to the world of Sony’ and ‘What’s New’,
but it does not provide an ‘ending’.
However, what readers actually do when they read (‘use’) such texts will still
follow a single, linear reading path that could be experimentally studied by using
a television eye marker and that forms a single, staged, goal-oriented process that
could be analysed with the methods of genre analysis described above. The
important difference is that now we study, not the structuring of the text, but the
structuring of the reading (using) process. Nevertheless, to make such structured
and purposeful reading processes possible, the elements of the text that the reader
selects as the specific stages of his or her reading path must still have semiotic
characteristics that will allow them to function as these specific stages. A particular
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PRODUCT PRODUCT PRODUCT PRODUCT
Figure 8.6 Visual representation of Sony home page
But this reader-activated ‘reading path’ is only possible if the text has elements 
that can realise the communicative activities of ‘offering a welcome’, ‘providing a
product choice’ and so on, and allows them to be read in the above order. In other
words, the text becomes an environment facilitating a number of staged, goal-
oriented reading processes. However, the text itself is no longer a staged, 
goal-oriented process. It is an environment for such processes, and must be
analysed as a kind of map, a spatial structure allowing a number of trajectories, 
or as the layout of a building, a spatial structure designed to facilitate a range of
specific activities. Analysis must therefore take place at two levels:
• Visual analysis of the text, to study the environment of the staged, goal-
oriented process, and the pathways it allows.
• Observational, ‘ethnographic’ genre analysis of the user’s trajectory, to study
actual staged, goal-oriented reading processes, and so access the (usually
internalised) generic patterns that inform it.
If such analyses are carried out with larger numbers of users, they will bring
out the degree to which different users follow the same trajectories, and hence
the degree to which the spatial or quasi-spatial (‘virtual’) composition of the
environment constrains what can be done in it.
Two examples
I will try to make things more concrete by means of two examples. The first is a
museum exhibition in the Old Royal Observatory in Greenwich. The successive
rooms of this exhibition present the episodes of a narrative that recounts the
problem of determining longitude for the purpose of navigation at sea, and its
eventual solution, after a number of complications, in the form of a clock that
could keep accurate time at sea. Within this narrative, some of the rooms form a
kind of descriptive digression, showing the living and working quarters of the first
Royal Astronomer, and the final room functions as a narrative Coda in the sense
of Labov’s functional analysis of the genre of narrative (1972), as we will see in
more detail below.
Figure 8.7 shows the layout of the first room of the exhibition.
Using the principles of composition analysis outlined in Kress and van Leeuwen
(1996), we can analyse this room as a triptych structure. Given is the left wall,
on which are hung a large, dark seventeenth-century painting (1) depicting the
building of the Observatory and an engraving (2) showing John Flamsteed, the
first Astronomer Royal. The wall that faces visitors when they enter the room
functions as Mediator, and is itself structured as a triptych, to be analysed below.
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wrecking a ship (9), a chart showing the zigzagging trajectory of a ship sailing the
east coast of South America (8) and engraved portraits of King Charles II (11) and
Christopher Wren, who built the Observatory (10).
The Mediator is by far the most salient item in the room, due to its lighting
and its position, immediately facing the visitors when they enter the room. Its
Given is a text panel explaining how King Charles II ordered the building 
to research the problem of determining longitude at sea (3), and a glass case
displaying objects relating to the Observatory (a book, seals, an ordinance). Its
own Mediator is a highly placed monitor with a computer animation showing the
Observatory being built, in time-lapse fashion (5). As this exhibit has a moving
image and luminous colour, it is by far the most salient item in the room. New,
finally, is another text panel, explaining the problem of longitude (7) and a glass
case displaying objects related to navigation (a compass, a ship’s logbook etc.).
Observing the trajectory of 60 visitors, I found that all but one of the visitors
skipped the left wall and immediately went to the leading exhibit, first watching
the animation, then reading the panels and glancing at the objects in the display




















































Figure 8.7 The first gallery of the Old Royal Observatory ‘story of time’ exhibition
at it briefly, on their way out, and only nine studied exhibits 8 to 11 more
carefully. Clearly the composition of this room played a large role in structuring
the visitors’ reading paths, even though in principle a multitude of reading paths
should have been possible.
Analysing this reading path as a staged, goal-oriented process, visitors are first
provided with the ‘instigatory’ event, the event that gets the ball rolling (the
building of the Observatory). This event is then elaborated in two ways, by
providing further detail (the role of the King), and by giving the reason for the
event (the navigation problems encountered because of the difficulty of accurately
determining longitude). The room as a whole thus provides the Orientation of the
narrative (Labov, 1972) that is about to unfold:
Orientation:




Stating the reason behind the instigatory event
While the first of these three ‘sub-stages’ is realised visually, through a computer
animation, the others are multimodally realised – through text, image and objects.
The final gallery has a Centre-Margin structure (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996),
as shown by the floor plan in Figure 8.8.
The main text panel (C) indicates the theme of the gallery: ‘Keeping Time’.
Four main sections deal with different aspects of time: the history of concepts of
time (D1), from linear time as conveyed in the Bible, to modern scientific time
(D2); the standardisation of time (B); types of time such as ‘Relative Time’,
‘Biological Time’, ‘Human Time’ (E); and types of time keeping, including those
of other cultures (F). The central exhibit (H) is a very large clockwork in a glass
case. It has a loud tick and chimes every 15 minutes.
Again observing the ‘reading paths’ of 60 visitors, I found that, on entering the
room, all visitors immediately faced the central exhibit, but only nine went up to
it to have a closer look. The rest glanced at it for a brief moment and then either
turned left (21 visitors) or right (30 visitors). In short, there was no common
pattern either in what they did or did not look at, or in the order in which they
surveyed the exhibits. They crisscrossed freely through the room, finding their
own trajectory.
The ‘reading path’ of the exhibition as a whole is highly biased towards linearity.
Each room leads directly to the next room, and the passageways between the
rooms are narrow. It is difficult to go against the flow. But the final room is ‘non-
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the problem of longitude. Thus it functions as a Coda to the narrative, as the
element that makes the story of time (the central element in the room) relevant


















































Figure 8.8 Final gallery of the Old Royal Observatory ‘story of time’ exhibition

















My second example is a CD-ROM for children called Dangerous Creatures,
produced by Knowledge Adventure in 1994. Dealing with wild animals, it can be
explored in three ways – through the alphabetically organised index, through
particular themes such as ‘habitats’, ‘weapons’ etc., and through a ‘guide inter-
face’. Choosing the guide interface produces a screen displaying 12 guides, each
able to provided a different ‘tour’ of the database – ‘Amazon Adventure’, ‘African
Safari’, ‘Coral Reef Dive’, ‘Native American Stories’, ‘Tales from Asia’ etc. Here,
I will concentrate, not on the internal structure of the ‘rooms’ (here screens) that
constitute the stages of the process, but on the overall structure of the ‘exhibition’
(here ‘database’), mapping it as a topological analytical structure (Kress and van
Leeuwen, 1996: 101–103). Figure 8.9 maps a small section of the tour of the
‘Aboriginal storyteller’ in this way. To explain it I will need to describe the screens




























































































Figure 8.9 Section of ‘Aboriginal guided tour’ (Dangerous Creatures, Knowledge Adventure,
1994)
The ‘death adder information screen’ has a headline ‘Death adders’ top right,
and includes two pictures showing more or less inert snakes against a neutral
background. There are three boxes with explanatory written text, unrelated titbits
of knowledge about snakes.
Death adder
There is a good reason that this Australian snake is called the ‘Death Adder’.
Before an antivenin was developed, half the people bitten by it died. Luckily,
the death adder is not very aggressive and bites only if touched.
But there is also a spoken text, read by the female voice of the ‘guide’, the
‘Aboriginal storyteller’:
In that time there was not yet death. It was the fault of the first humans that
death was led into the world (didgeridoo music starts at this point). For the moon
came down to the earth and said to them: ‘If you carry my pets across the
river you will rise again after you have died and so live forever’ (didgeridoo
music fades out). But the humans refused. They were afraid of the moon’s pets
which were all deadly snakes. So the moon said: ‘Silly humans, now when
you die you will stay dead and I will always send you poisonous snakes to
remind you that you disobeyed me.’
The ‘death adder screen’ links to two ‘definition screens’ – clicking on the
italicised words of the written text produces a superimposed text box with a
spoken and written headline (e.g. ‘amphibians’) and an explanatory text:
Animals that are cold-blooded, lay eggs, and have moist skins. Frogs, toads,
and salamanders are amphibians. When amphibians are babies, they have gills
and must live in the water like fish. As they grow up, they lose their gills,
grow lungs and eventually must live on land.
After returning to the death adder screen, the user can either go back or follow
the guide to the ‘Mangrove snake exploration screen’. The picture on this screen
is larger and more dramatic than the pictures in the ‘Death adder information
screen’, showing a snake which raises its head menacingly. The text, too, is more
dramatic, and not accompanied by ‘subsidiary texts’:
Coiled and ready to strike, a mangrove snake opens its mouth in warning. Its
threats should be heeded – like many wasp-coloured animals, it’s venomous.
The snake lives in South-East Asia, spending its days resting in branches above
saltwater mangrove swamps and hunting in the evening. Its venom isn’t lethal










































90 Theo van Leeuwen
At the same time the voice of the guide continues the story:
One of those snakes was the mangrove snake. One day he sat complaining to
his friend, the whipsnake: ‘Yeah, I am very poisonous, but I am so slow, 
the humans are always chasing me and I must bite them when they catch me.
It is quite exhausting.’ The whipsnake, who was very fast, but perfectly
harmless, said: ‘Let me have your poison teeth, so the humans won’t hate
you anymore, and since I am too fast to catch, I won’t need to bite them.’
The mangrove snake agreed and ever since he has been only poisonous enough
to kill his food and humans don’t bother him.
What links these two screens? It depends on whether you focus on the speech
or on the writing. From the point of view of the guide’s story, this screen is the
next episode in a narrative. From the point of view of the written text, it is an
additional item of information about snakes.
The ‘Mangrove snake exploration screen’ links to various other information
screens, providing yet other morsels of relatively unconnected information on the
same topic: more on rear-fanged snakes, more on saltwater swamps, and so on.
The layout of these screens is similar to that of the ‘Death adder information
screen’, but the Aboriginal story does not continue. Instead, a male voice provides
an item of information unrelated to the other information on the screen:
How can you tell snakes and legless lizards apart? Look for eyelids.
There is also a link to a movie loop and a ‘fact screen’. This ‘fact screen’ (every
‘exploration screen’ has one) contains a heading (‘Mangrove snake’) and three
separate ‘facts’, each accompanied by an icon. To the right of the facts are three
pictures, a representation of the snake itself, without setting; a map showing its
habitats; and a picture comparing its size to a human being. In all, there are no
less than eight links to choose from, so the ‘Mangrove snake exploration screen’
does allow some ‘free’ exploration of the database.
Clearly this environment allows more choice. It can be read as an illustrated
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Or it can be read as an information genre in which morsels of facts about a partic-
ular topic are accumulated, and elaborations and explanations of terms explored









































































































Figure 8.10 Reading path through a section of the ‘Aboriginal guided tour’
Clearly, this is a less linear environment than the exhibition in the Old Obser-
vatory. But that does not mean there are no constraints upon the user. Users can
be positioned either as accumulators of unrelated facts, of ‘quiz knowledge’, or
as listeners to a story, but they cannot, for instance, make up their own story, 
or make the items of information relate to each other in such a way that they
become relevant, that they become knowledge you can do something with, rather
than quiz knowledge. By structuring knowledge according to this ‘quiz’ model,
Dangerous Creatures controls meaning just as much – maybe even more – than
other, more linear texts. As Umberto Eco has said (1979: 9): in the ‘open text’
‘you cannot use the text as you want, but only as the text wants you to use it 
. . . an open text outlines a “closed” project of its Model Reader as a component



































































































Figure 8.11 Alternative reading path through the same section of ‘Aboriginal guided tour’
0 
Mediational means/cultural tools:
questions and mini projects
Questions for discussion
1 All mediational means come with affordances and constraints on action.
Give an example of how one particular mediational means makes some
kinds of actions and social identities possible while restricting others.
2 Wertsch makes a distinction between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ media-
tion. Give an example of each of these and discuss how they might
function differently.
3 As discourse analysts, the main kinds of mediational means we are
traditionally interested in are verbal utterances and written texts. Often
such utterances and texts are ‘resemiotized’ or transformed into objects,
actions or identities. Can you think of some examples of this?
4 Van Leeuwen discusses how multimodal genres embody affordances
and constraints by creating reading paths. What are some of the features
that govern reading paths in such texts?
Mini projects
1 Choose a particular mediated action familiar to you and enumerate the
mediational means used to perform it. Try to make a distinction
between those mediational means that are ‘explicit’ and those that are
involved in what Wertsch calls ‘implicit mediation’. In the case of
implicit mediation, what methods did you use to detect these ‘less
transparent’ mediational means?
2 Collect data from your own interaction using different mediational
means (such as face-to-face conversation, mobile or land-line tele-
phony, internet web pages, email, instant messaging or computer chat).
Examine how these mediational means affect how you present yourself
and construct your identity and how discourses are ‘resemiotized’ or
transformed through the use of different mediational means.
3 Gather a small corpus of multimodal texts which you consider to be of
the same genre and plot the reading paths, the functional stages these
paths lead through, and how these stages are realized in terms of































































































































Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
As a theory of how discourse and identity are implicated in situated social actions,
MDA is essentially a theory of social practices. According to Scollon, social
practices are the basis of all social actions (Scollon, 2001b), and thus the basis of
all claims and imputations of social identity. The study of social practices links
individuals and their cognitive and social development to the socio-cultural
environments in which they reside. In order to understand how ‘practice’ fits into
mediated discourse theory, however, it is necessary to distinguish the way the











































Practice: Used as a count rather than a non-count noun.
Narrowly defined social actions with a clear material
existence in the world, as well as a psychological
correlate in the habitus of social actors.
An action involving entrenched beliefs, values and
emotions.
Real-time mediated actions that have been linked to
other actions in ways that are recognizable to a
particular group of social actors.
A historical accumulation of mediated actions – within
the habitus of social actors – performed over a period
of time, which are understood by other social actors to
be ‘the same’ social action.
The term ‘practice’ is particularly popular in modern social analysis. While its
earliest use probably dates back to Aristotle (who distinguished praxis – everyday
actions – from theoria – contemplation), more contemporary uses often come out
of the Marxist intellectual tradition which emphasizes the inherently ideological
nature of social practice. CDA, for example, sees practice as the habitualized 
ways in which people reproduce relationships among social actors, resources 
and settings (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), and perceives the purpose of
discourse analysis as discovering how discourse constitutes and is constitutive 
of social practice.
MDA shares with critical discourse analysis and other approaches concerned
with social practice the notion that a practice, as opposed to an action or activity,
constitutes some kind of linkage between action, identity, ideology and power.
Where it departs from these approaches is primarily in the ‘scale’ upon which it
conceptualizes the term ‘practice.’ First of all, rather than as a non-count noun
referring to collections of actions, as it is used by most social scientists, mediated
discourse analysts use the term as a countable noun, usually to refer to a single
action or set of actions that are so closely linked as to be practically indivisible.
Thus, while others speak of, for example, the practice of ‘gift giving’ (Bourdieu,
1977) or the practice of ‘sheep farming’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), MDA
takes a much narrower approach to practice, speaking of, for example, the
practices of ‘handing’ (Scollon, 2001b), ‘greeting,’ ‘using chopsticks’ and ‘waiting
in a queue’ (Scollon, 2001c), preferring to see larger activities like gift giving or
sheep farming as constellations of linked practices which it calls ‘nexus of practice.’
The main reason for the narrowness in scope is analytical practicality. It is quite
difficult to speak of ‘sheep farming’ or ‘gift giving’ as clearly defined entities with
an unambiguous material basis in the world or a clear psychological basis in the
minds of those who engage in them. Seeing practices more narrowly allows us to
more easily identify their occurrence and analyze how they are linked to other
practices in real time.
What, then, is the difference between a social practice and a mediated action?
The answer to this question lies precisely in these real-time linkages. According
to Wertsch (1998) the term ‘practice’ is used to speak of mediated actions when
they are instances in a chain of actions that have a history within a particular group
of social actors and within the cognitive development of an individual. Bourdieu
(1977) puts it more simply when he defines a practice as an action with a history.
Scollon (2001c) defines a practice as ‘a historical accumulation within the
habitus/historical body (Bourdieu, 1977; Nishida, 1958) of the social actor of
mediated actions taken over his or her life (experience) and which are recognizable
to other social actors as “the same” social action.’
As we move through our social worlds we appropriate social practices within










































98 Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
in the mediational means we have available to take action (Norris, 2002b, 2004b).
In fact, mediational means are only available as mediational means or, what
Wertsch calls ‘cultural tools’ insofar as they are embedded within some social
practice and insofar as that social practice has been appropriated into the habitus
of the users. Mediational means thus arise as the ‘codification’ of social practices
(S. Scollon, 2001).
Given this narrower definition of practice, the search for values, ideology and
relationships of power in social practices that concerns many social analysts cannot
be satisfied through analyzing practices themselves but, rather, should focus on
the ways particular practices are linked in real time to form a nexus of practice.
It is at this nexus that individuals build their social identities – and often margin-
alize other social identities through their actions; and it is these linkages of
practices which, over time, become social groups or ‘communities of practice’
(Lave and Wenger, 1991; Jones, 2001; S. Scollon, 2001) that advance ideological
agendas and reproduce relationships of dominance.
The chapters that follow explore how mediated actions become practices by
being linked with other actions in real time, and how they consequently come to
define not only ‘what social actors are doing’ but also ‘who they are.’ In Chapter
10, Filliettaz explores how participants in service encounters make use of various
mediational means to create a historical context for their actions – in ways that
make them recognizable as social practices to other social actors. In Chapter 11,
Lemke further explores the importance of temporality in the definition of practice,
showing how the actions that players of a computer game take are linked in
recognizable spatio-temporal sequences which he, after Bakhtin, calls chronotopes.
Finally, in Chapter 12, Rowe uses the concepts of ‘situation definition’ and ‘hybrid
activity type’ to analyze how different nexus of practice are formed in the











































10 Mediated actions, social
practices, and contextualization:
a case study from service
encounters
Laurent Filliettaz
Contextualization and mediated discourse analysis
The problem of contextualization has long been a key issue in contemporary
approaches to discourse. It has been central in various disciplinary subfields
concerned with the description of actual language use. It has also been a factor 
in epistemological and methodological debates among different analytical para-
digms such as CA, CDA, and interactional sociolinguistics (see Duranti and
Goodwin, 1992; Gumperz, 1999) regarding the local or global character of con-
text (Cicourel, 1992; Schegloff, 1992), or its deterministic vs. emergent relation to
situated interaction (Gumperz, 2001).
Unlike many other approaches, MDA does not consider the notion of ‘context’
a fruitful concept to account for the complex relations between discourse and
society. Scollon (2001a), for example, views the notion of context with suspicion,
since it is associated with approaches to discourse that focus in the end primarily
on language and see ‘contextual information’ merely as an external set of
background determinations:
Many theories of language and of discourse start out with a focus on ‘social
action’ such as speech act theory, pragmatics, interactional sociolinguistics,
and CDA but then somehow in practice tend to become focused only on 
text. Other aspects of social action and other mediational means than language
and discourse are backgrounded as ‘context.’ Unfortunately, this can lead to
a distorted understanding of the relationship between discourse and social
action.
(Scollon, 2001a: 4)
In order to account for the complex links relating discursive forms with situated
social practices, MDA investigates alternative solutions to the notion of ‘context.’










































• By stating a ‘principle of social action’ (Scollon, 2000), MDA acknowledges
the idea that discourse does not consist exclusively of producing and inter-
preting utterances, but is best described in terms of the social actions carried
out by language users. It aims at shifting the focus away from discourse to the
human actions being taken, and therefore argues that social actions should be
seen as central and primary units of analysis.
• By conceiving of language as a mediational means, MDA sees discourse as one
type of cultural tool contributing to the construction of social actions, but
explicitly refuses to see language use as the sole means by which actions are
taken (see Scollon, 2001a; Scollon and Scollon, 2003). Because texts neces-
sarily ‘under-represent the meaning present in the actions’ (Scollon, 2001a),
other semiotic means, such as material objects or non verbal conduct, are
taken into account. From such a multimodal perspective, physical artifacts 
are not seen any more as ‘contextual’ or background elements, but as units
of analysis that play a central role in our understanding of how human actions
are carried out in society.
• By exploring how actions and discourses move through time (see Scollon, this
volume; de Saint-Georges, 2003), MDA takes into consideration the various
rhythmic patterns that constrain mediated actions and aims at making explicit
how locally negotiated actions are embedded in long-term ‘timescales’ that
link actors, objects, language, and practices both with history and with future
states (Scollon, 2002b). Here again, the historical trajectories intersecting in
a ‘nexus of practice’ are not perceived as ‘contextual’ or ‘peripheral’ informa-
tion. Rather, their analysis is seen as necessary for the understanding of the
action at hand.
• By ‘expanding the circumferences of discourse’ not just to take into account
contextual information, but also to broaden the scope of what linguists inter-
ested in actual language use should be able to account for, MDA provides a
fruitful alternative to models that focus primarily on text or talk and that arti-
ficially conceive clear-cut boundaries between language and ‘extra-linguistic’
realities such as action, culture, history, and objects.
Contextualizing service encounters: a case study
In their recent work, Ron and Suzanne Scollon have often based their arguments
on mundane examples taken from everyday life in order to stress the idea that
actions such as lighting a camping stove (Scollon, 2002a), having a cup of coffee
(Scollon, 2001a), or buying a book (Scollon, 2002b) can tell us a lot about
discourse, action, and social practice.
At first glance, service encounters can be regarded as relatively elementary










































Mediated actions, social practices, and contextualization 101
encounter, one can indeed characterize such interactions as highly predict-
able, predetermined by a restricted set of scripted actions, and engaging clearly
defined and interdependent social roles. However, when faced with empirical
data, one cannot fail to notice that service encounters turn out to be far more
complex and unpredictable than we intuitively imagine them to be (see Aston,
1988; Filliettaz, 2004d).
From this perspective, interactions between service providers and clients can be
viewed as a very relevant domain of investigation for MDA. The social practices
involved in service encounters are mediated by various types of linguistic means:
the position of a service provider, for instance, requires an ability to advise clients,
to facilitate their choices, to coordinate with other colleagues, to place phone calls,
and to find specific information in a catalogue. Focusing solely on these linguistic
means, however, gives rise to a distorted and incomplete picture of the semiotic
realities taking place when clients and service providers meet. In such settings,
joint actions are not taken exclusively through language use, but very often also
incorporate nonverbal conduct and references to material objects accessible in the
physical environment (see Filliettaz, 2004a). Such elements cannot be ignored by
the analyst and should be given central attention within a multimodal approach 
to discourse.
The data used for this case study are extracted from a large corpus of more than
350 interactions that were audio-recorded in a department store in Geneva during
the spring of 2001.2 This data collection took place during a four-month period
of ethnographic fieldwork focusing on how shop assistants and clients coordinate
their actions in the context of encounters referring to goods associated with
complex technical knowledge. Three specific settings were therefore selected: (a)
a sports department; (b) an electronics department; and (c) a do-it-yourself and
gardening department.
The excerpt transcribed below is from a service encounter recorded in the 
do-it-yourself department in July 2001. It is extracted from a five-minute long
interaction between a 50-year-old female client (C) and a 25-year-old female
assistant (A). The transcription is a translation from French.3
C: er a compass do you have a compass?
A: er we might . come and have a look well by compass you mean a small thing
for the car right? [A and C are walking towards the appropriate aisle]
C: Yeah
A: maybe this could work
C: if it’s the same that I already have uh ::
A: well let me show you and then you will see [A and C reach the aisle where
compasses are]











































A: well we don’t have anything big here
C: something that would be that big at least [C performs an iconic gesture]
A: yeah something as big as this we don’t have we only have small things for the
car uh: you might check if by chance they have one in the electronics
department right below the sports department
C: yeah all right I’ll have a look there
A: Yeah
C: because my husband he still hasn’t understood . that . a compass points to the
North <A laughs> . so if one turns around like this it points like this if one
turns around like this it points like this if one turns around like this . it points
. like that [while talking, C progressively accomplishes a 360 degrees rotation]
<yes of course> so er : . I have to give him a little lesson but with a small
thing such as this one it’s not so convenient <A laughs> I would like a nice
compass it might even be :: a gift for his birthday uh : for next year but <A
laughs> yeah really when one puts a compass like this <yes of course> it
indicates where we are <yes of course> right? it indicates where WE are .
so he says to me uh :: the arrow . I say but the arrow always shows you where the
North is <well yes> then he goes on asking so where is the North? . and I say
you just have to turn around until the arrow points to the North <A laughs> . but
he still hasn’t understood . so with a little thing such as this one a tiny little
sphere that is even half hidden he will not understand so I’d like to buy him
a nice compass <A laughs> . thanks
A: you’re welcome [pause 3 sec.]
C: you must meet strange people sometimes don’t you?
A: no it’s a pleasure precisely because we meet a lot of different people and that’s
what’s great 
[A laughs] [C’s cellphone rings]
Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of this excerpt, I would like to
start by making a couple of brief comments about what is going on during this
sequence. What makes this example of a service encounter particularly interesting
to me is the rather complex ways in which the agents negotiate the joint actions
they are engaged in. In the first section of their encounter (lines 1 to 16), the client
and the assistant seem to be contributing mainly to a commercial exchange: the
client performs a request (‘Er a compass do you have a compass?’); the assistant
makes an offer (‘er we might come and have a look’); the client utters an explicit
refusal (‘I was looking for something a little bit bigger’); and finally, the assistant
proposes an alternative solution (‘you might check if by chance they have one in
the electronics department right below the sports department’). At this stage of
the encounter, speech seems to be primarily a matter of exchanging information













practices that shape what could be viewed as a particular kind of ‘institutional
interaction’4: a service provider pursues the goal of a client and tries to satisfy
their needs. Through doing this, she contributes to enhancing the profit of the
company by which she is employed.
However, important changes occur in the second part of the encounter. The
client could have simply ratified the assistant’s advice and gone to the electronics
department in order to check if more appropriate compasses were sold there. But
instead, in an extensively developed turn, she chooses to display elements of her
private life to the assistant, talking of such things as her husband, who does not
understand how compasses work, and the lesson she wants to give him. In this
section of the interaction (lines 17 to 31), the goals ratified by the interacting
agents consist much more of ‘having a conversation’ than of accomplishing a
commercial transaction. This has visible effects on the organization of discourse
as well as on the situated identities displayed by the participants.
This twofold organization of the encounter raises interesting questions in terms
of professional discourse and of theorizing the relationship between discourse and
social practices: how do the assistant and the client proceed in order to articulate
an institutional and public practice with the sharing of ordinary and private
experiences? What do such intimate considerations bring to the construction of
joint actions? In what sense do they help the participants elaborate a mutually
ratified ‘context’ for their interaction? To what extent are such constructions
mediated by language? In the following paragraphs, I will try to give some elements
of answer to this set of questions by exploring some of the conceptual tools
developed by MDA.
A discursive account of timescales
As mentioned above, MDA argues that it is crucially important not to restrict the
scope of action to the narrow and momentary lapse of time during which it is actu-
ally performed. Rather, one should systematically take into consideration the fact
that the actors, objects, or places that intersect in the ‘nexus of practice’ are embed-
ded in larger timescales: they are at the same time emanations from the past and
prefigurations of possible futures (see Scollon, 2002b; Scollon and Scollon, 2003).
In our example, the sequence of interaction between the client and the assistant
incorporates many such trajectories. From the perspective of the assistant, this
encounter is one element in a series of encounters carried out with other clients
during the same day and over a longer period of time. Moreover, this encounter
is one among a vast array of other routinely accomplished tasks associated with
the position of a professional sales assistant (arranging goods on shelves, attending
team meetings, making stocklists, etc.). It is precisely because of such past experi-











































satisfy the client’s request (‘we might . come and have a look well by compass
you mean a small thing for the car right?’) and is able to project a possible
immediate future for her (‘you might check if by chance they have one in the
electronics department right below the sports department’).
Similarly, from the perspective of the client, the transaction she tries to
accomplish should no longer be seen as a decontextualized isolate. It is tightly
linked with past experiences and future projects. Quite interestingly, it should be
mentioned that the client herself makes elements of her timescale explicitly
accountable to the assistant: she recalls past events (the problems faced by her
husband while using a compass) and anticipates future actions such as the lesson
she wants to give to her husband (‘I have to give him a little lesson’) or the gift
she plans to offer him for his birthday (‘it might even be :: a gift for his birthday
uh : for next year’).
These segments of her trajectory are constructed discursively by means of
textual constructions of variable complexity. If anticipated actions are briefly
evoked by single sentences, the reconfiguration of past experience gives rise to a
prototypical case of story-telling in conversation. From line 23 on, the client
performs a complete narrative in the technical sense defined by Labov or Gülich
and Quasthoff (1986): she utters narrative propositions that enter in a temporal
relationship (‘he says . . . I say . . . he goes on asking . . . I say . . . he still hasn’t
understood’) and privileges a ‘replaying mode’ of telling in which she tries to
‘make things present’ by performing direct reported speech and sharing numerous
evaluative attitudes towards her husband. In other words, the client not only
explains to the assistant how difficult it is for her husband to master a compass,
but she replays a moment of past action during which she desperately tried to
demonstrate how compasses work.
These ‘pre-action anticipations’ and ‘post-action narratives’ can be seen as lin-
guistic accounts of the client’s life trajectory. They show how tightly social actions
are intersecting with each other in everyday experience. In our example, these
discursive accounts of timescales assume various pragmatic functions in the con-
struction of a mutually ratified action frame: they enable the participants to bridge
the public and institutional nature of the encounter with the sphere of privacy and
make explicit how the present they share is deeply shaped by larger projects.
Motives and contextualization
Elements identified in the preceding section have not only to do with time but
also with motives, another of MDA’s central concepts. In Scollon’s view, defining
the motives associated with actions raises important methodological issues to social
sciences, since one can always identify a multitude of possible candidates as
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process that might attribute motives’ (Scollon, 2002b), Scollon proposes that
motives are primarily discursive constructions:
Put in contemporary terms . . . the causes of that action are discursive
constructions, not behavioral primes, though they might well have been
constructed ‘in advance’ as anticipations. That is immaterial to the case. In
this view of human motives, whether they are post-action narratives or 
pre-action anticipations, any and all motives are matters of discourse, not
psychological or material primes.
(Scollon, 2002b: 8)
From this standpoint ‘motive analysis’ does not aim so much at identifying
fundamental or ‘true’ causes for the action, but consists in paying attention to how
participants ascribe explanations to the actions in which they are engaged.
In our example, it is important to stress the idea that timescales and motives
seem to be closely interrelated: when expressing past experiences and future
projects, the client explains the reasons why she takes part in the encounter and
ascribes causes to her presence in the do-it-yourself department. Analytical
philosophers – especially Anscombe (1957) – have clearly shown that a theory 
of action must distinguish between ‘what the agent aims at or chooses’ – their
intentions – and ‘what determines the aim or choice’ – their motives. From this
perspective, one could say that the discursive expression of timescales precisely
aims at making the client’s motives accountable for the assistant.
This being said, it begs a further question: why does the client make her motives
visible in these circumstances? In what sense do these explanations contribute to
contextualizing her mediated actions? As a tentative answer to these questions, I
would like to argue that such mediational means seem to satisfy crucial pragmatic
functions, both on the objective level of the commercial transaction at hand, and
on the more subjective level of the management of the relationship between the
interacting agents (Filliettaz, 2002, 2003). On the level of the transaction taking
place, discursively expressed motives help the client to justify why she cannot
accept the assistant’s offer: the compasses available in the shop are not satisfactory
because they are felt to be incompatible with the client’s needs in the practices
she refers to (giving a lesson, making a gift): ‘I was looking for something a little
bit bigger’; ‘so with a little thing such as this one a tiny little sphere that is even
half hidden he will not understand.’ In other words, motives seem to clarify the
‘felicity conditions’ of this economic transaction and contribute to specify under
what conditions the client guarantees her engagement in the joint action.
The expression of motivational information is also not unrelated to more
subjective components that shape interpersonal encounters. As Habermas (1984)











































sort of ‘theatrical representation’ in which they aim to manage the image they give
of themselves. By sharing subjective personal experiences, they accomplish face
work and negotiate what one could call the dramaturgical dimension of their joint
action. From this standpoint, the story-telling and anticipatory discourse associ-
ated with the expression of motivational information help the client to present
herself as competent, devoted, and obliging: she knows how to master a compass
and wants to help her husband to do so. The assistant seems to adopt a highly
empathic attitude regarding the drama played by the client, as shown by the
frequent backchannel signals (<yes of course>, <well yes>, etc.) and laughs.
Motivational information thus also helps the agents to position themselves with
regard to the relation they build with each other.
Cognitive artifacts as mediational means
As argued by Scollon and Scollon, it would be a great mistake to pay exclusive
attention to discursive mediational means. In the excerpt under analysis, the
presence of a material object such as the compass obviously plays a central role in
the ability of the interacting agents to frame the actions in which they are engaged.
More precisely, compasses in the interaction seem to assume successively three
distinct semiotic positions:
• In the client’s request and in the initial section of the encounter, the compass
appears as a discourse topic: it is present in the environment under the form
of a linguistic sign but is not yet incorporated in any physical object.
• In contrast, when the client and the assistant reach the appropriate aisle where
compasses are sold (lines 6 and 7), the transactional object takes physical
shape. It is not only a semantic content referred to by speakers, but a real
object whose material properties are accessible to the agents and give rise to
various appreciations: ‘I was looking for something a little bit bigger’; ‘so
with a little thing such as this one a tiny little sphere that is even half hidden
he will not understand.’ At this level, the compass as mediational means does
not satisfy the ‘felicity conditions’ of the transaction and leads to a
reorientation of the client.
• Beyond its ‘linguistic’ and ‘material’ modes of existence, it seems that at
certain points in the encounter, the compass also functions as a ‘cognitive
artifact,’ which is to say as an external device that stands for, refers to, or
represents a thing that exists in the world (Norman, 1993). Although the
interactants never physically handle the object of transaction, the client
simulates its manipulation by accomplishing a 360 degrees rotation around an
axis: ‘so if one turns around like this it points like this if one turns around
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these circumstances, the compass functions as a symbol embodied in the
situation by gesture. This simulation is crucially important in the client’s
discourse: it enables the client to transpose the object from the transactional
setting to other practices in which it is used. It also leads her to express
internalized actions and discourses associated with the compass in her past
experience.
Taking into consideration the various semiotic faces of the compass in our
example shows how central this mediational means can be in the present circum-
stances. Indeed, it is mainly this object, with its various material characteristics,
that connects the multiple practices integrated in the present nexus: the practice
of a service encounter, the practice of using a compass, the practice of giving a
lesson, the practice of making a gift for a birthday. Not only does it shift from one
possible practice to another, but it travels through time (the past, the present, and
the future), and among various actors (the client, the assistant, the husband). In
sum, it can be seen as an essential element of cohesion in the various contexts
experienced and discursively represented by the interacting agents.
Conclusion: reframing a social practice
To conclude, I would like to return briefly to the final comment made by the client
before her cell phone rings. After the completion of her narrative, she thanks the
assistant and seems to initiate a closing sequence. She then briefly addresses 
the assistant by saying: ‘you must meet strange people sometimes don’t you?’
Her question produces various interesting effects on the situation. First, it
contains an appreciation of her own conduct and manifests a reflexive attitude
regarding what has happened in the encounter. The client and the assistant are 
not only acting together, but they are also sharing considerations about how 
their actions have been carried out. Second, this statement ascribes a judgment of
‘strangeness’ to her contribution to the encounter. By doing so, she makes explicit
that service encounters are framed by underlying expectations, and that her
behavior may be seen as challenging such expectations: in her view, simulating the
handling of a compass and proposing an extended narrative of past and private
experience are not usual contributions associated with the role of a client.
In sum, this example shows that discourse assumes important functions in the
way actors orient themselves in mediated actions: it makes social practices visible
by expressing some of the premises that frame the situation (see Goffman, 1974);
and it enables the participants to negotiate these premises by taking distance with
the frame. From this standpoint, it becomes crucially important to go beyond a
clear-cut delimitation between deterministic and more constructionist approaches











































specific situations, mediated actions do not come down to a predetermined set of
scripted conducts. Nor can they be described satisfactorily as strictly emergent
processes. Rather, they are best conceived as a combination of both typified social
knowledge and interpersonal negotiation, in which language intersects with other
mediational means.
By exploring the various ways in which action and discourse may be related,
MDA aims to bring some discipline and systematic methodology to such a fine-
grained conceptualization of mediated action. It is in this sense that it proposes to
go beyond a strict delimitation opposing ‘text’ and ‘context’ and to elaborate new
approaches for describing the complex linkages between language and society.
Notes
1 ‘. . . an instance of face-to-face interaction between a server who is “officially posted”
in some service area, that interaction being oriented to the satisfaction of the
customer’s presumed desire for some service and the server’s obligation to provide
that service’ (Merritt quoted by Aston, 1988: 27).
2 In order to deal with frequent space shifting, the data were collected by means of a
light recording device. Seventeen volunteer sellers had been equipped with micro-
phones and portable mini-disc recorders. The clients were informed about the
recordings by means of posters made visible at the entrance of the store. Additional
information was provided to those who wanted to know more about the research. The
recording was complemented by fieldnotes.
3 I use the following transcription conventions: (.) (..) indicate appropriately timed
pauses; (::) indicates that the syllable is lengthened; underlining indicates overlapping
talk; and square brackets ([ ]) mark nonverbal behavior or events; uninterpretable
sequences are transcribed with XXX.
4 Following Drew and Heritage (1992: 22), one can define institutional interaction as
follows:
Institutional interaction involves an orientation by at least one of the participants
to some core goal, task or identity (or set of them) conventionally associated with
the institution in question. In short, institutional talk is normally informed by goal
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11 Place, pace, and meaning:
multimedia chronotopes
Jay Lemke
We make meaning along our lives’ traversals: across real and virtual spaces, across
multiple institutions, genres, media, and semiotic systems. We do so in real time,
across multiple timescales of action and activity, from the blink of an eye to the
work of a lifetime. But how do we succeed in coherently integrating the meaning
of a moment into the meanings of minutes, days, months, and lifetimes? How do
momentary actions come to be seen as situated activities and social practices?
In this chapter, I develop a conceptual framework within which to give accounts
of how the prior coherence of places and of the discursive imaginaries of multi-
scale projects helps us constitute meaning through time. I use Bakhtin’s notion 
of the chronotope (Bakhtin, 1981b) to represent culturally typical movements 
and pacings along trajectories of activity, and combine this with my own develop-
ment of the principle of heterochrony, according to which meaningful activities 
are linked across timescales by our use of discursive-semiotic artifacts (Lemke,
2000a).
To make these issues more concrete, I illustrate meaning-making across both
real and virtual environments, by focusing on how temporal and spatial coherence
is achieved in the interactive, immersive, multimedia environment of a computer
gameworld.
Theory as toolkit
I began my intellectual and academic life as a theoretical physicist, so I have a
profound regard for the value of theory, but also a considerable skepticism about
the excessive claims sometimes made for it. Theories are not meant to be ‘master
discourses’ providing the keys to the kingdom. They do not consist of universal
and timeless or culture-free objective truths. They are simply assemblages of
intellectual tools. In the case of well-developed theories these tools have long 
been found to work well together, complementing and extending one another in










































a historical continuity in theory development, from bricolage to paradigmatic
theory, but the stuff of theory remains merely an assemblage of tools, not truths.
In a sense, this view of theory as assemblage of tools is entirely parallel to 
R. Scollon’s (2001a) notion of a nexus of practices insofar as an intellectual tool
is nothing at all apart from the practices in which we use it, and the kind of
assemblage a theory represents is, indeed, a nexus in Scollon’s sense: an emergent
system of interdependent practices, discursive and non-discursive, always
material, organized around some recognizable activity (here the activity of theory-
based inquiry), and the product of a specific history. Indeed, it is the product of
history on short timescales and long ones, from the interpretative instantiation 
of the theory in the course of a specific ‘application’ of it, to our own biographical
and educational ontogenesis as users of the theory, to the socio-cultural history of
the development of theory in the context of a variety of long-lived social
institutions. I put ‘application’ in quotes because I do not believe that theory
remains unchanged when we bring it to use in a particular inquiry. The practices
of tool-using necessarily enter into the mediated action of an inquiry in ways that
require them to be modified and adapted as they are co-ordinated with other
practices to get something done. They are differently adapted in each case, though
we can of course construct some invariants and similarities from case to case 
to imagine a certain stability to our tools or cultural practices. Tool and practice
are nouns, but nouns I want to use for naming processes, not things; they have a
different sort of identity and stability from things, despite grammar and its
sometimes misleading semantic connotations. A theory, as an assemblage of tools-
for-practice, an abstract system of imagined relationships among classes of partial
similarities of observable processes or actions, is about as little like a thing you can
have, know, or believe in, as I can imagine.
What kinds of tools form a useful toolkit for asking and answering questions
about the continuity of action and meaning through time? Certainly we need a
serviceable semiotics of discursive and non-discursive meaning-making as action:
a multimedia semiotics, a multi-modal semiotics, a semiotics of action. I tend to
make my own tools of this kind (Lemke, 1995, 1999, 2002b) but their historical
roots lie in the linguistic social semiotics of Michael Halliday (1978) with some
borrowings from C.S. Peirce (1998) and M.M. Bakhtin (1981a, 1981b). Extending
them to a semiotics of action and multimodality, including visual semiotics and the
semiotics of sound has been the work of a large community which shares these
roots (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996, 2001; Thibault, 2000; van Leeuwen, 1999).
We also need a phenomenology of space and time, which may not yet be a
theory of how time, space, and movement are used as semiotic resources, but
which alerts us to how our experience of time and space play a role in what 
is meaningful to us (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962; Husserl, 1992; Heidegger,
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structuralism regarding the importance of pacing and timing is very important
here. The contrast between the view of space and time in modern physics and the
phenomenological view, particularly of time, and the development of models of
social space and place in postmodern social geography (Crang and Thrift, 2000;
Lefebvre, 1991; Thrift, 1996) opens up many possibilities for conceptualizing
timing, pacing, duration, built space, abstract space, felt space, etc.
Finally, we need some sort of social ecology, a theory of the complex ecological
systems that human societies and our artifacts form as integral parts of larger ‘natural’
ecologies (Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Salthe, 1993). This, too, is not quite a
theory as yet, but we need from it: concepts such as interdependence, organizational
hierarchies (which are not the same as power or control hierarchies), emergence,
and most importantly, timescales. When our fundamental tools, and our objects of
inquiry, are processes rather than things or persons as such, it is not just spatial-
extensional scales from small constituents to large aggregations that matter, but 
how processes that occur on short timescales become embedded in and potentially
cumulative towards longer timescale processes (Lemke, 2000a).
How do they? My basic theoretical tools for posing and answering this question
are the concepts of heterochrony and semiotic artifact. In the general theory 
of complex systems which are organized across multiple scales (e.g. molecules
within organelles within cells within tissues within organs within organisms within
ecosystems . . .), the laws of physics and chemistry (themselves tools, of course,
embedded in practices) more or less require that processes on vastly different
timescales be independent of one another (basically because they can’t efficiently
transfer energy, and so information, back and forth). But in human eco-social
systems the addition of semiotic artifacts, such as material texts or architectural
blueprints, means that events distant in time can become indirectly coupled to one
another (e.g. design and construction) and so events on short timescales (which
happen quickly) such as drawing a blueprint or reading one, and processes that take
place slowly, over much longer timescales (like building a cathedral) become
coupled or linked. In eco-social systems with material meaning-carriers (signifiers,
signs), processes on very different timescales do exchange information (this is
heterochrony), not via direct energy-coupling but through the indirect means of sign-
users (writers and readers who are also enactors of other sorts of material action)
interacting with semiotic artifacts (material structures that can carry meaning for
us) that, as things (not processes, or at least not for present purposes) persist across
timescales that are long compared to the timescale of ‘writing’ or ‘reading’ them.
Here, too, the notion of a nexus of practices is useful. For it helps us to understand
how discursive processes (which are essentially semiotic processes in my terms,
generalizing from discourse and language to all semiotic modalities) come to be
interdependent in activity with other material processes (like holding the pencil,











































material activities like placing a stone in building a cathedral. (Of course the
cathedral itself is a semiotic artifact no less than the blueprint for its construction,
but the nexus of practices in building it from the blueprint is different from that
of, say, reading the cathedral as a historical ‘document.’) We often use one
semiotic artifact in the practices of constructing another, and this is in fact a direct
generalization of the principle of intertextuality.
How do our tools work together as a theory? Imagine yourself walking 
down the nave of a gothic cathedral. You feel the space and its complexity
phenomenologically even as you ‘read’ its architectural plan semiotically and
combine those meanings with the ones you make by reading the visual images 
of its stained glass windows and the textual inscriptions on gravestones under-
foot. You are engaged in an activity, in a whole set of activities on different
timescales, from a glance down to a step forward, from walking to ‘touring 
the cathedral’ to ‘seeing the town’ to ‘being on vacation.’ You are doing all 
these things in every moment, not one now and the others later.
You are moving at a certain pace, and rushing down the nave full-tilt would
vastly change your experience of the space, the meanings you could make of
images and texts, and the meaning for you of the activity itself. Not to mention
that you would be behaving in a culturally inappropriate manner for the type of
place you are in. Around you other people are engaging in the whole range 
of typical and appropriate activities for a cathedral setting, and for a particular
time of day and day in the year. You could read their activities as signs, just 
as they could read yours. You can sign the visitor’s book and leave a semiotic-
material trace that can be read hundreds of years from now, as we read such signs
from times past. Reading the material signs in the cathedral, some created a very
long time ago, influences our present behavior, and our present behavior thus
becomes in some small part a moment in long-term processes of social continuity
and cultural change.
As we move through our tourist day, we are producing a trajectory that
traverses across settings and activities. In seeing the town we are now in the cath-
edral and now in the park or the museum, we are at lunch in the café on the square
or resting on a bench by the river. In each setting there are different expectations,
different affordances, things it’s possible to do and things it’s culturally appropriate
to do. There are different semiotic artifacts available, cueing us in to actions we
can perform with them (ordering from the menu, seeing the museum piece in
light of the accompanying description, re-experiencing the square overlaid with a
performance in son et lumiere). We move from setting to setting, from institution
to institution, from genre to genre of semiotic artifact, from activity to activity.
And they are not, for us, at the time, or retrospectively, disconnected. They are
experienced with a continuity, they can be coherently narrated, the trajectory 
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I use the concept of traversal (Lemke, 2002a, 2003) to foreground continuity across
difference: across different media, settings, institutional expectations, activities,
etc. I appropriate from Mikhail Bakhtin the notion of a chronotope for the culturally
typical movements from place to place, each with its own characteristic timing
and pacing, that characterize complex extended human activity every bit as much
as they do the spatio-temporal organization of action in a novel (Bakhtin, 1981b).
Space and time in The Sims
The Sims [Deluxe Edition; Maxis, 2002] has been called by its principal designer,
Will Wright, more of a ‘software toy’ than a game. It is regarded as an innovative
and pioneering game largely because prior popular games were mainly about
achieving hard-programmed puzzle-solving or foe-vanquishing goals whereas The
Sims has no such goals or criteria of winning or losing, and the use of artificial
intelligence (AI) programming techniques in its design makes for surprisingly 
life-like behavior by the simulated characters in the game.
Wright and his company came to The Sims from prior experience develop-
ing their equally pioneering SimCity series [Maxis 1989, 2003], in which the 
player-user could build model cities and their infrastructures and manage them
dynamically in response to the needs of their imaginary populations.
The SimCity heritage is most evident in The Sims in the tools provided to the
player-user for building homes or remodeling existing ones. What is new is the
ability to create individual inhabitants, or import them ‘off the shelf.’ They have
assignable personality traits, rather like characters in familiar role-playing fantasy
games (e.g. Baldur’s Gate, Everquest), but they also have ‘moods’: degrees of happi-
ness or need (hunger, sleep/energy, socializing, calls of nature, etc.). You can
create a household group of one to six ‘sims’ (simulated persons) and move them
into a pre-fab or purpose-built house. Once in the house, they begin to ‘live’ by
moving around, talking to one another (in a language that has recognizable intona-
tion and attitude, but nonsense vocabulary), using the toilet, demanding food 
or sleep, etc.
The initial point of the game is to make them happy (or torment them, if you
so choose). In addition to the basic ‘Living’ mode, you can put their lives on hold
while you Build (re-model the house) or simply Buy (and place purchased
furnishings in the rooms of the house). You are a voyeur in their lives, seeing their
actions, interpreting their desires, and monitoring their needs by means of a
graphic display of mood and other state variables. You can intervene in their 
on-going activity by issuing commands for them to interact with objects in the
house: use the toilet, make coffee, go to bed, change clothes at the dresser, etc.1
My initial concern here is to sketch out something of the role of space and time,











































chronotopes, traversals, and heterochrony can be applied in making sense of the
development of meaningful action across sites, media, and timescales.
Consider first the semiotics and phenomenology of space and place. In the spirit
of an action-centered or processual approach, let us not ask what the spaces and
places of The Sims are, but rather how we know them through what we do. If we
simply start the game, we can observe the inhabitants going about the business of
their lives, and this includes seeing them walk from room to room, climb stairs
from level to level, and walk around tables and other objects. We see the spaces of
this place as they are defined by actions undertaken within them. But we can also
change our own viewpoint on the household, by altering the angle of our isometric
perspective and shifting view between upstairs and downstairs. We can also zoom
in and zoom out, changing the scale of images relative to the viewing screen.
The Sims does not allow us to actually see the gameworld as if through the eyes
of a character in it (first-person perspective), which some other games do (e.g.
Doom, Quake). But it does allow us to get to know space and place in two other,
very powerful ways. One is an affordance of the ‘Buy’ mode, in which having
purchased an item of furnishing from a menu we can position and place this item
somewhere in the house where it fits. With the kinesthetic sense of moving the
mouse, integrated with a visual display of locations and pre-existing objects, we
maneuver the new item to a position where it is not in conflict with other objects.
Just as in real life, we come to know space and place through such actions, and
not simply by passive observation or by watching the actions of others. In the Build
mode, we can go further and create or delete sections of walls, and we can 
re-surface the floors. In these ways, too, we come to know the spaces and places
of the gameworld. We also are forced by the logic of the game and of architectural
form to consider relationships of interior and exterior views, and of walls that
define spaces and rooms above and below on different floors.
I should say here that I use both the term space and the term place because 
the former connotes the abstract, available geometric volume, while the latter
reminds us that real (or virtual) spaces are always also places, defined by what they
contain and by the actions we perform in them. How then are space and place
used as semiotic and phenomenological resources in The Sims?
Spatial resources can be used to separate scenes and places, at various distances,
and to create multi-scale assemblages of items, from the artifacts and appliances
in a kitchen, to the rooms of a house, to the houses of a neighborhood (all visible
in The Sims). Walls can separate and so can lawns, outdoor spaces, rivers, high-
ways, etc. Conversely, spatial resources can be used to connect: as doors connect
rooms or interior and exterior spaces, and walks or paths (indoor and outdoor)
connect locations. Even windows connect; in The Sims you can really see through
a window to the actual scene outside or inside. Movement itself can connect as
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as we observe a sim move in these ways. In ‘Buy’ and ‘Position’ mode, we usually
avoid placing an object so as to block a doorway, enacting our knowledge of
connection and separation. In Build mode, we create doorways and align vistas
and pathways, as well as creating separating walls and thinking about where the
window and door should be placed in a bathroom.
The topology and topography of place in the gameworld affects the action: 
how far is it to the nearest toilet when a Sim has an urgent need? Is the television
that needs to be turned off before collapsing on the bed to rest en route to the 
bed or in a different direction? You can’t maintain a conversation, or propose 
a kiss, between characters unless they find themselves in the same room at the
same time.
Separation and connection, placement, and distance are not just enabling and
constraining facts of life regarding action, they are also resources for expressive
meaning-making. Interior design layout and placement, architectural organization
of spaces and places afford expressive semiotic potential for the player-user, and
in fact the sims themselves respond to room design as a factor in their happiness.
Artifacts are not considered part of a space, but they are certainly part of a
place, if we define place (or occupied space) in terms of what can be done there.
Much of the structural organization that defines a place depends on the relative
positioning of artifacts within it (as a room is given its character by the arrangement
of its furnishings). If the sofa in front of the television faces away from it, rather
than towards it, affordances for action change.
The dynamics of space and place makes an immediate connection to time and
pace, and these too are semiotic and phenomenological resources. When we
experience space, whether by walking through it, using objects in it, positioning
its moveable elements, or re-modeling its ‘fixed’ elements, we do so on some
timescale. The aspects of time (and aspect, with its formal grammatical sense, is a
particularly apt term here) are relevant for all action: duration, rate or pace,
repetition and cycles or rhythms, acceleration and deceleration, incipience and
termination. ‘Timing’ can mean the punctual moment in time when something
happens, and it can also mean the relative rates at which processes take place.
Timescales are the characteristic times or rates of processes: the time for a process
to complete, the time for a full cycle to return to any point. Phenomenologically,
we can feel that an activity has a leisurely pace or a hurried, pressured pace 
of varying degree. We might also judge, semiotically, that an event happened at
just the right moment (Gr. kairos), or too soon, or too late (by degree). We may
feel phenomenologically that events are taking place much too slowly (bored) or
much too quickly (frantic). Some actions are materially or semantically on-going
or completed and completable or not, repeatable or not, and interruptible/
resumable or not. Some actions are also reversible or not, not just in their











































This view of temporality provides a rich repertory of conceptual tools for
analyzing how time plays a role in action and meaning. Consider some aspects of
temporality in The Sims.
There is a clock that runs in the Living mode, visible on screen in a control
panel area superimposed at the bottom of the household scene. User-players 
can change the rate of the clock, and the associated actions of the sims and other
game events to fast and ultra-fast settings. Normal time in The Sims runs 
much faster than in life outside the gameworld (24 hours passes in about 30
minutes). You cannot slow down gametime, but you can pause the game and stop
the clock, by command, or automatically when you leave Living mode for Buy,
Build, or other mode options. This creates a complex relationship between 
time as experienced by and relevant to the sims in the game and time for the
user-player.
Activities, which are discrete routines (prepare breakfast, read a book, take a
nap or a bath), have in some cases inherent fixed durations that may be relatively
longer or shorter. In other cases duration may be variable depending on need (e.g.
a longer nap when more rest is needed). Some routines may be interrupted and
others not, some can be instantly terminated and others will run on for a while
after you try to terminate them. Activities can usually not be resumed, or only
from some specified point. There are cyclic activities, from frequent bladder relief
to once-a-day breakfasts, trips to work, etc. There are timescales in the game from
the short ones of specific menu-commanded activities, to the longer ones (multiple
days) that it takes to develop a friendship or relationship by repeated positive social
interactions or to move up a career ladder (often by acquiring more friends and
business contacts, and so on a timescale one order of magnitude longer than that
for developing friends).
But how do activities on shorter timescales cumulate to forward projects on
longer timescales? For this we turn to other conceptual tools: chronotopes and
heterochrony.
Chronotopes and heterochrony in The Sims
Chronotopes are typical movements from place to place with their associated
times of passage and pacings of events. In Bakhtin they are associated with the
spatio-temporal organization of narratives, and represent the first insight that space
and time were themselves narrative, and so semiotic, resources which could be
flexibly and creatively manipulated and deployed, and were not simply givens,
backdrops to plot and action. There need not in principle be any chronotopes in
The Sims: every day could be different, time spent in any given place could be
different from one occasion to the next, the next place we go from here might
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no relationship to place. Chronotopes represent a kind of routinization of life on
longer timescales than individual events or activities. They provide a measure of
predictability and a sense of expectation about how long we should spend some-
where, how fast events should take place in this setting vs. that one, what should
come next.
For the sims themselves, there are some default chronotopes. They have a
cultural routine for the day: getting up, using the toilet and shower, getting
dressed, having breakfast, greeting other members of the household, going to
work, coming home, eating dinner, using the toilet again, watching television or
talking with friends and family, going to bed. There are typical places associated
with these activities, and typical timings of events. We move from bedroom to
bathroom to kitchen; events pass slowly in the bedroom (sleep, dreams), less so
in the bathroom (long soaks in the tub to quick relief ), and in the kitchen may
include a hurried breakfast to be on time for the carpool (it doesn’t wait long, and
if you miss it you may be fired). But the joy of playing the game comes from
altering these default routines, sending the sims to swim in the pool, read a book,
dance with each other, get romantically involved. Players create chronotopes 
in organizing narrative meaning in the daily life of their sims. We work with 
and against the default chronotopes of the game (which tend to emerge from a
hierarchy of needs, so they are not strict: a sim may decide to play a video game
before breakfast). Other games have much more predictable chronotopes (e.g. in
role-playing fantasy games, we often find slow-paced travel, preparation against
attack, fast-paced fighting, slow healing after the fight, more travel and finally rest
as a typical chronotope, with each element happening in its own typical time and
setting and with its own typical pace of events).
User-players of course also have chronotopes in relation to their activity of
playing the game. These can differ significantly from those created for their in-
game characters’ lives. The user comes to the game in the Neighborhood screen,
where time does not pass, and events are generated by our own actions. We then
usually enter a household and observe the mood-state of our sims, perhaps pausing
the game on our arrival, if we had not done so before we quit the game. We can
leisurely interpret the graphic displays for time, degree of rest, hunger, need for
fun and socializing, etc. We can plan out what each of our sims is going to do 
for the first hours of the coming day. We unpause the game and the action begins,
the sims following our instructions, but sometimes deviating for their own needs,
or when unforeseen events occur (a visitor at the door, the phone rings). The
pacing of our experience in the Living household is much faster than in our reading
of the mood displays while the action is paused. We can also switch into Buy mode
or Build mode, and each of these has its own typical activities and pace: Buying
and placing are fast, Building is slow; each involves phases of planning, acting, and











































place in Living (paused vs. running), Buying, and Building modes. In each of these
virtual places there are different activities and pacings. And we enact a traversal
across these spaces in playing the game.
Our player trajectory constitutes a traversal insofar as it moves across spaces
with different affordances for activity, different media and semiotic artifacts. It
instantiates a chronotope to the extent that it is culturally typical and repeated, with
definite expectations. But whether typical or not, how do we cumulate meaning
and longer-term activities, agendas, or projects along such traversals?
Heterochrony is the mixing of timescales, the coupling and interdependence of
processes that occur very quickly, on short timescales, and those that take place
over much longer periods of time. Perhaps the most important aspect of hetero-
chrony is the coupling of short-term meaningful action with long-term projects,
persistence, and cumulation over time. The persistence of a type of action is enabled
by the persistence of the actants (Latour, 1987) which participate in it. Actant is
Latour’s borrowing from Greimas’ semiotics of narrative as a term to stand for
both human and nonhuman participants, for agents, patients, and instruments in a
process or activity. For all that process as such is characterized by energy and
dynamics, it is matter that provides inertia for the persistence of structure in time,
and so for the persistence of the signs that an interpreting agency can read as
information some long time after or, at least, long compared to the timescale of
inscribing the information in matter or interpreting its traces there as meaning-
ful. Every process is in this sense a nexus, not only of practices but of practitioners
and what they practice with and upon (cf. Halliday’s (1976) analysis of the semantics
of participants in material process clauses in language). As Peirce points out, a 
sign is not functional as a sign until the representamen, the material signifier, is 
joined to its object, the signified, by the action of creating the interpretant which 
links them, i.e. by the action of some material system that does the work of
interpretation, the work of semiosis (Lemke, 2000b; Peirce, 1998). So, in all sign-
mediated activity we need the material signifiers and interpreters, and in all activity
that participates in heterochrony, it is their material persistence that enables them
to participate at the same time in short-term practices and long-term processes,
continuing to enable homologous interpreting practices to re-occur even at great
distance in time.
Any trace of action left in matter can be read as, at the least, an indexical sign
of the occurrence of that action in the past. Our actions in every present moment
are only possible because of the affordances of material artifacts and conditions,
each of which potentially influences the shape of our actions not just through its
material form and properties, but also through the meaning it may have for us.
The semiotically mediated bearing of the traces of the past on present events











































Place, pace, and meaning 119
In The Sims, there are many ways in which virtual material persistence (i.e. the
material memory of the computer translated into observable images and actions)
affords cumulation of activity and meaning over longer timescales. The built
architectural space of the house itself can function as an environmental memory,
enabling persistent affordances for some kinds of action and not others. The
inventory and spatial placement of the furnishings of the house also does so. The
character of the individual sims persists from their creation and their original basic
traits (degree of neatness, playfulness, etc.) persist unchanged and do influence
behavior in each moment. The continuing material persistence of each sim, as
such, provides affordances for momentary actions (e.g. conversation, renewal of
friendship previously established).
Much of what persists also changes, on some specific timescale. The skill levels
of each sim, reported in the graphical display of the game state, slowly increase
with learning and practice (e.g. cooking skill by reading cookbooks). The state 
of friendships and other relationships advances or retreats with successful or 
unsuccessful interactions and the passage of time (friendships must be maintained
or they erode). Career ladder advancement depends partly on skills and partly 
on social contacts and changes much more slowly. Moods on their various dimen-
sions change with passing time (bladders fill, energy wanes) and with activities
(drinking coffee, taking a nap) much more quickly than relationships, skills, or
careers develop. But in all these cases there is cumulation of the consequences 
of momentary activities in these longer-term cumulative indices, and the indices
in turn are ‘read’ by the game program in each cycle and influence short-term sim
behavior.
Player-users also read these indices as they are graphically displayed, and 
we too adjust our instructions to the sims accordingly. If we are promoting a
friendship or a courtship, we notice eroding relationship indices and move to
strengthen these bonds. We cannot write notes to ourselves within the game, 
to be read later as reminders of projects in progress, though we can create a
chronological ‘photo album’ of snapshots that might serve a similar function, or
set the game to automatically export webpages depicting our evolving households.
(The new Sims2 will also support making ‘home movies.’) Most of the cumulation
of information across events is tracked and displayed by the program itself, auto-
matically. Still, I often write myself notes and reminders of what is needed for 
the next play session. I have created neighbors as prospective friends for my
original sims. The very existence of their occupied house in the Neighborhood
screen, and the existence of these new sims serves as a material reminder of my
long-term friendship-building project, even as it makes it materially possible in
the game.
Ed Hutchins, Chuck Goodwin, Ron Scollon, and other analysts of situated or











































meaningful activity is mediated by artifacts, documents, and persistently available
other persons in related roles (Goodwin, 2000, 2002; Hutchins, 1995a; R. Scollon,
2001a). An analysis in terms of chronotopes and heterochrony extends this
perspective to longer timescales and longer-term projects that entrain many specific
activities in different times and places.
I have only sketched here the beginnings of such an analysis for the role of space,
place, time, pace, and material semiotic artifacts and actants across a range of
extensional and temporal scales for one virtual gameworld. I believe however that
such simplified worlds are now complex enough to embody the key elements and
strategies shared with the far richer repertoires of sign-mediated activity in our
own lifeworlds. Certainly they are a good deal easier to study.
Further steps
What I have provided here is only an outline and a prospectus for the much larger
project of doing an activity-centered analysis of the semiotics and phenomenology
of heterochrony in gameworlds. I have not mentioned the specific role of text and
discourse as such, nor issues of how we integrate meanings across verbal and visual
modalities. These are also central to my research interests. Analyses also need to
be made across a range of different gameworld genres, because each simplified
gameworld will foreground only some of the key principles and strategies at work
in making meaning through space and across time.
Meanings made within gameworlds also connect to meanings made across the
constructed boundaries between gameworlds and lifeworlds. We need to under-
stand traversals that construct meaning as we enter and leave the gameworld, and
as we find the themes and images of the gameworld re-presented to us in other
media elsewhere in our lives. As I go about the routine matters of my own daily
life at home, I now find my experience in The Sims overlaid on its meanings for
me as I remark how game-like aspects of my life are. And there is a real possibility
that my lifeworld choices and actions, as well as these reflective meanings, will
change as a result of my gameworld experiences.
On a larger scale, as I have discussed elsewhere (Lemke, 2004), many game-
worlds today are part of transmedia ‘franchises’ that show themselves to us in
many guises across time, space, settings, and media. Gameworlds associated with
the Lord of the Rings franchise present themes and images, philosophies and
ideologies, that we re-encounter in films, books, toys, other games, and a vast
array of commercial merchandise. How do we make meaning across these instan-
tiations of the franchise? How do we critique and critically analyze the power of
these post-modern media to continue to influence us even as our new traversal
lifestyles (Lemke, 2002a, 2003) begin to give us some freedom from individual










































Place, pace, and meaning 121
From analysis within gameworlds we need to look outward, beyond individual
texts, traversals, and genres to begin to more fundamentally and more compre-
hensively understand how we make meaning, and how we are oftentimes led to
make meaning, not only across media, but across the places and moments of our
lives.
Note
1 To get a better sense of the game, you can view still photos of game scenes or
demonstration videos (www.gamespot.com/pc/strategy/sims/index.html?q=sims
or www.thesims.ea.com/us/index.html?menu=about&content=about/index.html),











































12 Using multiple situation
definitions to create hybrid
activity space
Shawn Rowe
Analysts working in a variety of traditions (i.e. critical discourse analysis, mediated
discourse, nexus analysis, symbolic interactionism, activity theory, sociocultural
analysis) look to interlocutors’ beliefs about what sort of discursive activity they
are involved in as a crucial part of reconstructing and understanding situated
utterances and actions.1 In Gumperz’s terms:
The hypothesis is that any utterance can be understood in numerous ways,
and that people make decisions about how to interpret a given utterance based
on their definition of what is happening at the time of interaction.
(Gumperz, 1982b: 130)
This ‘definition of what is happening at the time’ goes by a variety of names:
situation definitions (Goffman, 1959; Linell, 1998; Rommetviet, 1988; Wertsch,
1984, 1985a), frames (Bateson, 1972; Goffman, 1974), schema (Bartlett, 1932),
language games (Wittgenstein, 1958), or activity types (Levinson, 1978) to name
a few of the most recognizable. Perhaps the most detailed analysis of situation
definitions is that by Goffman (1959, 1974) who put the definition of the situa-
tion as the basis of social interactions. But whereas for Goffman the definition of
situation and its management are chiefly projections of social actors, I draw on the
work of Linell (1998), Scollon (1998), and Wertsch (1984, 1985a) to define 
the term ‘situation definition’ as a socioculturally particular type of activity or context
that specifies what we are doing at a given moment or what we take to be the background
against which our utterances and actions are to be interpreted.
The place of situation definitions in teaching and learning activities is of interest
in a mediated discourse (Scollon, 1998) or mediated action (Wertsch, 1991, 1998)
approach. From the point of view of mediated discourse, learning may be thought
of as the appropriation of mediational means for both cognitive and communicative
purposes which include but are not limited to the development of identity as a










































includes learning how to use particular mediational means that carry their own
social, cultural, and historical affordances and constraints to define situations.
In this chapter, I explore some ways in which interlocutors can invoke multiple
situation definitions to create activity spaces where multiple ways of knowing and
discursive goals coexist. I call these hybrid activity spaces. They are interesting to
those studying learning as mediated discourse because in hybrid activity spaces 
the power to define the situation may shift as interlocutors move creatively and
strategically among multiple social languages (Bakhtin, 1981a), speech genres
(Bakhtin, 1986) and ways of knowing and demonstrating knowledge.
The first part of the chapter is a theoretical discussion of meaning making as a
process of contextualization and deals with three aspects of situation definitions
that relate to meaning making, agency, and power:
• situation definitions establish contexts for making meaning;
• situation definitions are dynamic and only partially shared;
• situation definitions are associated with authority.
The second part of the chapter draws on transcripts of group interaction in an
interactive science museum to show some of the ways that social languages and
speech genres are invoked by both adults and children to establish multiple
situation definitions and finally hybrid activity spaces. I conclude with a discussion
of the affordances and constraints of hybrid activity spaces and their implications
for understanding agency in learning.
Situation definitions establish contexts for 
making meaning
We often make a distinction between literal meaning (denotation) and other kinds
of meaning (connotation), but even the literal meaning of a word (much less an
action) is not its dictionary definition. Literal meaning is contextual, constructed,
and situated (Gee, 1999) since it is dependent on physical and socio-cultural
contexts of uttering and acting and the responses to those utterances and actions
given by interlocutors (Hanks, 1996). To assign meaning to a given string of move-
ments or sounds is to ‘lay down a set of our own answering words’ (Voloshinov,
1973: 102) that contextualize the action and/or utterance and construct a ‘situated
meaning’ (Gee, 1999) out of both it and our response to it.
Situation definitions are part of constructing situated meanings because they
concern ‘the way in which objects and events in a situation are represented 
or defined’ (Wertsch, 1985a: 159), and they are thus intimately related to the
possible meanings that utterances, actions, and objects have for interlocutors at a











































of Rommetviet (1974) who stresses ‘that any situation, event, or object has many
possible interpretations and that speech serves to impose a particular interpreta-
tion and create a temporarily shared social reality’ (Wertsch, 1985a: 160). Making
meaning of actions and utterances thus involves the imposition or recognition 
of the context(s) within which they appear, and that recognition has to do with
establishing situation definitions.
The contexts within which an utterance or action may have meaning are
potentially limitless, so the problem is to understand how we as interlocutors 
or as analysts decide which contexts are more or less appropriate and relevant 
at a given time for making meaning of a given utterance or action. Speakers 
and respondents have at their disposal a host of strategies such as indexicality
(Silverstein, 1976) and contextualization cues (Gumperz, 1982b) for making
certain contexts relevant at a given moment and thus certain objects, people,
actions, beliefs, etc. salient for making meaning.
But to say that such strategies simply index contexts is somewhat misleading.
It encourages us to assume that the contexts of speaking always exist first before
we speak. Some of course do, but contextualization cues can also be used to create
contexts. For Gumperz (1982b: 131) contextualization cues are ‘the means by
which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how semantic
content is to be understood and how each sentence relates to what precedes or
follows.’ Contextualization cues include ‘any feature of linguistic form that
contributes to the signaling of contextual presuppositions.’
Contextualization cues are thus examples of how situated and literal meanings
are both constituted by contexts and constitutive of contexts. Language is full 
of contextualization cues. More accurately, different social languages (Bakhtin,
1981a) exploit different grammatical and lexical and pragmatic aspects of language
as contextualization cues (Gee, 1999). Part of becoming a member of a social
group is mastering the contextualization cues appropriate to a given social 
language that indicate (and create) the conditions in which that social language 
is relevant.
Situation definitions are dynamic and only 
partially shared
Once they have been established, however, situation definitions are neither
monolithic nor static. While open conflict between situation definitions is rare
(Goffman, 1959: 9), multiple situation definitions often do exist simultaneously
since ‘interlocutors may differ and may change in their representations of the same
set of objects and events’ (Wertsch, 1985a: 159) or because ‘actors sometimes
entertain more or less competing situation definitions of the interaction in which










































Using multiple situation definitions 125
Wertsch and Linell both argue that the existence of competing situation
definitions and the process of coming to share situation definitions is a crucial
feature of learning. The process by which novices come to share situation defini-
tions with experts is an important element of socio-cultural accounts of learning.
The key to learning in these accounts is establishing and maintaining a shared
situation definition – one that the expert has already mastered and the novice may
not yet share. This state of shared situation definition is what Rommetviet (1974)
calls intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity names what we presuppose as minimally
shared when we participate in a conversation. Rommetviet stresses its provisional,
negotiated nature:
The basic problem of human intersubjectivity becomes a question concerning
in what sense and under what conditions two persons who engage in a
dialogue can transcend their different private worlds. And the linguistic basis
for this enterprise is not a fixed repertory of shared literal meaning, but very
general and partially negotiated drafts of contracts concerning categorization
and attribution inherent in ordinary language.
(Rommetviet and Blakar, 1979: 7)
This contract further concerns rules for role taking and intermeshing of
participant goals and motives. Intersubjectivity thus underlies all successful com-
munication and learning and exists ‘when interlocutors share some aspect of 
their situation definitions’ (Wertsch, 1985a: 159). But establishing and maintain-
ing intersubjectivity involves establishing and maintaining shared situation defi-
nitions which, in turn, involves establishing and maintaining agreement (or
assuming agreement) on ways of categorizing and attributing the intentions of parti-
cipants, the motives of activity and goals of actions, and the roles and positionalities
of participants as speakers and audience, whether addressees or onlookers.
In this sense, learning is the appropriation of cultural tools for both communica-
tive and cognitive purposes, and the first step in this process is negotiating shared
situation definitions. But since situation definitions are not static and monolithic,
neither is the state of intersubjectivity that allows for learning: ‘Intersubjectivity
exists when interlocutors share some aspect of their situation definitions. Typic-
ally this overlap may occur at several levels, and hence several levels of inter-
subjectivity may exist’ (Wertsch, 1985a: 159). But they may also be only partially
shared and may change over the course of an interaction with negotiation. That
negotiation may be explicit (‘Wait, I thought we were having a friendly
conversation . . .’), or different situation definitions may be made relevant
through the use of different contextualization cues.
Of course, this does not mean that interlocutors or analysts always ‘pick up’











































analysts share complete understanding of the cues or the contexts the cues help
create. But as part of everyday activity and communication, we act as if we do in
fact share them. This process, however, takes work because meaning making is 
an active process of contextualization, or as Linell (1998) argues, recontextualization
and learning is in part the process of becoming expert at using appropriate
contextualization cues that create or subvert intersubjectivity.
Situation definitions are associated with authority
Situation definitions are associated with authority, but this is not a neutral process.
Situation definitions have a moral character since they carry rights and responsibili-
ties for interlocutors (Goffman, 1959: 9–13). Making meaning by recontextual-
izing utterances and actions requires what Gee calls ‘recognizing and being
recognized’ as a particular type of person engaged in a particular kind of activity.
To be making meaning is to be involved in the production and transformations 
of Discourses, ‘socially accepted associations among ways of using language, of
thinking, valuing, acting, and interacting, in the “right” places and at the “right”
times with the “right” objects’ (Gee, 1999: 17). The processes of recognition work
that are part of making meaning through Discourses are far from passive. Both the
producer and the consumer of Discourse are intimately involved in the continua-
tion and/or transformation of the Discourse. Speaking and acting, we (re)create
and transform our world. For each word, we ‘lay down a set of answering words’
(Voloshinov, 1973: 102) as part of an ongoing dialogue that reproduces or
transforms the culturally specific values assigned to the particular linguistic and
non-linguistic ‘members’ resources’ (Fairclough, 1989) that we use to enact and
recognize Discourses. In the process we become ‘members’ of particular social
groups (or communities of practice – Lave and Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990) as
we master and/or appropriate (Wertsch, 1991, 1998) particular ways of using
particular resources as part of particular Discourses. We change in the process,
but so does the Discourse. As Gee puts it:
The key to Discourses is ‘recognition.’ If you put language, action, inter-
action, values, beliefs, symbols, objects, tools, and places together in such a
way that others recognize you as a particular type of who (identity) engaged in
a particular type of what (activity) here and now, then you have pulled off 
a Discourse (and thereby continued it through history, if only for a while
longer). Whatever you have done must be similar enough to other perfor-
mances to be recognizable. However, if it is different enough from what has
gone before, but still recognizable, it can simultaneously change and trans-











































Using multiple situation definitions 127
Being in a social group by using a Discourse brings us back again to the place
of situation definitions and contextualization cues in learning. Becoming a fluent
member of a given group means recognizing which resources are relevant 
to enacting and recognizing such membership. And recognizing the value of
members’ resources means being able to correctly define the situation and the
relevant contexts, identities, cultural models, and other linguistic and non-
linguistic Discursive resources relevant to that situation. Because this recognition
is active, we can do more than simply respond to given situation definitions; we
can also enact them, thereby (re)creating a given context that allows for different
ways of being certain kinds of people using certain kinds of things to engage in
certain kinds of activities that may be more to our liking or our benefit than others.
The authority to define situations is the authority to determine what kinds of
people engaged in what kinds of activities with what things we are at a given
moment (Goffman, 1959: 9–13). The authority to define situations is the authority
to author one’s own life and circumstances rather than simply to respond to what
is given.
Hybridity through multiple situation definitions: 
an example
In order to illustrate these three aspects of situation definitions used to create a
hybrid activity, I will now turn to the analysis of a family group activity with a
somewhat strange kind of object. In this case, two young boys, their father, their
older sister and their grandmother interact around an interactive museum exhibit
called The Great Gravity Race. The exhibit consists of an inclined plane with two
wheels that roll from the top to the bottom. The wheels each have three weights
that can be moved to one of three positions – from closer to the outer edge of
the wheel to closer to the axle. Where the weights are positioned determines the
relative acceleration of the wheels as they move down the ramp.
I have reproduced the first three minutes and last one minute of a six-minute
transcript in Figure 12.1. The transcript is read left to right as a musical score.
Agents are listed in order of their appearance at the exhibit. As new agents enter
the setting, a new box or cell is added for them. Each box or cell contains two
lines. The bottom line details the agents’ actions. Just above that in the same box
is a line that details the agents’ talk. Bold type separates the talk from the action.
The transcripts thus capture both talk and action as they develop over 
the course of an activity within a group (Rowe, 2003). They also visually repre-
sent which actions and utterances co-occur and which are constructed by more
than one person. Each utterance is numbered. Overlapping and latched speech 
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In the transcript (in Figure 12.1), two boys under 10 (B1 and B2) and a man
(M) are the initial members of the group, but they are joined by an elderly woman
(W). B1 and B2 begin with an explicit situation definition, ‘racing’ (utterance 2).
At least in the beginning of the transcript the boys certainly see the activity as a
competition. They urge ‘their’ wheels on to victory, assessing the wheels’
performance through a variety of evaluations (i.e. utterances 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 18,
19, 24, 25). They negotiate procedure (utterances 8, 9, 21) and perhaps explain
their perceived wins and losses by accusing each other of cheating (utterances 11,
12, 13, 14, 16, 20). They also argue over procedure (utterance 9). B2, who
defines the activity as ‘racing,’ also takes responsibility for signaling simultaneous
starts – (utterances 3, 10, 22). It is only in utterance 26 (‘Da:n, you’re supposed
to move these to see if they go faster or slower or what’) that M, having read the
label, makes an authoritative bid for a different situation definition: ‘moving the
weights and observing the results.’ The otherwise innocuous phrase ‘supposed to’
suggests that there is a preferred way to use the exhibit that the boys have not yet
tried. This leads M and B1 to work together to adjust the weights on B1’s wheel,
but B2 has already moved on to rolling his wheel. He observes that it now ‘goes
slower’ stressing that it goes ‘a LOT slower’ (utterance 30). M models the same
kind of procedure for B1 with his question in utterance 31. B2 and B1 disagree
over the result, but M offers an explanation, (‘it goes slower in the middle’) the
second half of which is cast as a question/statement that seeks affirmation/
agreement from B1 (‘in the middle, doesn’t it’ (utterance 31)). M continues to
stress a ‘moving the weights and observing the results’ situation definition by
explaining (utterance 33) what will happen if all the weights are moved ‘to the
outside,’ a suggestion B1 takes up immediately. B2, in the meantime, has jammed
his wheel in the ramp diagonally and despite his attempts to remove it must now
ask M for help (utterance 34). B1, however, can’t move the weights himself, and
asks M to help him as well. They remove the stuck wheel and adjust the weights.
They roll the wheels and B2 urges his on (utterance 38), but the enthusiastic
evaluations of progress are not present here, suggesting that the boys have at least
temporarily adopted the man’s situation definition. In utterance 39, M extends
his explanation of the activity, reinforcing the situation definition of ‘moving the
weights and observing the results.’ He offers to help B2 make a final adjustment
by stepping up to him when he pulls the wheel out of the ramp, but he steps back
as soon as B2 succeeds. The next two rolls (not reproduced here) seem to return
to the situation definition ‘racing,’ with synchronized starts, pushing of the wheels
to speed them along, and exclamations of victory and defeat.
Three minutes later, the boys are indeed still ‘racing’ as the next reproduced
roll demonstrates with its synchronized start, exclamations and gestures of
winning and losing, with B1 calling his wheel a ‘winner wheel’ (utterance 82) and











































to the accusation of cheating that draws its validity from the second situation
definition. B2 claims that he is not, in fact, cheating but adjusting the weights (‘No,
I’m putting mine in a different way’ (second part utterance 83)). He thus moves
strategically between the two situation definitions in order to ‘explain’ what he is
doing as legitimate.
At this point, B1 also offers his own proof that he, in fact, is participating in
this second situation definition as he makes his own bid at (re)establishing the
situation definition from ‘racing’ to see which boy wins to OBSERVING which
wheel is faster (utterance 84). In the process he appropriates the voice of his 
father who introduces the idea of seeing which wheel is faster and which slower
in utterances 26, 31, 33, and 39 as part of establishing the situation definition of
‘moving the weights and observing the results.’ Both boys then show that they can
use the right ‘contextualization cues’: in this case moving the weights (‘putting
mine in a different way’ (utterance 83)) or observing (‘see which one’s faster’
(utterance 84)) as part of participating in ‘moving the weights and observing the
results.’ But they have not abandoned the idea of ‘racing’ either. The hybrid nature
of the situation is captured in B1’s utterance number 84, a hybrid utterance that
draws on both situation definitions. At first he suggests that they should ‘see how
fast we can get them to go’ (‘racing’), but he quickly reformulates the goal in
terms of a comparison to see which goes ‘faster and slower’ (‘moving the weights
and observing the results’), the way that M has done up to that point.
The boys thus show flexibility in moving from one situation definition to the
other, adopting and abandoning one or the other strategically to explain their
actions at different points during the course of the activity. M gets one more
chance to reinforce the ‘moving the weights and observing the results’ definition
when W joins the group and evidently says something to him about what the boys
are doing, as his utterance 88 and her response indicate. B2 exploits the hybrid
space created by the two co-existing definitions in his parts of utterance 89,
employing the ‘preferred’ idea (‘moving the weights’) in ‘I’m gonna fix mine real
quick’ to argue for ‘one more race’ (‘racing’). W accepts the argument and the
situation definition of ‘racing,’ helping to define it as a race in utterance 91 and
to synchronize the start in utterance 92.
Hybrid activity spaces and agency
I have argued that when multiple situation definitions co-exist a hybrid situation
emerges. I have further argued that by appropriating (or at least deploying) the
mediational means for indexing two situation definitions at once the two boys in
this example have acted with strategic agency, exploiting the hybrid situation to
pursue their own agenda within the frame of a ‘preferred’ or more official agenda.










































Using multiple situation definitions 133
agency through the strategic use of mediational means, but also how they
appropriate mediational means for performing situated identities.
The hybrid situation links different kinds of mediational means to different kinds
of identities. In this sense, hybrid activities are similar to the hybrid texts described
by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 143) that mix social practices, genres, and
social languages. Because of their view (consistent with symbolic interactionist
approaches in general) that texts are part of both the (re)production and trans-
formation of social practices, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 14) consider
hybridity to be both a strategy for establishing hegemony and a strategy for resis-
tance or the creation of ‘non-repressive dialogues.’ The ability to move critically
among genres and social languages in a hybrid text for strategic reasons is the
ability to be an empowered agent: ‘We might say that people are active – agents
– to the extent that they are capable of pursuing collective or individual strategies
in their discourse’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 14).
I argue, following Bakhtin, and Chouliaraki and Fairclough, that just as the
presence of multiple social languages and speech genres can create hybrid texts,
multiple situation definitions can create hybrid activity spaces like the one the boys
in the transcript exploit. I further argue, following Chouliaraki and Fairclough
(and Goffman and Scollon), that because the ability to define the situation is tied
to some agentive authority, the ability to move strategically among situation
definitions is a sign of agency. Because different situation definitions carry with
them different affordances for speakers (especially in terms of their perceived
authority), speakers can borrow the powerful voice(s) associated with and realized
in situations strategically to realize alternative agendas and practices. When agents
can manipulate the situation definition, they can reframe the ongoing activity in
ways that may help to create more equitable interactions. When more equitable
interactions exist, there is a more inclusive possibility for agency that means more
people have a chance at ‘getting in on’ defining situations and learning to move
strategically among them. This, in turn, opens new possibilities for our under-
standing of the purposes of learning in all sorts of learning and teaching situations.
We can begin to see how agency and identity and empowerment are just as much
important outcomes of education as concepts and facts and knowledge generating
processes.
Note
1 The writing of this work was supported by the National Science Foundation under
Award No. ESI-0227619. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommenda-
tions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect












































questions and mini projects
Questions for discussion
1 Based on your readings of the chapters in this section, what is the
relationship between practices, mediated actions, and mediational
means? How do the different authors conceive of this relationship
differently?
2 In his chapter, Filliettaz notes that discourse intersects with other
mediational means to frame social practices by making the underlying
premises of those practices more visible. Discuss how this occurs in the
example he gives and try to think of some of your own examples.
3 According to Rowe, social actors sometimes use multiple situation
definitions to create hybrid activity spaces, which allow them to act 
in strategic ways and create more equitable situations. How does 
this occur in the example that he gives? Can you think of your own
examples?
4 In his chapter, Lemke, drawing on the work of Bakhtin, introduces the
concept of chronotopes, culturally typical movements and pacings along
trajectories of activity. What is the relationship between chrono-
topes and practices and how might they affect the ways practices are
linked?
Mini projects
1 Choose a particular computer game that you are familiar with and
discover which practices are embedded within the game.
2 Go to a store and try to purchase a particular item, involving a sales
clerk’s help. After your expedition, note down the practices underlying
your and the sales clerk’s actions.
3 Visit a museum and follow the actions that a particular group of social
actors take within this setting. Do they create hybrid activity spaces and







































































































































































13 Introducing sites of
engagement
Sigrid Norris and Rodney H. Jones
In the previous sections the concepts of mediated actions, mediational means, and
social practices have been discussed. In this section we will turn to how actions,
mediational means, and social practices converge in moments of ‘real time’ and
at actual locations, both physical and virtual.
Every mediated action is viewed as taking place within a site of engagement.
Scollon (1998, 1999, 2001a) defines the site of engagement as the real-time
window that is opened through an intersection of social practices and mediational
means that make that action the focal point of attention of the relevant participants.
As Scollon (2001a: 4) points out, ‘the idea of site of engagement takes from
practice/activity theory and interactional sociolinguistics the insistence on the
real-time, irreversible, and unfinalizable nature of social action.’ It also takes from
interactional sociolinguistics and conversation analysis a concentration on the focal










































Sites of engagement: The ‘real time window’ opened through the inter-
section of social practices and mediational means that
enables a mediated action to occur.
The convergence of social practices that opens this
window.
The window which makes certain actions (lower or
higher order) the more focused or less focused points
of attention of participants.
The orientation towards time and space, distributed in
built environments, social practices, and the habitus of
individuals, that people bring to situations.
Norris (2002a) broadens the notion of site of engagement by defining it in the
following way: ‘A site of engagement is the real-time window opened through 
the intersection of social practice(s) and mediational means that make that lower
(or higher) level action the focal point of attention of the relevant participants, and
radiates from there encompassing the intersection of practices and mediational means that
make those lower and higher level actions the less focused or un-focused points of attention
of the relevant participants.’ What is important in this definition is the addition 
of the notion of different levels of action and, more importantly, the notion of
focused action as constituting a continuum from focused action to less focused and
finally to unfocused actions of participants.
One of the difficulties of operationalizing the concept of sites of engagement is
locating them in time. As Scollon pointed out in the first section of this book, at
any given moment there are at least six different cycles of time occurring. In the
first chapter of this section, Jones takes up this issue, as well as the issue of focused
attention developed by Norris (2002a). He argues that sites of engagement are
amalgamations of the patterns of orientation towards time and space that partici-
pants bring to these moments and locations of social action mediated through what
he calls attention structures.
Another important issue to consider when discussing sites of engagement is 
how we as researchers contribute to the construction of such sites through our
own actions, and how multiple trajectories of actions and practices of both the
researcher and the researched converge in these sites of engagement. In her
chapter, de Saint-Georges examines how researchers and participants jointly
construct sites of engagement, which she describes as time/space stations that are











































140 Sigrid Norris and Rodney H. Jones
14 Sites of engagement as sites 
of attention: time, space and
culture in electronic discourse
Rodney H. Jones
One of the least theorized concepts in mediated discourse analysis is that of the site
of engagement, those moments in time and points in space where mediated actions
happen. According to R. Scollon (2001b), these moments and locations are to be
defined not so much in terms of time and space as in terms of the convergence of
social practices which opens a window for mediated action to occur. Questions
remain, however, as to where and how sites of engagement actually exist in relation
to ‘real time’ and ‘real space.’ As R. Scollon (this volume) points out, time is always
more complex than ‘a moment,’ consisting of multiple, overlapping ‘timescales,’
and space, as noted by Scollon and Scollon (2003), is always more complex than a
physical location, consisting of the interaction among the built environments, the
relationships among participants, and the meanings assigned to the various semiotic
tools introduced into the space. Thus, the same moments in time and the same
points in space may for some people function as sites of engagement whereas for others
they may not. In fact, like social actions, sites of engagement are concrete, specific
irreversible and unfinalizable (R. Scollon, 2001a: 4). At the same time, it is ‘at’
these sites, that more durable social practices, social identities and social groups are
constructed.
Computer mediated communication presents further challenges to those
interested in the relationship between time/space and mediated actions, involving
additional layers of time (synchronous, asynchronous) and the convergence of
multiple built environments. The aim of this chapter is to explore the ontology 
of sites of engagement and to examine the usefulness of this concept in understanding
action and identity. In particular, it examines how sites of engagement occur in
computer mediated interaction among members of different communities that
form around different nexus of practice (R. Scollon, 2001a). Sites of engagement, I
argue, are not ‘objective’ moments or locations, but rather the results of orienta-
tions towards time and space that participants bring to interaction, mediated










































environments, partly in the social practices that grow up within communities and
partly in the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) of individuals.
The data for this analysis come from two separate studies of computer mediated
communication, one focusing on secondary school students in Hong Kong,1 and
the other focusing on gay men in the same city.2 Both studies employed a multi-
modal ethnographic methodology for data collection ( Jones, 2001a) which
included individual and group interviews, text logs of interactions, ‘screen movies’
of participants’ computer use and ‘site movies’ of the places where participants
operated their computers, as well as participants’ reflections on their own actions
and motivations.
Cyberspace/cybertime
Much contemporary writing on new communication technologies (see, for
example, Barnes, 2003; Meyrowitz, 1985; Turkle, 1995) emphasizes how they
affect our sense of time and space. Technology, we are told, ‘dislodges social
situations from physical settings . . . and results in new configurations of social
experience’ (Waskul, 2003: 25). This perspective is perhaps best exemplified by
McLuhan’s (1964: 3) assertion that electronic media have been ‘abolishing both
place and time as far as our planet is concerned.’
This focus on the separation of physical space from virtual spaces, or what has
come to be known as ‘cyberspace’ (Gibson, 1984), has fostered a bifurcated view
that sometimes obscures the ways ‘cyberspace’ and physical spaces interact (Hine,
2000) as well as the fact that people do not ever just reside in one space at a time.
They inhabit multiple spaces, various built spaces, geographical spaces, political
spaces and personal spaces. ‘Cyberspace’ is just one more. Similarly, we also
orient towards multiple timescales as a matter of course; timescales of personal
schedules, of natural cycles, of histories of people and objects, in what Blommaert
(2004) (see R. Scollon (this volume)) calls ‘layered simultaneity.’
Actual ethnographic investigations, such as those I will be drawing on for this
chapter (see also, for example, Hamman, 1998), reveal that interactions through
computers more often than not are extensions of off-line practices and interactions
rather than separate from them. Far from having been ‘abolished’ by new media,
physical spaces and ‘real time’ remain central to communication on-line. For two
gay men looking for potential sexual partners in a chat room, for example, much
of their discussion involves talking about where they are physically in relation to
each other and when they might meet up physically in the future. For secondary
school students chatting with their friends on computers placed in the living 
rooms of their crowded urban flats, the internet has radically altered the spaces in
which they live and their interaction with parents and other family members within










































142 Rodney H. Jones
interactions, homework, watching television, downloading and sharing music files
and interacting with physically co-present others, they subvert the systems of space
and time maintained and policed by the attention of their family members.
‘Cyberspace,’ then, does not create a ‘separation’ of spaces so much as
additional layers of space within which participants can maneuver. However, the
ways that different groups of people with different purposes navigate these
multiple spaces are different. People construct time and space through their social
practices, their shared goals, plans, and the conventions that build up around their
interactions. Cyberspace is actually part of a combination of orientations towards
space/time associated with social practices and social identities, orientations
towards physical spaces, conceptual spaces, perceptual spaces and social spaces
(Strate, 1999). And it is at the nexus of these different spaces and timescales that
the notion of the site of engagement becomes more useful than more traditional
conceptualizations of time and space, because it sees spaces and times as arising
from actions. Rather than saying that actions occur ‘in’ or ‘at’ sites of engagement,
says R. Scollon (2001a: 159), it would be more proper to say that actions occur
as sites of engagement. Through our actions we set into motion spatial and temporal
entrainments, trajectories that determine how we strategize future actions and 
how we remember past ones. It follows, then, that time and space are never
‘neutral’ but, rather, reflect the ideologies embedded in the actions and practices
communities perform together.
Perhaps, the most important contribution to the discussion of how different
communities use space and time comes from Edward T. Hall (1959, 1966, 1976).
Hall maintains that members of different cultures operate on different systems of
time which organize their perception of such things as ‘appropriate’ intervals, and
whether or not they tend to orient towards a single activity at one time or juggle
multiple activities, what Hall calls ‘monochronic’ and ‘polychronic’ orientations.
Hall is similarly concerned with how different groups communicate through
the way they use space, in particular in regard to territoriality – how we exert
control over the various spaces we inhabit.
Hall’s ideas form much of the framework with which I analyze my data. The
mediated discourse approach I take differs from Hall’s, however, in two important
ways. First, while Hall is chiefly concerned with how unconscious ideas about time
and space cause misunderstandings between people of different cultures, MDA is
interested in how people employ the ‘tools’ of time and space, both consciously
and unconsciously, to open ‘windows’ within which mediated actions can take
place. Second, Hall tends to separate ‘culture’ along ethnic or national borders,
talking, for example, of the different ways Americans and Japanese understand
time and space. In contrast, MDA shuns such essentialist notions of culture ( Jones,
2001b), preferring instead to speak of the nexus or intersection of practices 
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When I speak of ‘gay Chinese men’ and ‘Chinese secondary school students,’
I am less concerned with their ‘gayness’ or their ‘Chineseness’ as I am with the
intersection of social practices they are performing which give rise to particular
social occasions. Social practices and social identities both require and make
possible different orientations towards time and space which, themselves, become
tools for claims and imputations of social identity.
The ‘there there’
When Gertrude Stein uttered her famous indictment of Oakland: ‘There’s no there
there,’ she certainly did not mean to suggest that there was a lack of physical space
in that city. What she really meant was, ‘there are no sites of engagement there
which allow the particular convergences of social practices and cultural tools which
I desire.’ When looking for the ‘theres’ that are ‘there’ in computer mediated
communication, we must examine the social practices participants engage in, and
which ‘theres,’ or spaces, they regard as significant. We must also examine how
these different ‘theres,’ some physical, some perceptual, some conceptual, interact
with one another.
In computer mediated communication, there are at least five kinds of space
towards which users can orient their attention:
1 The physical spaces in which they are operating their computers (such as offices,
homes, cybercafés), both in terms of the immediate built environments and
the geographical coordinates of these spaces;
2 Virtual spaces created by the interfaces they are using to communicate (chat
rooms, ICQ contact lists, web pages);
3 Relational space created by the ‘state of talk’ between participants;
4 Screen space – the actual space of users’ screens upon which they arrange
various elements (windows, toolbars, writing spaces, video screens);
5 Third spaces – spaces inhabited by neither participant but rather referred to in
the course of interaction (bars, saunas, classrooms, shopping centers).
These spaces represent negotiated social orientations that are not totally
independent, but instead overlap and affect one another. What is happening in
virtual spaces helps shape the actions and identities that are possible in physical
spaces and vice versa. Computers can allow a fifteen-year-old girl to enact the
identity of an ‘obedient daughter’ in physical spaces while simultaneously engaging
in a relationship with a boyfriend nobody in her crowded urban flat knows she
has. The death of pop star Leslie Cheung in the ‘media space’ can turn a gay chat
room normally used for ‘fast pick ups’ into a space for mass mourning. Even the










































144 Rodney H. Jones
oriented towards. ‘You can measure the typhoon signals by the number of people
online,’ the webmaster of the gay chat room I investigated told me. ‘By typhoon
signal eight the place is full.’ Similarly, physical spaces and virtual spaces determine
how participants manage and orient towards screen space. One gay man who
shared a flat with his family said:
while I am going to the chat room or looking at gay (porn) pictures, or
browsing any gay websites, I open some word documents or games as back-
up or to cover the banner ads in the chat room and websites. If any family
member suddenly comes near me while I am doing some gay-related activities
on my computer, I immediately open the word documents or open the 
game page.
One way of understanding how different groups engaged in different practices
orient towards these different spaces and communicate these orientations is by
examining how they discursively ‘index’ space in their use of deixis – demon-
stratives (this, that), deictic adverbials (here, there, where), and nouns referring
to particular places. While this can only give us part of the picture (as often the
most deeply engrained orientations towards space, are not referred to explicitly
in discourse), deixis can still reveal much about where participants think they 
are, what they think they are doing and who they think they are being. Schegloff
(1972) notes that references to space in conversation have three functions: (1) to
index location; (2) to establish ‘membership,’ and (3) to index the topic. Similarly,
Hanks (2001) sees every case of the construction of ‘here’ and ‘there’ as a socio-
cultural construction depending on and reflecting how the people see the world
and how they see themselves in it.
A breakdown of how these two different groups talked about the spaces they
oriented towards in a corpus of chats from the gay men (n = 260) and the
secondary school students (n = 170) can be seen in Table 14.1.
The figures suggest that the gay men are much more focused on the physical
spaces they inhabit at the time of interaction than the secondary school students.
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Table 14.1 Percentage of space deixis (this, that, here, there, where, proper/common
nouns referring to places)
Physical Virtual Relational Screen Exophoric Other
(third spaces)
Gay men 53 17 7 1 13 9
Secondary students 16 39 3 3 37 2
transformation of an orientation towards virtual space into an orientation towards
physical space ( Jones, 2004a). Physical spaces, including features like whether
participants live alone or with their families, and the relative distance they live
from a Mass Transit Railway station, play a crucial role in participants’ social
identities. Many, in fact, use either the name of the district where they live or
some description of their physical living situation (‘live alone,’ ‘hve place’) as their
screen names in the chat room.
Participants’ orientation towards physical spaces is also intimately connected
with their orientation towards time, a view of the interaction that sees it as having
clear episodes and intervals pointing towards some future goal. The significance
of these physical spaces is not just in their present use, but also in their potential
as future sites of engagement, and from the onset of the interaction the partici-
pants work to construct these sites of engagement through anticipatory discourse
(de Saint-Georges, this volume). As one participant put it:
the first thing that not only I require but also the other one is the PLACE, if
we are sure we have place to have fun, then we will keep talking. After making
sure that there is a place for us to have fun, we start to talk more deeply.
At the same time, these physical places, both present ones and future ones,
depend on virtual spaces (chat rooms, picture-sharing sites) for their existence. 
It is interaction in these virtual spaces that turns physical spaces into places.
References to this type of space also play an important role in communicating
identity and activity. In Example 1 (Box 14.1), Participant A mobilizes an orienta-
tion towards the virtual space of the chat room to claim a certain kind of moral
identity. In Example 2 (Box 14.1), A uses this orientation to accuse his
interlocutor of dishonesty or inconsistency.
A third important space for these participants is one that is rarely referred to










































146 Rodney H. Jones
Box 14.1 Examples
Example 1 Example 2
A: do u have bf? A: we talked but then you said 
B: of course I’m single that that you didn’t actually play 
why I come here outside the relationship
B: u? A: which is fine – tho beggars the 
A: so u look for bf here? question about why yr here 
with that profile!
space created by the ‘state of talk.’ The number of explicit references to this space
is far less, participants referring to it only when it is seen to be in need of repair.
The degree to which participants orient towards it, though, can be seen in the
frequency of their use of the deixis ‘here?’ or ‘there?’ after pauses in the interaction
long enough to be perceived as threatening this space. The ‘here’ or ‘there’ they
are referring to is not a physical space but, rather, a state of attention towards the
interaction, what Holmes (1995) calls a ‘shared deictic center.’ Interestingly, and
consistent with the findings of Holmes, participants most often refer to relational
space with the adverb ‘here?’ (whereas in telephone conversation participants 
are more likely to say, ‘are you there?’), suggesting that orientation towards rela-
tional space in CMC is seen as less distant. One of the chief goals of participants
in this kind of interaction is to maintain control over relational space, to ‘keep the
conversation going,’ for once a conversation is terminated the possibilities of
transforming that conversation into something more evaporate. In contrast, the
students seem less oriented towards maintaining relational spaces through a con-
stant state of talk. Rather, their interactions are more fluid, occurring at varying
rhythms, with many not really having clear beginnings or clear endings as conver-
sations migrate from physical spaces like school corridors to virtual spaces and
then back again.
There is in my data from the gay men a sixth use of deixis not accounted for
in Table 14.1: a use of deixis to refer not to any external physical or virtual space
but, rather, to the space of one’s own body, or the ‘self.’ Some examples, are:
btm here, swimmer style top here and A: wot r u wearing now/B: just a T here. These self-
referential deixis, which are not found at all in my secondary school data, have
the effect of inviting one’s interlocutor to experience one’s physical space with
them through a description of the body or ‘self.’ They index physical space partly
to erase it, creating a sense of physical intimacy.
While the gay men move strategically across boundaries of physical spaces,
virtual spaces, the tenuous spaces of their electronic intercourse and the spaces of
their bodies, the students appear to be mostly oriented towards third places,
schools, shopping malls, electronic game centers, and it is really these places that
virtual spaces are extensions of. They hardly ever mention the physical spaces
where they are operating their computers. One reason for this is that, unlike the
gay men who seek to decrease the separation between physical and virtual space,
for many of the students, the social practices they are engaging in (playing on-line
games rather than focusing on their homework, engaging in sometimes illicit
interactions with friends) depend on their maintaining this separation. One of the
chief ways computers amplify social actions for them is through enabling them to
extend the territory upon which they can act to realms to which others (parents,
siblings, teachers) have no access and cannot police. Computer mediated commu-
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ICQ, one participant noted, is that ‘no one will know what we are talking and
doing in ICQ.’ Another said, ‘sometimes when I find that it is not convenient to
talk on the phone, ICQ provides me a convenient means to communicate with
others and to secretly disclose information.’
Along with indexing third spaces where they and their friends interact, the
students spend much of their time building new spaces for interaction: virtual
spaces like ICQ contact lists, forums, diaries, message boards, and the environ-
ments of on-line games. The number and variety of on-line spaces they inhabit is
far more than the gay men, and each of these spaces has its own geography,
timescales, and ‘sense of gravity.’ Each also affords different ways for users to
enact ‘presence.’ As one participant put it:
In the space of reality, you can only have one identity. It is a student with
good academic result and manner, obedience toward parent, kindness,
happiness and love. In cyberspace, you can have many identities. You can be
a good fighter . . . in <<Jing Yong On-line>> or <<Gu Long On-line>>,
gallant male in ICQ, attractive female in chat room and a bad guy speaking
foul language in the forum.
Perhaps the most important role new communication technologies play for
these students is to afford them greater control over personal space and personal
distance, not just in the physical environments they inhabit, but also in the virtual
ones. In situations where participants are not physically co-present, the notions of
personal space and personal distance are more usefully seen in terms of ‘presence’:
the degree to which one makes oneself available and the way one reacts to the
availability of others. Engaging in an ICQ messaging session, signing a friend’s
guestbook on their home page, contributing to a discussion in an on-line forum
and taking on the identity of an avatar in an on-line game all involve different
degrees and kinds of presence. Even the software most popular with the students,
ICQ, allows users to modulate ‘presence.’ Whereas in the java-based interface in
the gay chat room, users make themselves available to all the other users in the
room simultaneously, requiring them to control presence in a much more explicit
way by, for example, ignoring or rejecting the advances of other users, ICQ allows
users to be ‘visible’ only to selected others, or to appear in various ‘modes,’ such
as ‘not available,’ ‘extended away,’ and ‘available to chat.’ These ways of enacting
‘presence’ are often extensions of patterns of personal space that have developed
in students’ physical interactions with their friends. In a sense, while for gay men
on-line spaces are seen as routes to off-line spaces, for these students, off-line










































148 Rodney H. Jones
Timescales and trajectories
There is also some variation in the ways members of these two communities talk
about and make use of time. The most obvious one is that the timing in the gay
men’s interactions is more fixed and more consistent over interactions. One can
almost predict by counting turns when, for example, a picture might be exchanged
or a phone number might be negotiated. The on-line interactions of the students
occur on multiple timescales – an interaction tonight might be a continuation of
a conversation that started in the school lunch room this morning or a week ago,
and these conversations are often embedded in longer timescales of relationships
as school calendars, class timetables, assignment due dates, movie schedules, and
TV timetables.
Clearly, the gay men are also influenced by multiple timescales, checking
emails, surfing the internet while they are chatting and, within the social practice
itself, chatting with multiple potential partners at once. But their orientation when
engaged in this particular social practice is more focused on the rhythms of the
immediate interactions, rhythms that are mapped progressively along particular
intervals towards a relatively clear goal. In fact, as ‘operating’ the chat room makes
significant demands on users’ attention, both in terms of their cognitive attention,
and in terms of the amount of attention they are meant to demonstrate to inter-
locutors, it is difficult to do many other things. Whereas the average time between
turns in the students’ chats was 6 minutes 23 seconds, with some gaps between
turns lasting more than an hour; for the gay men, the average time between turns
was 34 seconds, and pauses of much longer length resulted in moves to repair the
relational space, like those discussed above, or a termination of the interaction.
One participant wrote:
How long is too long to wait for a reply from someone in a chat room? It
depends on different conditions. If I am really horny at that moment, I would
say reply within 10 seconds is acceptable. If more than that, I would guess
the guy is no longer interested in me, unless he told me to wait.
The norms concerning turn taking are very different in the students’ inter-
actions. One participant said:
If the other side is someone you really want to talk with, you will be willing
to spend time waiting for the other side’s reply. Sometimes I just casually ask
others ‘Have you had the dinner?’ I might have asked ten people but I would
not wait for all of them to reply to me.
The orientation towards time in the students’ interactions, then, tends to be










































Sites of engagement as sites of attention 149
synchronous, some asynchronous, as they consult one another on the homework
assignment due tomorrow, leave a message to someone about a bit of gossip heard
yesterday, or just say a momentary ‘hi’ to a friend while surfing the internet. They
have become masters of distributing their attention over homework assignments,
electronic social interactions, listening to music, watching television, talking on
the telephone and interacting with family members to the point where it is difficult
to separate out and measure their different activities. When asked the question,
‘How much time do you spend on ICQ,’ most participants could not answer 
it, saying things like: ‘How do I know? The ICQ is on all the time.’ Even indi-
vidual conversations are rarely as focused as those engaged in by the gay men.
‘Normally,’ said one student, ‘those who talk to me in ICQ can talk about many
things within a minute.’
The students’ orientation towards time on-line contrasts with the orientation
dominant in their off-line lives, which is highly scheduled and policed by a linear
view of time. They go through their days moving from classroom to classroom 
at a rhythm fixed by the institution, are repeatedly told to ‘pay attention’ to 
one thing at a time, and then return home where there are times they are allowed
to do some things, and times they are not. Their lives are situated in cultural 
and institutional expectations punctuated by significant times: dates of public
examinations, for example, and deadlines for university applications.
Time, in this powerful Discourse (Gee, 1996) promoted by their parents 
and teachers, is seen as a commodity one spends to gain future reward. But it can
also be wasted. One spends time wisely doing constructive things (like home-
work) and wastes time doing ‘unconstructive’ (primarily relational) things (like
chatting on ICQ). ‘Wasting time’ is seen as a display of laziness, selfishness or
moral turpitude. For most of these students, conflicts with their parents over
computer use centered on the notion of ‘wasting time.’ One participant said of
his parents:
They do not know how to use computers and what I am doing with my
computer. But they would ask me not to waste time as they always see me
sitting in front of the computer. I do not care.
This view of time that talks of it as being spent and wasted has at its foundation
a fundamentally monochronic orientation. One should spend time on a particular
task until it gets done. On-line, however, students are able to subvert this
Discourse through mixing and blending timescales and activities. On-line inter-
action provides an escape not just from the space of the family, but also from 
its time. The escape, however, is rarely complete, as their family members 
make intermittent interactional demands on them or question ‘what they are










































150 Rodney H. Jones
simultaneously, acting polychronically in virtual spaces while performing a
monochronic orientation for their parents.
There is a similar case of disjuncture between temporal orientations in different
spaces in the data from the gay men. While it is expected that users normally
distribute their attention among a variety of interlocutors, the orientation towards
time that one must display to each of these interlocutors is more monochronic.
One must create the impression of undivided attention through the timeliness and
appropriateness of one’s responses. Multitasking is something that everyone does,
but few admit to. One participant wrote in his diary:
Those who respond promptly I will see that as a sign of their interest and
good integrity. I also tend to use their response time to see how serious they
are in making a conversation. There are some who are talking to lots of people
at the same time and maybe doing something else such as watching TV or
listening to music. I find that annoying. I tend to leave the chatroom with
people like those. To me, I give my 100% attention to the person I am
chatting to and I expect the same in return.
Demonstrating this orientation towards time which is at odds with the pattern
of orientation evident on these men’s screens does have its social purposes.
According to Hall (1976), a monochronic orientation towards time often has the
effect of promoting intimacy or a sense of privacy. Monochronic time, he writes,
‘is like a room with a closed door’ (20). It ‘seals off people . . . and intensifies
relationships’ (19). This orientation also, though, indexes a powerful Discourse
in these men’s off-line lives, a Discourse of romance which determines the
different kinds of relationships and possibilities invoked through different practices
of giving and getting attention.
Sites of engagement as sites of attention
I do not mean to suggest that my participants orient themselves towards time and
space the way they do in these interactions because they are gay men or because
they are secondary school students. Rather, what I am interested in is how they
use these different patterns of orientation towards time and space to open up sites
of engagement in which the social practices through which these identities can be
enacted can converge.
Participants construct sites of engagement for particular practices through fairly
durable patterns of orientation towards different spaces and different timescales.
These patterns are in some ways ‘built into’ the mediational means they use to
take action: the technology, through its potential for creating virtual space as well
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applications that people use. They are also built into the practices of the
community, its norms of interaction and the range and types of social identities it
offers. Finally, these patterns exist in the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) of the individual
participants’ ways of operating that have become as much part of the body as 
of the mind. They are among what Bourdieu (2001: 37) calls ‘the schemes of
perception, appreciation and action that are constitutive of habitus.’
I call these patterns of orientation attention structures. Attention structures are
themselves cultural tools, as basic as languages and systems of counting, made
available by the sociocultural environment, mastered by individuals, passed onto
others, built into the frozen actions (Norris, 2004b) of our architecture and
furnishings, and appropriated strategically to open up sites of engagement. Sites of
engagement are, then, made up not just of the physical spaces we inhabit and the
timescales and trajectories that flow into them, but also, and more to the point,
those aspects of space and time that we are inclined to pay attention to. We
construct sites of engagement through our attention. According to R. Scollon
(2001a: 4), sites of engagement operate to make particular mediated actions ‘the
focus of attention of the relevant participants.’ Norris (2002a) goes even further,
defining sites of engagement as means of making various lower- and higher-level
actions the focused, less focused or un-focused points of attention of participants.
I take the term attention structures from Lanham (1993), whose work falls into
a category of literature focusing on ‘attention economies,’ (Goldhaber, 1997;
Lankshear and Knobel, 2003). The idea of ‘attention economies’ is that, in an age
of information overload, what gives value to information is the amount of attention
it can attract. The real currency of the information age is not information, but
attention. Whether or not this theory holds true on the macro-economic level, it
is, and has always been, an important principle in the micro-economics of social
interaction. All interpersonal communication is based on attention: getting
attention and ‘paying attention.’ Not only is attention organized around behavior,
but behavior is organized around attention. Lanham uses the term attention
structures to refer chiefly to technological means of helping people deal with the
overload of information carried by ‘the rich signal’ associated with the digital
revolution. But all signals, no matter how rich, require some kind of attention
structure to make sense of them, some way of knowing what to attend to and what
not to attend to. These attention structures reside partly in the mediational means
and partly in the ways people use these mediational means in patterned interaction
that reproduces some aspect of their social identity. Attention structures take form
in our socio-cultural worlds, and are reformed as we interact with those worlds.
In many ways attention structures are related to frames as conceptualized by
Bateson (1972) as well as the attentional tracks of Goffman (1974). But, whereas
frames and attentional tracks are chiefly theorized around the participants and their










































152 Rodney H. Jones
structures, conceptual structures and relational structures. They exist in houses,
on computer screens, in bouts of ritual teasing and in tightly choreographed
practices of seduction as well as in the minds and bodies of users.
Most studies have focused on attention as a cognitive mechanism or, rather,
collection of mechanisms which include alertness, orientation, detection, facilita-
tion and inhibition (Schmidt, 2001). In social interaction, however, attention is
not just an individual cognitive process, but also a kind of commodity that inter-
locutors trade in interaction. When we speak of ‘attention,’ we are really speaking
of two separate but interrelated systems. The first of these we can call the cognitive
attention system, the system individuals use to mentally distribute their attention
across the various activities they are involved in. The second we can call the social
attention system, the system participants use to display attention and to interpret
displays of attention by others ( Jones, 2003).
One of the most important aspects of attention structures is that they involve
the distribution of both of these two kinds of attention, and sometimes, as we have
seen, these different kinds of attention can be distributed rather differently across
different spaces and different timescales. In both of these communities we have
seen a difference between the way people use time and space and the way they
‘perform’ time and space to those with whom they are interacting or other 
co-present parties.
The management of time and space in multiple sites of engagement requires
what R. Scollon (1997) calls interperformativity: the ability to distribute attention
in different ways on different timescales and in different spaces. These multiple
orientations towards time and space also invoke larger Discourses within which
particular attention structures are valued, promoted and reproduced in the service
of particular ideologies (Blommaert, 2004). Sites of engagement, then, are sites of
political struggle between competing Discourses with competing attention
structures. These struggles pervade both on-line interactions as well as the off-line
ways that students, for example, react to how their teachers make them use
computers in school, or the ways that gay men treat their sexual partners once
they meet up with them.
Sites of engagement, therefore, are convergences not just of social practices, 
but of individuals and their histories, of schemes, scripts and plans, of social
identities, of architectural or software designs, and of the various Discourses we
participate in with their patterns of fixing social relationships of power and of
marginalizing certain kinds of social identities and practices. They are, says 
R. Scollon (2001a), the historical outcomes of social practices embodied in cultural
tools and appropriated into the habitus of individuals and the homologous habitus
of groups.
On a practical level, theoretical attention to how sites of engagement are formed
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interested in literacy to answer questions like how attention structures developed in
on-line interaction affect students’ responses to school-based activities, and help
those interested in sexuality or public health understand how the attention structures
that gay men make use of in on-line interaction affect the ways they orient towards
each other when they finally meet. In this sense, sites of engagement, and the
attention structures that activate them, are heuristic devices, both for participants and
analysts. They are points where social practices and social identities converge, 
and where a single action like inviting somebody to chat in a chat room can be
traced to the interplay of larger Discourses and relations of power in the socio-
cultural environment.
Notes
1 Computer Mediated Communication and Youth Literacy in Hong Kong: A Partici-
patory Ethnographic Approach (Principal Investigator in collaboration with Dr David
Li). Hong Kong RGC Competitive Earmarked Research Grant # 9040856. www.
personal.cityu.edu.hk/~en-cyber/Cyberkids/Home.htm.
2 An Ethnographic Study of Computer Mediated Communication among Gay Men in
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Process in discourse analysis
With its aim of contributing knowledge to the understanding of agency, social
action and social change, mediated discourse analysis has sought since the
beginning to develop concepts and ideas to show how actions and discourses
acquire their meanings from the positions they occupy within historical sequences
of events. In this perspective, one important notion in mediated discourse analysis
is that people, objects, tools and discourses have a history and project a future. They
move, each at their own rates and on their own timescales, along trajectories (Scollon
and Scollon, 2004; S. Scollon, 2001; R. Scollon, this volume). This focus on
trajectories has come to be an important component of nexus analyses. It naturally
invites us to enlarge the scope of traditional discourse analysis and to move beyond
the level of single events to start addressing issues such as how social realities 
are constituted across time and spaces, and what kind of methodological and 
theoretical tools we need to conceptualize how events, people, ideas, objects 
and knowledge evolve over time.
In this chapter, I explore how the sites of engagement that constitute a research
process are constructed by researchers and participants and connected to one
another through actions and anticipatory discourses. I examine how distant discourses
and actions become linked to constitute this research process and attempt to
describe how, as a researcher, I fit into time myself as my research evolves. I
outline various moments where I enter into relationships with the participants,
and sketch the evolution of the research process from determining a zone of
identification to interacting in complex tasks with the participants. Finally, I reflect
in more general terms upon the kind of topics diachronic data may lead linguists
to examine and discuss some of the implications that adopting a processual view
of discourse may have for discourse analysis. I hope to show how mediated












































To ground my reflections on how a research process is constituted across time and
space, I have chosen to examine three threads of linked actions and interactions.
These threads are drawn from ethnographic research I carried out at ‘Horizons,’
a vocational center located in Belgium which provides training in manual trades
to long-term unemployed youth. This data consists of excerpts from fieldnotes,
shots from video-recorded actions and excerpts from documents collected in the
course of my observations of the activities of a group of individuals being trained
in sheet-rocking. My description and analysis of this data will partly take the form
of an introspection since, as a researcher, there are many times where I have only
access to the chain of mediated actions I carried out myself. I cannot reconstruct
the other participants’ trajectories towards a particular moment of work since I
was not present to observe how they prepared or oriented to this work outside
of the moments when we met.1
Looking at these documents and notes as material traces of my history of
dealings with the sheet-rocking group, the following timeline can be recon-
structed, with several landmark events or sites of engagement conceived as space/
time stations:
• Space/time station 1. June 18, 1999. Horizons/Namur, Belgium. In June 1999, I
begin pilot fieldwork at Horizons in view of developing a research project to
meet doctoral requirements at Georgetown University. On June 18, I ask
Henry, the monitor in sheet-rocking for permission to carry out observation
on the work site when he and his group are working. This is my very first
encounter with a member of the group.
• Space/time station 2. June 23, 1999. Arch Town, Belgium. On June 23, 1999, I
join the sheet-rockers’ group and spend one day observing their work, which
consists in the building of an arch in a house. I video-tape part of the work
done on that day.
• Space/time station 3. December, 1999. Washington, DC, US. In August 1999, I
return to Georgetown and start writing about my time with the sheet-
rockers. In December of 1999, I hand in a proposal with my ‘action-plan’ for
my actual fieldwork, which will begin in January 2000. This proposal
recontextualizes some of the moments lived with the sheet-rockers.
• Space/time station 4. Early March, 2000. Horizons, Belgium. I resume fieldwork
in January 2000. At the beginning of March, I request from Henry the permis-
sion to visit his group again. This is the point at which my trajectory and the
group’s trajectory meet again after a long interval without interactions.
• Space/time station 5. March 5, 2000. Namur, Belgium. I prepare the material 










































156 Ingrid de Saint-Georges
• Space/time station 6. March 6, 2000. Apartment Town, Belgium. I spend the day
observing activities linked to partitioning a mansard-roofed apartment.
• Space/time station 7. Between June 2000 and May 2003. Namur, Belgium/
Washington, DC, US. I carry out my analysis and write up my research work
on the basis of the data gathered.
• Space/time station 8. December–July, 2004. Brussels, Belgium. I transform and
revise my analysis and write up the current chapter.
• Space/time station 9. After editorial transformation by the authors of this book
you are now reading this chapter somewhere else as a part of your own
trajectory.
I view sites of engagement as space/time stations (Gu, 2002) and follow
Hägerstrand and Gu who propose that individuals’ trajectories sometimes diverge
and sometimes converge. When they converge, they cross paths on specific ‘social
occasions’ or stations, which can be thought of as spatially and temporally bounded
experiential spaces (a home, a work site, a city, etc.) within which individuals can
engage in individual or joint actions. Individuals can open up a variety of sites of
engagement within these space/time stations. Thus, stations are not ‘practico-inert
containers of action’ (Crang and Thrift, 2000: 2). Rather, through the actions of
the participants these space/time stations are both constituted and transformed over
time. They are thus best conceived ‘as process and in process (that is space and time
combined in becoming)’ (Crang and Thrift, 2000: 3, emphasis in original). What
I would like to consider now is how these space/time stations become connected so
as to start integrating into trajectories. I would like to propose that one method-
ological way in which we can attempt to capture the unfolding of trajectories 
is by looking at the relationship between what people anticipate they will do
(anticipation) and how these chains of anticipation and action start weaving the
threads of practice and mediational means across sites of engagement.
In the next section, I will show through the analysis of the empirical data how
sites of engagements become connected through the anticipatory discourses and
the actions of the participants.
Anticipatory discourse: from anticipation to
performance
One of the ways in which actors in the world construct events across time and
space is by first projecting those events and then trying to find ways to realize
them. An overwhelming part of our everyday behavior indeed consists of con-
sciously or unconsciously projecting outcomes and finding means for accom-
plishing them. We set agendas, plan, prepare and organize courses of action; we










































From anticipation to performance 157
follow their courses or are disrupted. Noting that very few studies had been done
regarding how individuals orient towards the future, Scollon and Scollon (2000)
have proposed that closer attention should be paid to studying what they have
called ‘anticipatory discourses’ (see also S. Scollon, 2001; de Saint-Georges, 2003;
Filliettaz, 2004c). The analysis of anticipatory discourses could be defined as the
study of ‘the ways in which discourse may be used to produce possible or
impossible actions in the future’ (R. Scollon, 2002c: 5). It invites us to explore
how discourses about future actions figure in the production of these social actions:
are they simply a part of the mechanisms through which we reason about actions
or do they play a part in ‘generating’ actions? These issues can be explored through
the analysis of three threads in the empirical data.
Thread 1: the trajectory of a practice
The very first traces I have of an encounter with a member of the sheet-rocking
group are a few notes in my fieldnote book:
(1)
Friday night. 06/18/99
make an appointment → Monday: masons; Wednesday: sheet-rocking with
Henry, who asks me who I am, if I work as a social worker; seems open to my
presence on the work site no problem. Will give me a cap and overalls; we
change clothes on the work site to not dirty his van. Direct. To the point
Let us concentrate on the three future-oriented propositions, ‘Wednesday:
sheet-rocking with Henry,’ ‘will give me a cap and overalls’ and ‘we change clothes
on the work site,’ and the actions that emanate from this first encounter. First,
while I write the text above to record an encounter prior in the day, this note is also
a reminder to myself about a future engagement (the plan to meet on Wednesday).
Ladrière notes that for an activity involving a plurality of actors to occur, the actors
must at some point develop convergence in their understanding of the activity in
question (Ladrière, 2001: 277). This includes communicating to each other the
timing of the activity. Making an appointment thus forms part of a ‘dynamic of
occasions’ (de Fornel, 1993: 97) and appears as a mode to start constituting an
intersubjective future between the parties scheduling the encounter. This ‘sched-
uling discourse’ is linked to the site of engagement opening on Wednesday June 23
(space/time station 2) when I join the group to do observations of their work. Our
project to meet thus concretizes into a real encounter, enabling me to pursue my
research and establish a relationship for future encounters.
The ‘intention’ expressed by Henry to bring me cap and overalls does not 










































158 Ingrid de Saint-Georges
Henry actually forgets to bring them (intention does not lead inevitably to action)
and as a result I do not change clothes on the work site as I have been instructed to
in this first encounter with Henry. Many months later, however (space/time 
stations 5 and 6), as I prepare to resume observations of the group’s work, I put in
my bag work clothes I intend to wear on the work site as I have been directed to
do in this June encounter with Henry. As I groom myself for work the next day,
Henry’s initial discourse about changing clothes on the work site has now been
‘submerged’ as part of my practices (Scollon and Scollon, 2004: 18). This practice
has moved from the explicit level of discursive explanation to the more implicit
appropriation of the meanings of this discourse on a behavioral level.
Thread 2: the trajectory of a mediational means
On my first day with the sheet-rockers (Wednesday June 23, 1999 – space/time
station 2, construction of an arch), Henry asks me if I would agree to film the
work done during the day. He would like to produce pedagogical materials for
future trainees who might not have the opportunity to learn how to construct an
arch hands-on. They could learn about it through viewing the video. One of the
effects of this request is to change significantly my perception of what is ‘possible’
or ‘practicable’ for my ongoing research. I can start designing a research project
that takes this technological possibility into account. I state these ideas in the
proposal I write in December 1999 (space/time station 3). The data collected
during pilot fieldwork has now become a resource to design an ‘action-plan’ for
the actual fieldwork I aim to begin in January 2000:
(2)
Regarding the video-recording of the data, it should be noted that the Center
has recently acquired a video-camera. The purpose of this purchase is to be
able to document the work on the different work sites. . . . I learned of this
project in the course of doing my pilot fieldwork, when one instructor requested
that I video-tape the different stages of the work for that day. . . . By 
using this video-camera, I will thus be able to fulfill [the following] function: . . .
record the mediated actions necessary for my analysis. To ease the analysis
of the discourse dimensions, I also plan to tape-record verbal activities taking
place on work sites and use this audio-recording for the discourse analysis
aspect of my research.
Proposals usually qualify as text of the ‘rational planning’ type: they are usually
produced in anticipation of carrying out research and have discursive character-
istics of rationalistic texts. As Dant and Francis (1998: 3.3)2 note, the ‘traditional










































From anticipation to performance 159
future action.’ However, viewed in this historical perspective we see that this plan
has as much a retrospective character as a prospective one. On the one hand, the
‘working plan’ of video-taping activities became a ‘rational plan’ only ‘after [it]
acquired a coherence during courses of action, not in advance of such action’ (Dant
and Francis, 1998: 4.2). On the other hand, as a plan, the proposal fails to detail
what exact course of action should be taken on the work site (e.g. when to begin
and stop video-taping, how to approach asking participants if one can video-tape,
etc.). It does not in fact so much create ‘strategies’ for action as it ‘programs the
strategies [I] already have’ (Mintzberg, quoted in Dant and Francis, 1998: 2.10)
and present them formally, leaving it to the moment of situated actions to find
practical ways to implement these strategies.
In fact, the implementation of the plan is not without difficulties. Bridging the
gap between the formal plan and the actual realization of the action of
video/audio-taping on the work site becomes an object of struggle as indicated in
a note I write to myself in the morning of March 6, 2000 on my way to Horizons.
I write in my fieldnote book as an injunction for the day:
(3)
I must manage to tape record more on the work site; I am afraid to ask and to
impose; I must, I must, I must;
While the repeated ‘I must’ does not generate the fact that I later taped
exchanges on the work site, I would suggest, however, that it stands in a deter-
minate relationship to my action of taping. For Campbell (1996), sociologists have
on the whole been more concerned about the meanings of action rather than on
the way in which action is constructed. For him however:
Truly to adopt the actor’s perspective is to regard action as an accomplish-
ment and to recognize that it is the outcome of a struggle: something which
has to be achieved against resistance, being in effect the end product of a
willed effort involving certain given processes of ‘determination.’
(Campbell, 1996: 158)
Understanding the subjective meanings of an action suggests Campbell (1996:
160), moreover ‘involves ascertaining the role played by emotion, imagination,
effort, attention and will’:
In this respect the actor’s capacity to create and manipulate meaning has to
be regarded as a critical resource employed to accomplish acts and not simply











































160 Ingrid de Saint-Georges
What these comments from Campbell highlight is that, in writing this note 
to myself, I am neither seeking to ‘ “make sense of things”, or “render them
accountable” ’ (Campbell, 1996: 159) as for example ethnomethodologists might
suggest, nor does it constitute a form of decision-making (my decision is already
made). I am trying to exert agency as a researcher despite the difficulties I perceive
for realizing my goal. I am thus not so much using discourse to reflect about a
future action as I am using it as an impetus to accomplish an ordinary action.
Later in the course of the day, I write as an evaluative afterthought in my
notebook:
(4)
Finally, I feel quite free to film and to tape.
I am performing smoothly the audio-taping I had feared I would not be able to
perform in the morning.
Thread 3: from design to production: the trajectories leading 
to a site of engagement
All the actions mentioned above (the pilot fieldwork, the filming, the proposal,
the preparing of clothes to change on the work site, the decision to audio-tape)
constitute anticipatory actions and discourses leading to my observations of actual
work on the work site. On March 6, the work to be carried out is the renovation
of an apartment where the sheet-rockers have been asked to construct interior
walls. This work inscribes itself in numerous other trajectories than my own: the
trajectories of the various workers, the trajectory of the architect’s planning of
the work, the trajectory of the apartment’s history etc., such that we could
consider this moment of work as:
a point at which historical trajectories of people, places, discourse, ideas and
objects come together to enable some action which in itself alters those
historical trajectories in some ways as these trajectories emanate from the
moment of social action.
(Scollon and Scollon, 2004)
Let us consider two phases in the realization of this work: its design and its
production.
The design of the work
Kress and van Leeuwen (2001: Chapter 3) distinguish between what they call the
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semiotic modes and resources to conceptualize, project and imagine how a given
semiotic structure should be produced – and the ability for ‘production,’ which
is to say their ability to implement the design in a given form. In the case of
construction work, the ‘design’ is often the task of the architect and is couched in
blueprints and set of specifications, such as this one, produced for the realization
of the interior walls:
(5)
Article 68.03: non-bearing partitions
1. Work description.
Fixed partitions made of metal frames with internal insulator and plaster
board coating.
2. This work comprises.
This work concerns the carrying into execution of light dividing walls.
The characteristics of this partition are conceived as to meet the
requirements of the NBN S01–400 and reach at least category 11b.
The on-site trial of a partition with simple frame coated with two boards 
on each side, insulated by 50 MM glasswool – 16 kg/M3 (MS 100/2.50.2.A)
falls within category 11a-Rm (100–3150 Hz) 52 dB.
A. METAL FRAME
Simple metal frame composed of iron sections galvanized by heat, 0.6 MM
thick, METAL STUD MSH (u) type and MSV (C) from GYPROC, which is to say:
• tracing of the work in the presence of the architect;
• depending on situation, punctual cleaning of the coat at the butt and
ceiling maintained in order to bond the finishing touches;
• implementation of peripheral break-away bands constituted, depending on
the thickness to be reached, of compressed glasswool, or padding;
• Assembling of the frame according to the manufacturer’s prescriptions,
width of the iron sections L = 50 MM;
[CONTINUES]
Even without understanding the professional jargon used by the architect in
referring to materials that are to be used in the work process, it is clear that this
document refers to an ensemble of norms and requirements, which either indicate
how to use the material (usually according to manufacturer’s prescription) or
specify legal requirements (e.g. regarding sound proofing [52 dB]). The document
thus functions as a set of instructions, which carry a number of responsibilities with
them and which are caught within a larger normative Discourse of construction
work. The document however remains rather sketchy about the work processes










































162 Ingrid de Saint-Georges
specifications can remain under-determined in this way, it is because they rely on
precise and well-known scripts within the domain of practice of sheet-rocking and
make sense in relation to regular, organized, socially meaningful occupational
practices. It is also these practices and scripts that the trainees have to learn if they
want to become sheet-rockers in their own right.
The production of the work
The physical production of what the blueprint represents – its articulation in a
material form (a wall partition) – includes moving from modes and resources
understood abstractly to examining how actors use their embodied skills to
accomplish the physical actions necessary to implement the design. The excerpt
described below was filmed during the construction of the partitioning walls and
is one example of this recontextualization of the architectural discourse into
action. In this sequence, Henry, the monitor, is making measurements, while Billy
(standing) and Norbert (sitting) are watching. Then, Norbert starts looking around
before uttering, ‘The drill, Billy,’ and he is scanning the room to try to locate the
drill. Henry then intervenes and turns towards the back of the room. Pointing
towards the window-ledge with his measuring stick he says, ‘it’s there’ and then
resumes his work. At this point, Billy starts his move to fetch the drill.
In this moment of work many practices are engaged and multiple agendas
interact to construct a unique site of engagement. For example, the measuring is
in compliance with the normative Discourse of the blueprints and specifications;
my filming inscribes itself in the academic Discourse of research; the action of
measuring is just one step in a highly scripted sequence of actions which will
constitute the higher level of action of ‘partitioning a room’ and is constitutive of
the nexus of practices of sheet-rocking. In bearing responsibility for the measure-
ments, Henry acts as the one in charge of fulfilling the contract he has with his
client but, in monitoring the actions of the trainees, he also acts within the
pedagogical Discourse of training. Through concentrating his attention in multiple
directions and engaging in several lines of action simultaneously, Henry thus seeks
to fulfill his several agendas.
Norbert’s request for the drill can, in the same way, be shown to have multiple
functions. In anticipating the tool ahead of the moment of drilling, the request is
meant to move the sequence of action forward. But anticipating the next step in
the action sequence has also another function. Through the request, Norbert also
displays that he has knowledge and expertise about this action sequence. The
request thus also positions him as a worker taking initiatives. The form of the
request also has an impact on the manner of acting. In requesting the drill, Norbert
uses a direct request which in other kinds of circumstances could appear face-
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one, the direct form may cue the need to comply with the request without delay.
Likewise, the utterance seems here almost to ‘generate’ the immediate reaction
of Billy to look around the room for the drill. The form finally indexes a certain
form of power over Billy. Although Norbert is a trainee like Billy, he is already
an old-timer at Horizons. Through requesting Billy to perform a task for him
(rather than performing it himself ), Norbert displays qualities of leadership and
initiative that are usually regarded as a sign of progress and good evolution at
Horizons. As a newcomer, Billy does not question the old-timer authority of
Norbert and responds by complying with the request. Anticipatory discourse (the
directive) in this case is used to prompt an action (compliance with the request),
as well as construct an identity.
Implications for discourse analysis
In this chapter, I have suggested one way in which a processual outlook on data
could be developed. To capture the dynamic evolution of discourses and actions,
I have drawn from the theoretical notion of anticipatory discourse. Methodolog-
ically, I have used ethnographic field notes and other artifacts collected during
fieldwork to document moves from anticipation to performance.
In my view, the trajectory approach put forth by mediated discourse analysis is
intellectually attractive because of its ability to shed light on new and important
areas of inquiry. The data analyzed suggest a few directions that could be fruitfully
taken to further our understanding of discourse in ways that we have not done
much so far.
First, in the domain of genre analysis, it calls for developing a better under-
standing of texts oriented towards the future (procedures, specifications, plans,
agendas, etc.) as opposed to the past (narrative accounts). Paying attention to how
actions and discourses are located in time also promises to renew the discussion
regarding the functions of discourse in relation to action (can it ‘generate’ action
in the strong sense or is it part of the mechanisms through which we reason about
action?).
Another area for study it opens up is to pay more attention to the specificities 
of time as a semiotic mode mediating social interactions. In this area, we need to 
construct a much more complex understanding of how humans are ‘organizers of
complex temporal arrangements and assessment’ (Star, 1997: 6.4). We also need
to get a better grasp of how objects, representations, institutions, etc. and their
respective timescales oppose resistance to individuals’ actions. As Star (1997) 
puts it:
We organize ourselves in time, guessing, modeling, depending on the timings










































164 Ingrid de Saint-Georges
there are twists and tangles along the way. How we manage these twists is in
some sense what makes us quintessentially human, what ties us to the world.
(Star, 1997: 6.2)
A truly ecological approach to interaction must thus necessarily involve developing
a much more complex and solid understanding of this dimension.
Paying attention to the specificities of time as one mode of becoming of things,
events, identities, representation is also the only way to proceed if we want to
address seriously the issue of change, a process that necessarily consumes time. In
this chapter I have considered very local changes (the transformation of the
physical space of an apartment, the semiotic transformation of my representations
over time, etc.); but what scales do we have to take into account if we consider
more important changes?
In a world that is ruled by the ‘cult of urgency’ (Aubert and Roux-Dufort,
2003), it will probably be a challenge to carry out the long-term longitudinal
studies required to make an epistemological breakthrough in this domain. Studying
time and its effects may be, in this way, a form of resistance to the short-term
views that characterize so much of the discourses and actions of our time.
Notes
1 This introspective approach as a methodology was first suggested and developed in 
S. Scollon (2001).
2 Dant and Francis (1998: 3.3; 1998: 4.4; 1998: 2.10) and Star (1997: 6.4; 1997: 6.2)
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Sites of engagement:
questions and mini projects
Questions for discussion
1 Jones, drawing on the work of Hall, discusses how different social
groups develop different patterns of orientation towards time and
space, and how these different patterns affect the way they construct
sites of engagement and the kinds of actions that can be taken at these
sites. Think of an example of a physical space towards which different
kinds of people orient differently and how these different orientations
affect the actions they can take there.
2 Jones says that people’s orientation towards time and space is governed
by what he calls attention structures. Think of a situation (driving on a
highway, listening to a lecture, navigating the internet), and discuss how
the structuring of attention is achieved through external features of the
environment, norms of behavior associated with particular groups, and
practices that have been learned by individuals and appropriated into
their habitus.
3 De Saint-Georges talks about how anticipatory discourse acts to limit
and shape the kinds of actions we are able to take. Can you think of
some examples of this?
Mini projects
1 Look closely at Jones’s chapter and consider your own computer habits:
ask yourself who you communicate with using computers and where
you locate yourself in relationship to the other participants. How do
you construct time and space through your own social practices, shared
goals, plans, and the conventions that have built up around your
interactions? Analyze logs of your computer mediated communication
for space and time deixis. What does your analysis reveal?
2 Think about time/space stations in your own life. Through which trajec-
tories and what kind of anticipatory discourse are these connected?
































































































































Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
Traditionally, the notion of agency has been associated with concepts like ‘will’
and ‘intentionality’ and seen to spring from the individual’s consciousness acting
upon the environment. At the root of most discussions of agency in linguistics and
other social sciences is what Wertsch (1998) calls ‘methodological individualism,’
a tendency to take individuals as the unit of analysis and to perceive them as
bounded, autonomous and as exercising independent control over their actions
(see also Lukes, 1977).
There is, however, a significant tradition in the social sciences that has
challenged this view (see, for example, Burke, 1966; Dewy, 1938; Taylor, 1985;
Vygotsky, 1981), insisting on the need to go beyond the individual mind when
considering human action – and it is in this tradition that mediated discourse
analysis approaches the question of agency. It is, in fact, the primary premise of
mediated discourse analysis that human action is never a matter of individual










































Agency: Traditionally, the individual’s intentionality as con-
structed through discursive actions.
MDA’s approach to agency goes beyond the individ-
ual, viewing it as integrated – and in tension with – the
actor’s habitus, the mediational means employed 
and the social practices involved in constructing a
mediated action.
Agency is always distributed among participants,
mediational means and discourses.
and the agendas embedded in the mediational means made available in the socio-
cultural setting and appropriated into the individual’s habitus as components of
social practices. Agency is always distributed (Al Zidjaly, 2004; Hutchins, 1994; S.
Scollon, this volume) among human actors, mediational means and the various
discourses that circulate through them. It is always something that is negotiated
between individuals and their social worlds.
How exactly this negotiation takes place and the role agency plays in the
production of the social actor and the social world, are questions that require
further study. According to R. Scollon (2001a), questions of how agency is
distributed, enacted, represented and contested are among the most crucial ones
faced by mediated discourse analysis. There is, for example, much evidence (Fung,
1994; Hsu, 1953; Scollon and Scollon, 2001; S. Scollon, this volume) to suggest
that different configurations of ‘culture’ produce different conceptions of the self
and patterns of negotiation between the individual and society.
Central to MDA’s approach to agency is the work of Kenneth Burke, for 
whom agency is chiefly a matter of perspective. In his Grammar of Motives (1969),
Burke proposes that an action can be approached from any of five points of view:
the scene, the social actor, (what Burke calls ‘the agent’), the mediational means
(what Burke calls ‘agency’), the mediated action (what Burke calls ‘the act’) and
the purpose of the action (see also R. Scollon, 2002). From this perspective, 
the study of agency is seen not so much in terms of objectively attributing
responsibility for social actions, but rather in terms of understanding how those
we study position themselves in various relationships to their actions, and
understanding how we as observers position ourselves when we formulate
interpretations of those actions. Burke (1969) makes the point that when we
attribute motives to actions, we are not so much describing the internal states 
that led to these actions but, rather, we are defining situations and conceiving
social actions in ways that others can understand and accept. In other words, the
discursive explanation and attribution of agency within social interaction, is, itself,
a cultural tool for the construction of identity (see Norris, this volume). Thus,
any analysis of agency must focus on the tension between the way agency is
constructed by individuals in their discourse, and the way it is interpreted by
others as actions unfold.
Another way our understanding of agency is affected by perspective is in how
its operation appears to change depending on the scope of our observation or the
horizon of our awareness. Agency on one timescale, that of a momentary, situated
action, for example, might appear quite differently when evaluated from the
perspective of a longer timescale, a larger activity, a lifetime, or an economic 
or political cycle ( Jones and Candlin, 2003; S. Scollon, this volume). Similarly,
agency seems much easier to attribute to individuals when considering moment-










































170 Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris
identity constructions and discourses, however, the distributed nature of agency
becomes much more apparent (see Norris, this volume).
Finally, agency is intimately connected to questions of power and domination.
The central question here is, again, one of perspective. Power is not so much a
matter of who ‘has’ agency as much as of who is able to control the positioning
through which motives are assigned and exchanged, often through controlling the
timescales and trajectories along which actions are defined (Blommaert, 2004).
In the following chapters, these issues of perspective and power in agency are
developed and applied to specific situations. In Chapter 17, Suzie Scollon notes
how agency is distributed across actors, time, mediational means and discourses
in the practice of filling out a census form. This pattern of distribution, she argues,
can only be understood by tracing trajectories of agency in the history of the
culture or cultures involved, in the historical bodies of the participants, and in the
interaction order of the moment when a census form is filled out.
In Chapter 18, Sigrid Norris considers agency as a tool in the construction of
social identity in the context of gender relations. In her study of the discourse 
of two women, one married and one divorced, she explores how life choices are
constructed in discourse, and how these choices are embedded in the societies and











































17 Agency distributed through
time, space and tools: Bentham,
Babbage and the census
Suzie Scollon
On a day in early April, 2000, Mrs Kang receives an envelope in the daily mail
addressed to the ‘head of the household.’ When she sees the envelope containing
forms for the decennial population count, buried in a stack of promotional mail
offering special credit offers and the like, she sets it aside. She not only cannot
speak or read English, she speaks only rudimentary accented Mandarin and cannot
read the small complex Chinese characters on a corner of the envelope saying that
Chinese forms are available by calling a certain phone number.
The next day, a friend at Mrs Kang’s English language class tells her about the
identical envelope she received and tells her that she saw that there was a special
form for overseas Chinese to fill out, but her husband had advised her against it,
saying ‘this doesn’t have anything to do with you.’ Her husband’s attitude had
partly to do with thinking the complex characters were meant for Chinese from
Hong Kong or Taiwan, not China, and partly to do with his intention to return
to China after a few years. Mrs Kang thinks no more about the matter.
Some days later, there is a knock on the door. Mrs Kang, who lives in an apart-
ment complex in the inner city, looks through a peephole and sees a strange African
American man who is not one of her neighbors. She is afraid to open the door,
with her husband at work at a Chinatown restaurant and her sons away at school.
After a few days of looking in vain for work, Mrs Kang returns to the Chinatown
Service Center at a nearby church for another English class. Mrs Ng explains to
the class that the results of the census will affect funding for their language classes
and other services such as emergency health care. She offers to help students fill
out the forms and return them to the Census Bureau, assuring them that all
personal data will be kept confidential.
Students express concerns that by revealing personal information such as their
home address they will lose their residence rights. Mrs Ng patiently explains that,
unlike in China, the green cards that give them the right to employment and
residence in the country are not tied to any particular address. The benefits would










































Mrs Kang agrees to let Mrs Ng help her fill out a form for herself and her family.
She finds not only the questions confusing but the order in which they are asked.
She feels inadequate having questions explained to her in Mandarin, just as she had
as a schoolgirl some decades before, and not being able to read the simplest
questions. She doesn’t know whether her son, who is a college student, should be
counted as part of her household.
Who is the agent?
If we ask who the agent is in the counting of Mrs Kang, her husband and her son,
the answer is by no means simple. The question ‘Who is the agent?’ makes the
basic assumption that agency is a property of the individual, a body in a cultural,
historical and institutional vacuum (Wertsch et al., 1993). In Goffman’s (1974)
terms, however, the three who are counted are but figures, with Mrs Kang and
Mrs Ng sharing in the animation of Mrs Kang as principal in an act authored by
countless Bureau of Census employees and their predecessors over a span of
centuries.
In this chapter I will show how agency as a motive force toward an end is
distributed through time, space and tools as well as actors in cycles of discourse
and action.1 Mrs Kang and Mrs Ng, immigrants from different countries in
different decades, each a speaker of a dialect of Fujian Chinese unintelligible to
the other and a speaker of Mandarin as a second language, share enough experi-
ence in common discourses to collaborate in filling out a form that resemiotizes
(Iedema, 2001) discourses originating on other continents in other centuries.
These langues are what Wertsch (1991) refers to as mediational means, as are 
the census form, with its letters, characters, shaded areas, arrows, numerals and
blank lines, the pen, the clipboard, the furniture and lights and the space in the
classroom.
Agency in modern times has been uncritically construed as involving a single
actor, an autonomous individual with a simple intention. From being defined as
‘an intervening action toward an end,’ in the mid-seventeenth century, agency
acquired a sense of ‘action personified, a source of action toward an end,’ in the
late eighteenth century (OED, 1993). By the late twentieth century, the theory of
radical choice conceived of the human agent as a disembodied ego acting on a
horizon with no anchoring in space, time or personal history (Taylor, 1985: 35).
Elsewhere I have argued that language needs to be analyzed from three points
of view: the langue or language with a historical provenience typically identified
with a nation state; the idiolect or linguistic habitus, the collectivity of resources
used by an individual to navigate her social world; and the speech community
resources used by everyone in the community (S. Scollon, 1977). I have shown










































Agency distributed through time, space and tools 173
of the collective resources of other langues present, including Chipewyan, Cree
and French (S. Scollon, 1982). Here, I argue that the agency of any action must
similarly be understood from the point of view of the discourses provided by the
nation, the historical body of the actor, and the interaction order (Scollon and
Scollon, 2003, 2004).
In an era with megacorporations spending megabucks in advertising campaigns
to control our every purchase while seeming to offer choice, it is imperative that
we seek to understand how agency is distributed socially, culturally and histori-
cally. Even an action as seemingly uncomplicated as completing a census form can
be demonstrated to entail very complex networks of distributed agency converg-
ing in time and space under the mutual influence of disparate discourses. Any
action occurs at the nexus of a historical human body, a social interaction order,
and discourses in place (Scollon and Scollon, 2003, 2004). Thus, an act of enumer-
ation takes place when a person, either alone or in interaction with others, fills
out a form that resemiotizes utilitarian and national discourses through the means
of questions printed with space for responses. The place, typically a home, where
the act takes place carries its own discourses. The convergence of these discourses
in a particular moment is mediated by what we call interdiscursive dialogicality
(Scollon and Scollon, 2003).
Agency in census enumeration is distributed across discourse cycles centuries
in duration, global in spatial extension and embodied in material objects and
biological persons. Mrs Kang’s behavior, not only her action of migrating from
Fujian to the Atlantic seaboard, but also her actions of avoiding census forms 
and finally consenting to have Mrs Ng fill out a form for her, as well as her
communication with Mrs Ng during the filling out of the form, has been shaped
by multiple discourses: Chinese imperial edicts; techniques for registering families
used by the Guomindang and Japanese; the Soviet passbook system for internal
migration; and regulations of the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s
Republic of China (Cheng and Selden, 1997). Mrs Ng’s behavior in assisting Mrs
Kang is shaped not only by her own experience of education in Manila, Singapore
and the US and later immigration, her knowledge of English and Mandarin and
the US decennial census, but also by authors like Locke, Hume, J.S. Mill,
Benjamin Franklin, Jeremy Bentham and Thomas Malthus whose ideas shaped
discourse in the American colonies, as well as Charles Babbage who drew up plans
in the mid-nineteenth century for an ‘analytical engine,’ the forerunner of the
computer, which was not actually built until 1946.
Understanding agency requires understanding human motives. Kenneth Burke
in 1945 (Burke, 1969 [1945]) proposed an analysis of human action and agency
that would go beyond the abstract analysis of linguistic form, looking at the human
actor as a participant in a drama, contained within and interacting with a scene.











































on the part of the one representing the action, he called his scheme a ‘grammar
of motives.’
According to Burke, ‘the basic unit of action is the human body in purposive
motion’ (Burke, 1969: 16). To describe the action of Mrs Kang in allowing 
Mrs Ng to count her in the census, we might say she is complying with the circum-
stances in which she finds herself at a Social Service Center that provides her with
instruction in English, which she considers necessary to her survival in a foreign
land. Burke would consider this a scenic motive. He would not consider her an
agent in that she did not have the intention of being counted but simply went along
with it after some resistance.
If Mrs Kang was not the author of her act, neither was Mrs Ng. She might be
considered the author of whatever she said that resulted in her writing words on
the census form beyond reading the words on the form, but she did not author
the form itself. She might also have authored some of the words with Mrs Kang
as principal taking responsibility for the words.
But what of a census enumerator? At a very basic level, it is clear that a census
taker who is paid by the number of people enumerated has more incentive to
complete the form than the ordinary citizen who has no idea what, if any, benefit
might accrue from cooperating with the enterprise. But even here, the real
incentive to count comes not from the individual, but from the US Bureau of the
Census as an agency of the government, a bureaucratic office that resemiotizes
utilitarian and nationalistic discourses in computers which spew out forms to be
filled out by citizens with or without the help of hired or voluntary enumerators,
and whose agency extends back to the Industrial Revolution and the ‘felicific
calculus’ of Jeremy Bentham.
Borrowing from Braudel, Blommaert writes of the ‘layered simultaneity’ of
three timescales that are present in every action: the longue durée, the time of inter-
mediate political or economic cycles, and événement or event-time, defined as ‘the
short time, measured on individuals, everyday life, our illusions, our understand-
ings and awareness’ (Braudel, 1969: 45–46). Participants in social events have a
restricted horizon of awareness of historical, social structural causes of those events
and can exert agency only in the immediate time frame and from their own angle
of awareness. The multiple contradictory perspectives which come together at 
the moment of the event form distinct trajectories with different origins develop-
ing at different speeds. ‘Synchronicity . . . combines elements that are of a different
order but tends to obscure these fundamental differences’ (Braudel, 1969: 128).
In what follows, I will sketch out significant discourses in the longue durée, 
the intermediate political and economic cycles, and event time, describing 
first Western and American layers and then Chinese ones. I will then show how
these layers come together in the moment of census taking in interdiscursive
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The development of the census in the West
The idea of the census developed straight out of Utilitarianism, for example,
and since the modern computer arose out of census taking, it is no stretch of
the historical fabric to say that contemporary uses of computers for such
functions as public opinion polls and market surveys are a direct realization
of the thinking of the Utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham.
(Scollon and Scollon, 2001 [1994]: 116)
To answer the question ‘who is the agent?’ we need to consider not only the actors
currently present in the situation and the discourses they embody but also dis-
courses embodied in the census form, which go back centuries in time. The
questions on the form were authored by various Bureau of Census employees, and
they were laid out on the form by a design team. But the author or strategist of
the master plan of counting may be said to be Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832),
whose ‘felicific calculus’ of happiness as ‘the greatest good of the greatest number’
entailed the imagination of a machine capable of carrying out unimaginably
repetitive calculations.
Many would consider public opinion polls and market surveys to be silly
progeny indeed, descended from Jeremy Bentham who thought happiness could
be calculated and Charles Babbage who conceived what became the technology
for the endless calculation of questionable items. Burke argued that it is in its
becoming that technology most fully represents the human agent, since his inventing
of it is an act, and a rational act (1969: 109).
The implication is that those of us who must use the technology are not agents
who author our acts but objects or, at best, instruments in a drama that began 200
years ago. The history of who said or wrote what in the chain of events that led
to the modern census would reveal early agents who could not have foreseen what
their acts would engender:
Remember always that no modern instrument could have been invented, or
could be produced, without the use of a vast linguistic complexity. A traffic
signal seems very simple, but its production, distribution and operation
requires a set of interlocking linguistic acts that would require a century 
to trace in their particularity. If we are not to be lost in such a maze of parti-
culars, we must build from the essential humanity of dramatist or dialectic 
lore in general, considering it as central to the contemplation of the human
tragi-comedy.
(Burke, 1969 [1945]: 319)
By ‘linguistic act,’ Burke meant any motion represented by a verb and having











































Bentham had asserted that motion had to be conscious and purposeful in order to
be considered a human act.
Burke simplified acts that go into the operation of traffic signals by categorizing
them within a hierarchy of acts on a continuum with acts of creation at one end
and jobs or occupations involving sheer motion at the other (Burke, 1969 [1945]:
14). Office jobs on the latter end, which entail filing, bookkeeping, recording,
accounting and the like, are acts belonging to a maze of particulars such as the
motions of employees of federal regulatory agencies or commercial producers of
traffic regulatory signs (cf. Scollon and Scollon, 2003: 190–192). People working
in offices of the Bureau of the Census are instruments in the operations of the
census just as the computers that fill innumerable buildings are.
These instruments, both human and mechanical, and the ideas that gave rise to
them in the nineteenth century, are mediational means themselves embedded in
longer histories, political and economic projects and exercises of power and
domination that can be traced all the way back to the supposed act of God,
recorded in the Book of Numbers of the Old Testament, commanding Moses to
take a census. Early inventories of people made in Babylonia, Palestine, Persia,
China and Egypt sought to control particular individuals for purposes of tax,
military service or labor (Brittanica, 1990; Ho, 1959). They counted only partic-
ular categories of persons such as family heads or males of military age and tended
to be inaccurate, as it was not in the individuals’ interest to be counted. The first
recorded census was ordered by Servius Tullius, sixth king of Rome, in 550 BC.
This was a register of adult male citizens and their property which determined
political status, military obligation and taxation.
Foundational discourses of utilitarianism and nationalism resulted in the com-
pulsion to enumerate the population of the American colonies beginning with 
the decennial census of 1790. The US decennial census was designed to balance
the counting of population for apportioning seats, an incentive for states to
maximize their counts, against the distribution of taxation, an incentive for states
to minimize their totals.
When the first decennial census results of 1790 showed runaway growth in the
thirteen original colonies, Thomas Malthus was moved to write his essay on popu-
lation in which he argued that at that rate of natural increase food production could
never keep up. The fertility rate for the white population in 1800 was about twice
the highest rate of the baby boom in the 1950s (Crosby, 1994: 168). Crosby attrib-
utes the fecundity of the colonists to the bounty of the land and the generosity of
the native population which allowed the settlers to survive and multiply on easily
available maize. The bounty of the land gave rise to ambition, self-confidence, 
self-satisfaction and self-righteousness, according to Crosby (1994: 176).
Beginning in the nineteenth century, decennial censuses became the practice in










































Agency distributed through time, space and tools 177
intimately related to nationalism, national censuses until the mid-nineteenth
century did not inquire into language. An item on langue parlée, ‘spoken language,’
was first proposed at the International Statistical Congress held in Brussels in 1853.
French was the language of the Congress, which was convened to establish
international standards of demographic statistics and census categories. At the
Vienna session of the Congress in 1857 the question of language was buried by
reference to ‘nationality.’
Similarly, the US began including questions about language in the 1870 census.
Before that and continuing to the present there seems to be more concern with
establishing race under the guise of ethnic identity (Leeman, 2005). Changing
immigration patterns with increased numbers of Jews from Germany and Eastern
Europe as well as Mexicans brought heightened attention to language and a new
question, regarding ability to speak English, in the 1890 census. By 1910 the
Census Bureau was attempting to classify foreign-born residents by mother
tongue. In 1950, after decades of limited immigration mostly from western
Europe, no questions about language were included. However, by 1980, with
increasing immigration, largely from Asia and Latin America, there were questions
on home language use as well as English-language ability.
In the intermediate timescale of political and economic cycles, the influx of new
immigrants has diversified the population, creating new needs for census data and,
at the same time, complicating the gathering of pertinent data. The implementa-
tion of Executive Order 13166 signed into law by President Clinton on August
11, 2000 requires accurate data on languages spoken by different segments of the
population. While this act sought to institute language rights in accordance with
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Bush administration’s ‘war on terrorism’ and the
institution of Homeland Security has brought an atmosphere of suspicion of, and
by, foreign nationals and immigrants and fear of deportation, with consequent
reluctance to speak with government representatives of any kind. Political
currents thus exert pressure on the event time of potential census encounters.
Discourses embodied in Chinese immigrants
Although some discourses resemiotized in census forms can be traced to their
roots, others, such as those rooted in the historical bodies of immigrants and
census takers, can be unearthed only through a process of reconstruction by
observation of behavior and linking that to sociological and historical documents.
Immigrants carry with them displaced discourses embodied in their every
movement even as they internalize the bureaucratic discourses of their intended
homeland.
Reluctance to speak with officials on the part of immigrants such as Mrs Kang











































US. In China, census taking goes back as far as the fourteenth century, when
‘yellow registers’ enumerated the entire population and resembled modern census
returns with listings of age, sex and occupation. Comparable returns were not
collected until after 1776 (Ho, 1959). Land survey handbooks known as ‘fish scale
maps and books’ contained summaries of land, each parcel described with the
name of its owner, other property, amount of taxes and labor services borne by
each household. These registers were compiled until the end of the Qing dynasty
in 1911. Emphases and methods of enumeration underwent important changes
through the centuries.
Buried in the US Congressional Record is a section translated from an edict
issued by the Emperor T’ai-tsu, who ruled China from 1368–1398. Under this
emperor, each household was issued a hu-tieh or ‘household certificate’ in which
was recorded information as to members and property. On December 12, 1370
the Board of Revenue received an imperial edict that underscored the seriousness
of accurate counts (emphasis added):
You, officials of the Board of Revenue, will send out proclamations ordering
the provincial and local authorities to get all the population within their
respective jurisdiction officially registered, and all the names of the people
entered into the offical registers. The number of persons of each household
must all be written down without falsification. Each household is to be given
a household certificate with a half seal on each side so that the two parts will
tally. . . . Those households whose tallies agree will be treated as subjects in
good standing; if they do not agree, the family will be placed on the list of
those liable for military service. If it is discovered in the course of checking that
some local officials have falsified the returns, those officials are to be decapitated. Any
common people who hide from the census will be punished according to law
and will be drafted into the army.
(Board of Revenue, 1370)
It is not known how many violations of this edict were punished during 
T’ai-tsu’s reign, but Ho reports that in subsequent centuries enumerations were
far from accurate. Shanghai county, for example, left many females out of the
count, recording a sex ratio of 460 males to 100 females. Another county omitted
children, and one county reported a drop of 5,000 in the number of households
between 1391 and 1551 (Ho, 1959: 11). Merging of clans to lighten or escape
the tax burden was rampant.
In the intermediate timescale, the system of population registration and control
that developed soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949
‘effectively denied the Chinese people freedom of residence and movement, plac-










































Agency distributed through time, space and tools 179
Citizens were required to apply for permission to change their residence and to
keep their residence registration current.
With the 1953 census, registration procedures were implemented in Shanghai
and other major cities with the issuance of new and very detailed household
registration books that recorded the birth, death, residence, education, and
occupation of every household member (Cheng and Selden, 1997: 33). The State
Council promulgated a ‘Directive on Dissuading Peasants from Blind Influx 
into Cities,’ which urged hundreds of thousands of peasants to return to their
villages. This was followed in 1955 by ‘The Directive Concerning Establishment
of a Permanent System of Household Registration,’ signed by Premier Zhou 
Enlai. This new directive encompassed countryside as well as cities. Cheng and
Selden (1997: 35) consider this directive the beginning of a shift in emphasis 
from population registration to migration control.
A ration system for grain and other staples as well as cotton and cloth was
established, resulting in increasing difficulties for illegal migrants in obtaining
food. Eligibility for food rations, subsidized housing, health care and pensions was
restricted to urban residents who were members of a danwei or work unit. Only
about 10 percent of the population qualified. Position defined by household and
work unit was graded into seven categories of grain-supply cards. Rural residents
were required to provide for their own food needs. Registration was intimately
tied to food rationing.
In 1958 every Chinese citizen was required to be registered in a household
registration book that constituted proof of ‘the identity of citizens’ (Cheng and
Selden, 1997: 41). In both city and countryside, persons were recorded by
workplace and location rather than kinship as in the former registration system.
Husband and wife living and working in two different locations were registered
in separate households, with children normally registered with their mother.
People were allowed to move from large cities to smaller ones or to the country-
side, but not vice versa. Moving-in certificates became required for moving 
into cities.
The moment of census taking
Scollon and Scollon (2003) draw connections between Braudel’s concept of three
timescales and the nexus of practice composed of the historical body that takes
social action, the discourses in place through which action is taken, and the
interaction order (Goffman, 1961) within which it is taken. Using these insights,
and building on Pan’s earlier work on the ways Chinese immigrants navigate the
Chinese translation of the form used in the 2000 census, Pan and S. Scollon (2004)
did a nexus analysis of the moment of enumeration involving Chinese immigrants,











































uncovered sociopolitical discourses embodied in census forms and census
enumerators as well as the immigrants we attempted to interview.
At the moment of filling out a form, discourses in place, including those
fossilized (or frozen) in the form itself (Norris, 2004b), interact with the inter-
action order and the historical bodies of the participants. We opened up the
circumference of the moment to map the objects, discourses and persons, and 
the histories they bring with them into the common task of census enumeration.
We examined how discourse, including the interaction order, becomes fossilized
in census forms, how these residues of prior actions become the mediational means
for succeeding actions, and how agency is embodied in the skills required to
complete a form as well as the motivation to do so.
We have seen how census taking originated in the longue durée and how it has
evolved in the intermediate political and economic cycles in Europe, North
America and China. Discourses of Christianity, imperialism, utilitarianism and
nationalism have been resemiotized in US census forms in English and again in
translation. These forms fossilize an interview sequence of questions and answers
as well as a sequence of questions with multiple-choice responses of the kind used
in standardized tests developed during the twentieth century (Pan, 2003). They
resemiotize an authority structure and a participation structure with words and
visual semiotics.
Historical bodies of participants such as Mrs Kang and Mrs Ng contain residues
in habitus of their previous experience or lack of experience in filling out forms 
or interacting with strangers who represent the government, in their homes or 
in municipal registration centers. Older persons lack experience with multiple-
choice questions, while anyone who has been schooled in the late twentieth
century in the US answers these as second nature.
The interaction order is also embodied, as well as dialogue in various varieties
of language and literacy in different writing systems. To Mrs Kang’s habitual
dialogue in Northern Min, her mother tongue, was added interaction in Putonghua
(Mandarin) when she entered school in the vicinity of Fuzhou, where she acquired
some literacy in simplified Chinese characters. In modern China the practice of
census enumeration has been to send census takers to homes to count residents.
Forms are not filled out by residents but by census takers, who keep an eye out
for residents not reported by heads of households.
Whatever layers of language and interaction patterns are embodied may shift
when a person moves to a foreign land where some family members are more
familiar with the new language than others. Children may have fluency but not
authority to speak to census enumerators and may have little experience with
translation and interpretation.
Social workers like Mrs Ng not only have the linguistic skills necessary to help
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to know that they can be much more effective in this task than strangers who go
from door to door. They can also enlist cooperation from immigrants as they have
a history of helping with forms that directly benefit people who are attacked and
need emergency crisis intervention, for example.
Mrs Ng thus exercises agency in event time, with the motive of increasing
funding by enumerating more residents in her service area. Her action in the event
is enabled by experience in intermediate cycles and motivated by anticipation of
further cycles.
Agency in census taking is thus distributed over cycles of discourse and action
taking place in separate locales initiated by different actors with a plethora of
mediational means including Bentham’s felicific calculus and Babbage’s analytical
engine.
Conclusion
We have seen that an action such as filling out a form is done by one or more
particular persons at a particular place at a particular moment, yet is never
independent of other persons, places, times or discourses. As Blommaert (2004)
argues, globalization affects language usage anywhere, anytime: through ideology,
which is both historical, in the sense of Foucault’s archive, and present in the
immediate context; and through habitus, or what we prefer to call the historical
body. In a text such as a census form, meanings are simultaneously produced in
historical layers, not all of them conscious or accessible to agency.
Blommaert points out that state bureaucracies maintain their power by insuring
that their laws prevail at any given moment, no matter what a particular person 
carries in their historical body. He contends that in our global world system, per-
sons who travel across state boundaries face official encounters that are inherently
unequal in that the discursive resources are stacked in favor of the bureaucrat.
Though the discourses that converge in an official event or document constitute 
distinct layers in time and space, through a process of layered simultaneity they all
pass through a filter of the state discourse that prevails at the moment of the
encounter, with this prevailing top layer eclipsing all earlier layers brought into 
the encounter by the itinerant. What Blommaert terms ‘synchronization’ is a means
by which bureaucratic agents retain power by collapsing layers of times and places
into the event of the moment, thereby eradicating events of other times and 
places stored in the historical bodies of the subjects over whom they rule.
Note
1 This chapter is based on a study, ‘Sociolinguistic Research on Immigration Character-
istics and Experiences,’ carried out under the auspices of the US Bureau of the Census,











































18 Habitus, social identity,
the perception of male
domination – and agency?
Sigrid Norris
. . . what appears, in history, as being eternal is merely the product of a labor of
eternalization performed by . . . institutions such as the family . . .
(Bourdieu, 2001: viii)
According to Nishida (1958) and Bourdieu (1977) social identity is embedded 
in cultural and social currents, constructed through social and societal histories,
and internalized by the individual as habitus. Certainly, identity is constantly
constructed on a micro level, where an individual’s identity is claimed, contested,
and re-constructed in interaction and in relation to the other participants (R.
Scollon, 1997). Such constructions are often, if not always, expressed as elements
through lower-level, higher-level, and/or frozen actions (Norris, 2002a, 2002b,
2004a, 2004b). But social identity is also constructed in relation to others who
may not be present at a given moment (Goffman, 1959) and it is always
constructed through schemes of perception.
In this chapter, I elucidate the interconnections between habitus, social identity
construction, and two women’s construction of male domination.1 In order to
demonstrate this complexity, I draw on nexus analysis and multimodal interaction
analysis as my methodological frameworks (Scollon and Scollon, 2004; Norris,
2004b); I take into consideration the performance of sequential and simultaneous
actions and the (not necessarily intentional) re-production of practices on different
timescales as constructed in the histories and cultures of the individuals and the
societies that they belong to; and I discuss the two women’s identity and power
construction, and thereby investigate what role – if any – agency plays in 
the process.2
Data and method
I look at two representative excerpts taken from a year-long ethnographic case










































and has three children, while the other woman, Sandra, is going through a 
divorce and has two children. During the year of data collection, I visited Anna
and Sandra and their families (who lived close to each other and spent much time
together) four times and lived with them for about four months in all, quickly
becoming a part of their families during my first stay. While I was living with the
two women, I shared their lives. I went shopping with Sandra and Anna; tagged
along when they dropped off/picked up their children at preschool and school;
read the books, magazines, and newspapers that they read; met their extended
families and social networks; watched the TV programs that they watched; and
listened to the music that they listened to. All the while I was jotting down field-
notes, had the video recorder running every so often and audio taped the women
when video recording was not possible. During the eight months that I was not
staying with Anna and Sandra, the women wrote day-diaries, audio taped some of
their own interactions, collected the books, magazines, and newspapers that they
were reading, and the CDs that they were listening to, and sent me this material
on a regular basis. Furthermore, I have studied the social histories of the two
women through family narratives, and learned about the practices of identity
construction that Anna and Sandra acquired while growing up.
The social identity constructions and the women’s perceptions of male domina-
tion found in these two excerpts are found throughout my personally collected 
60 hours of video and audio data of naturally occurring interactions, several hours
of informal sociolinguistic interviews, and an abundance of fieldnotes. The two
examples illustrate the complexity involved when we start studying social identity
construction in more than one mode and on more than one time scale (Lemke,
2000a, 2000b; Norris, 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b; Scollon and Scollon, 2004);
when we take the cultural projections and societal currents that are embedded 
in the individual’s habitus into consideration; when we analyze the actions within
their practices (Scollon, 1998); and when we investigate the power relationships
that are being constructed and reconstructed (Bourdieu, 2001). Such a complex
analysis brings with it the challenge to balance the micro analysis of the examples
with the macro analysis of historical information that cannot possibly be explicated
in a short chapter like this, perhaps resulting in shortcomings on either side. How-
ever, I believe that it is crucial to bridge micro and macro analysis in order to
advance our understanding of human interaction, identity construction, and power
relations. By bridging micro and macro, a micro analysis is greatly informed by
the macro analysis, as our understanding of the macro societal and cultural
underpinnings allows for a richer micro analysis.
Interaction and identity construction
As I demonstrate elsewhere (Norris, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b), a person seldom acts











































simultaneous higher-level actions, each of which is constructed out of a multi-
plicity of lower-level actions performed through the use of various communicative
modes. Every action that is performed by an individual claims at least one of the
individual’s identity elements, so we find that individuals always construct several
identity elements simultaneously (Norris, 2002b). Concurrently, each action
displays some kind of power relation – or better, as T. Bartlett (2004) suggests:
an array of power relations. Just as one action can have different simultaneous
meanings, it can claim more than one identity element, and/or a variety of power
relations (see also Norris, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b).
During these excerpts there are no male participants present, and yet, both
women demonstrate that they construct at least some of their actions according
to what we can interpret as their internalized perceptions of male domination. It
is this portrayed power-relationship that I am particularly interested in here, as
this seems to be the power relationship that the participants themselves experience
as the strongest one.
A sociolinguistic interview
During a sociolinguistic interview, Anna was asked to describe who she perceives
herself to be. The interview was conducted on a morning that Anna had chosen.
When the interviewer entered Anna’s apartment that day, and throughout the
interview, Anna was ironing her family’s clothing, her daughter was playing
behind her on the floor, and Anna was watching a soap opera, as illustrated in the
first image of Figure 18.1.4
The interview started with the request ‘well, talk a bit about yourself, about
your identity.’ Anna starts her narrative at the point when she was born, and
moves quickly through the early years by listing dates and events, before she pauses
and then says, ‘I actually got where I am today and what I do today in quite a
round-about way.’ At this point she starts telling her social history from her youth
to now, as represented in the transcript below.
The transcription conventions are adopted from Tannen (1984): each period
indicates a 1⁄2-second pause; : indicates lengthening of vowels; - marks abrupt
cutting off of sound; ? marks rising intonation; , marks phrase-final intonation (i.e.
more to come); z indicates latching or (in the following excerpt) continuous talk;
and CAPITALS illustrate emphatic stress:
(1) als Jugendlicher ...
(2) ich wollte nicht Hausfrau werden,
(3) und mich von einem Mann abhängig machen,











































Habitus, social identity, perception of male domination 185
(6) hab ich irgendwann Robert kennengelernt
(7) und dann
(8) wurden auf einmal
(9) alle Grundsätze über den Haufen geschmissen
(10) und dann
(11) war auf einmal alles ganz anders
Translation of the excerpt:
(1) as a youth ...











































Figure 18.1 Identity construction and perception of male domination
A sociolinguistic interview: 
Setting up the computer: 
der hat mich an sowas nie rangelassen he never let me do anything like this 
icb werde es schaffen 
I will manage to do this 
Loud hard-rock type music 
with lyrics like: 
I wanted love, but it's gonna 
kill me, you swear you 're 
faithful, that was a lie, 
you 've cheated on me with 
half of this city, you aren't 
worth it, bye-bye. 
ich mach spater da weiter 
I' ll continue there later 
(3) and make myself dependent upon a husband,
(4) I didn’t want any of that ...
(5) but then
(6) I met Robert at some point
(7) and then
(8) suddenly
(9) all principles were overthrown
(10) and then
(11) suddenly everything was completely different
At this point, Anna talks about her family and how every one of the family
members is important to her (for about five minutes). Then she starts talking about
her current place in life5:
(12) und nach wie vor bin ich auch .. so zufrieden
(13) mit all dem was ich mache.
(14) ich bin zufrieden mit meinem Haushalt,
(15) bin zufrieden mit dem Partyservice,
(16) als Ausgleich zum hier-
(17) Haushalt und Familienleben?
(18) wobei ich das nich:t . sehe . als .. ä:hm ..
(19) .. wie soll ich sa:gen,
(20) .. als Gelegenheit mich hier ..
(21) finanziell unabhängig zu machen von Robert —
(22) — darum geht’s mir ÜBERHAUPT nicht.
Translation:
(12) and I am as .. content as ever
(13) with everything I do.
(14) I am happy with my household,
(15) I am happy with the party service,
(16) as a balance to here-
(17) household and family life?
(18) while I do:n’t . see . this as .. a:hm ..
(19) .. how shall I pu:t it,
(20) .. as an opportunity to make myself here ..
(21) financially independent from Robert —
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---
Actions
As mentioned earlier, during the course of the interview Anna is ironing, her
daughter plays in close proximity, and Anna watches a soap opera. Thus, what we
find here are several higher-level actions being constructed simultaneously
(Norris, 2002a, 2004a, 2004b). Each higher-level action – the telling of a social
narrative, ironing, watching TV, or interacting with her daughter – is constructed
through chains of lower-level actions. For example, the telling of the narrative is
constructed through a chain of utterances, a chain of glances at the interviewer, a
chain of gesture units, a chain of postural shifts, and a chain of head movements;
while the higher-level action of ironing is constructed through several chains of
object handling: a chain of movements taking an item of clothing from a basket 
to place it on the ironing board, a chain of movements of the iron, a chain of
movements of the pieces of clothing that are being ironed, and a chain of move-
ments of folding the ironed clothes. Similarly, the higher-level action of watching
TV and the higher-level action of interacting with her daughter are being
constructed through a number of chains of lower-level actions.
Some of these many chains of lower-level actions happen simultaneously to
construct one and the same higher-level action, as for example, when the chain of
head movements coincides with the chain of gaze shifts when Anna either glances
at the interviewer or at the TV. Alternatively, some of the chains of lower-level
actions are coordinated with two (or more) higher-level actions, as for example,
the chain of gesture units can only be performed when Anna’s hands are free, and
the iron is placed on the ironing board. When the iron is placed on a piece of
clothing during the gesture, the gesture has to be performed at great speed, so that
the piece of clothing does not burn. Thus, coordination and timing are of great
importance when crossing chains of lower-level actions that simultaneously
construct different higher-level actions.
Practices
Each higher-level action is part of a practice. The higher-level action of telling
about herself can be portrayed as the practice of a sociolinguistic interview or, for
Anna, the telling of personal narratives, or the telling of narratives in general.6
The higher-level action of ironing can be described as the practice of ironing, or
as part of the practice of being a housewife (in Germany). The higher-level action
of interacting with her daughter can be viewed as the practice of mothering, or
can again be described as part of the practice of being a housewife. The higher-
level action of watching a soap opera, or of watching TV in the morning, again
falls under the rubric of the practice of being a housewife.
Each practice is embedded in the historical development of the society. The











































with her daughter, and watching TV in the morning, display some of the normative
historical meanings of a nuclear family within Anna’s community of practice (Lave
and Wenger, 1991), which in turn is embedded within the normative historical
meaning of a nuclear family within German society. The practice of telling a
narrative, on the other hand, can be theorized as happening on an overarching
level, as it is not limited to housewives, but is in fact a practice that is acquired
by each and every person through family interaction and schooling.
All practices are embedded in a person’s habitus, and all practices show signs
of power structures within family, community, and society. As Bourdieu (2001:
37) points out, ‘[t]he effect of symbolic domination (whether ethnic, gender,
cultural or linguistic, etc.) is exerted not in the pure logic of knowing conscious-
ness but through the schemes of perception, appreciation and action that are
constitutive of habitus.’
Social identity
Anna’s actions, consistent with the practices that they (re)construct, also give us
insight into Anna’s social identity. The action of telling a narrative both displays
Anna’s identity as an interviewee (complying with the request to talk about her
own perceived identity) and her self-perceived identity as a housewife. The actions
of ironing, watching TV in the morning, and interacting with her daughter, also
display Anna’s identity as a housewife.
Perception of male domination
When we now take a closer look at the narrative sections above, we find that Anna
problematizes the concept of the ‘housewife’ and male domination. There, Anna
says, ‘I didn’t want to become a . . . housewife, and make myself dependent upon
a husband, I didn’t want any of that.’ Here, the power relationship, the
dependency of housewife upon husband is directly addressed. But, what is more,
here Anna portrays agency and free will through her choice of wordings.
Then she goes on by saying, ‘but then I met Robert at some point and then
suddenly all principles were overthrown and then suddenly everything was
completely different.’ As soon as Robert is introduced in the narrative, the voice
shifts to passive, illustrating that some unknown force brought about a great
change in her life. Here, agency and free will are no longer claimed.
In this section of the social narrative, Anna depicts the historical development
of her social identity from not wanting to become a housewife to ending up in
exactly that position, and in doing so assigns the historical development of her
social actions from past to current as progressing towards the normative social
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male domination in a nuclear family is addressed directly, and agentively contested
in the beginning of the excerpt, Anna shifts to a passive voice later on, when she
adopts just that normative power difference. Thus, as soon as Anna introduces
Robert in the narrative, she speaks with a less powerful voice.
The second section of Anna’s transcribed narrative (lines 12–22), where she
starts by saying ‘and I am as .. content as ever with everything I do.’ – Anna again
uses active voice. She starts listing, ‘I am happy with my household, I am happy
with the party service,’ and then displays hesitance in the next two lines, saying
‘as a balance to here- household and family life?’ – as marked by the glottal stop
after ‘here’ and the rising intonation after ‘family life.’ The following three lines
are produced at a much slower speed, with several short pauses and elongations
(lines 18–20), where she says ‘while I do:n’t . see . this as .. a:hm .... how shall
I pu:t it, .. as an opportunity to make myself here ..’ – then she speeds up (in lines
21–22), uttering an 11-word-long intonation unit, saying ‘financially independent
from Robert that’s not AT ALL what this is about.’ – emphasizing the word(s) ‘at
all.’ The speed in lines 21–22 and the emphasis demonstrate that Anna believes
that she does not want to be financially independent. She then continues with her
narrative, explaining that she only works as a caterer sometimes, and only works
because she enjoys it.
This narrative projects the narrator’s identity elements. Like a boomerang,
Anna’s narrative veers away from her portrayed identity as a housewife, when she
comments that she is happy with the party service, only to slow down in lines 16
and 17 and reverse course, slowing down even more in lines 18–20, before
returning at fast speed to the current identity location of the narrator in lines 
21 and 22.
Here, Anna’s talk evidences the social norm of a housewife being dependent
upon a husband as a conscious decision, pointing to the self as agent with a free
will. In other words, this section of the narrative points to the self as transcending
the social norms of society through free will and as a meaning-making conscious
agent. As Bourdieu points out:
Symbolic power cannot be exercised without the contribution of those who
undergo it and who only undergo it because they construct it as such. But . . .
one has to also take note of and explain the social construction of cognitive
structures which organize acts of construction of the world and its powers. It
then becomes clear that, far from being the conscious, free, deliberate act of
an isolated ‘subject’, this practical construction is itself the effect of a power,
durably embedded in the bodies of the dominated in the form of schemes of
perception and dispositions (to admire, respect, love, etc.) which sensitizes












































When we follow this thought, we can surmise that Anna’s display of free will,
in expressing her desire to take on the normative submissive position of housewife
and of not wanting to be financially independent from her husband, is a social
construction that is deeply embedded in a society’s history. Likewise, when Anna
constructs her agency in the first section of the narrative by explaining that she
had not wanted to take on the submissive role of housewife and to become
dependent upon a husband in her youth, she in fact portrays herself as a normal
youth. Youth in Germany at the time when Anna was growing up commonly
contested social norms of the nuclear family. Here again, we can claim that the
agency that is depicted, or the free will of not wanting to be dominated by a male
partner that is expressed, actually is a manifestation of social behavior that is deeply
rooted in the communities of practice that the individual belongs to.
But next we want to ask ourselves what happens when an individual suddenly
leaves a community of practice? In the following example, Sandra is moving from
a house to an apartment because of her divorce. By profession, Sandra is an archi-
tect, an artist and a part-time caterer with her friend Anna.7 She considers herself
a stay-at-home mother, however, and schedules her work around her children.
Before separation she and her husband had assumed stereotypical gender roles.
‘he never let me do anything like this’
At the moment of this excerpt, loud music is playing, and Sandra is sitting on the
floor, setting up the computer and telephone, as depicted in the second image of
Figure 18.1.8 The researcher is sitting across from her in a chair, and Sandra’s sons
are playing in the hallway. Only Sandra is speaking, and has just declared, ‘he
never let me do anything like this.’ Before Sandra puts all the pieces back into the
boxes and stops working on the computer, she says, ‘I will manage to do this.’ –
gets up from the floor and concludes, ‘I’ll continue there later.’
Actions and practices
During this brief excerpt, Sandra performs several simultaneous higher-level
actions: she works on the computer, interacts with the researcher, and watches
her children, who are playing in the hallway. Some of the chains of lower-level
actions are overlapping, so that Sandra’s talk about the computer, for example,
partly constructs the higher-level action of working on the computer and simulta-
neously partly constructs the higher-level action of interacting with the researcher.
Certainly, we can see that each higher-level action is also part of a practice.
The action of working on a computer is embedded in the practice of computer
use; the action of interacting with the researcher can be viewed as the practice 
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children falls within the practice of mothering.9 However, while Sandra is without
a doubt constructing the higher-level actions of interacting and mothering as
practices, she does not construct the higher-level action of working on the
computer within a common practice. She has not (yet) acquired the knowledge
that is necessary to perform such actions within a practice. Here, she is (still) a
novice within the community of practice of computer users. She calls specialists
or friends for help, reads instruction manuals with great care, and tries to decipher
abbreviations like ‘the USB,’ which are taken-for-granted within the community
of practice.
Social identity, levels of discourse, and perception of 
male domination
Sandra’s higher-level action of working on the computer is an attempt to acquire
a new practice and, as pointed out earlier in the chapter, actions and practices
allow us to perceive an individual’s social identity. When we consider the first
general statement – ‘he never let me do anything like this’ – which Sandra utters
before she starts working on the computer, we find that the talk projects her own
historical development of a social identity from wife to divorcee, and from
acceptance of the symbolic power of male domination to learning to overcome it.
While Sandra and her now ex-husband had enacted normative gender roles and
Sandra had taken on the identity of a housewife, she now explains her obvious
non-belonging to the community of practice of computer users by fusing
normative male behavior with technical knowledge.
When we take this utterance, and then look closer at her actions of working
on the computer, we see that Sandra is doing something that she stated she could
not do while she was married. As Bourdieu (2001: 38) points out, ‘the dominated,
often unwittingly, sometimes unwillingly, contribute to their own domination by
tacitly accepting the limits imposed.’ While Sandra no longer accepts the prior
perceptions of imposed limits, she has not yet acquired the necessary – in her
perception ‘normatively male’10 – practices that allow her to live her life as a single
mother without constant struggle and frustration. During this time of learning
new practices, Sandra takes on the identity of a divorcee.
This divorcee identity can be seen as a temporary social identity, which was
invoked as soon as Sandra’s identity of wife was negated, but her identity as a
single mother was not yet developed. This temporary divorcee identity is
displayed at three different levels: the general, which is constructed through actions
that concern the divorce by and large; the continuous, which is constructed through
long-term actions, whose starting points coincide with the divorce and are
permanent; and the immediate, which is constructed through performing actions











































of as vertical constructions,11 where the general builds the highest level, the
continuous builds the mid-level, and the immediate builds the lowest level.
When linking the utterance – ‘he never let me do anything like this’ – to her
actions of doing this, Sandra displays a general divorcee identity. She also constructs
this general divorcee identity by listening to the music, as the lyrics, ‘I wanted
love, but it’s gonna kill me, you swear you’re faithful, that was a lie, you’ve
cheated on me with half of this city, you aren’t worth it, bye-bye,’ suggest.
Simultaneously, Sandra’s actions of working on the computer are due to, and in
the middle of, her move out of her house into an apartment. The move is a long-
term action that has its starting point in the divorce and which is permanent. Thus,
the mid-level of a continuous divorcee identity is constructed. Concurrently,
Sandra works on the computer, which is a task that her ex-husband used to
perform, which constructs her immediate divorcee identity.
While these three vertically constructed levels of her divorcee identity are
constructed through the duration of the various actions, these levels of identity
are also constructed through various communicative modes simultaneously in a
moment of time. The most obvious level in a moment of time is the lowest level
or the immediate identity construction: Sandra is working on the computer,
displaying her frustration with the task through her intonation, facial expression,
and her use of print, as well as gesture. However, when you take a close look at
the surroundings in image 2 of Figure 18.1, you will see moving boxes, stacks of
clothing, books, paint brushes, and much more. This layout ‘tells’ of the move
that Sandra is going through, and allows us to observe that this very moment is
simultaneous to, and part of, a vertically higher level of action. Now, when we
observe that at this very moment loud music is playing, and when we consider
Sandra’s account during playback when she was asked about the music – ‘yes. I
needed that. he yells everything out. my frustration had to go somewhere. when
he yells, that makes me feel better instantly.’ – we can be sure that Sandra’s choice
of music displays her general divorcee identity. The lyrics, the hard rock, the
intensity, and the volume all depict the general frustration that Sandra is feeling
at that moment. Thus, Sandra’s divorcee identity is particularly salient at this time
because it is constructed on three vertical levels simultaneously.
Projection to the future and perception of male domination
Looking at the utterance of the excerpt, when Sandra stops working on the com-
puter and says – ‘I will manage to do this.’ – her utterance projects to the future,
which is evident by her use of the future tense. While the utterance can be seen as
just projecting the future outcome of her current actions of setting up the com-
puter, it can also be interpreted as simultaneously operating on both higher levels
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manage to learn new practices that enable her to live as a single mother. When tak-
ing these higher levels of discourse into consideration, we can see that this utter-
ance projects Sandra’s future development of her social identity as a single mother.
This utterance then, projects away from her current actions and her current 
identity of a divorcee, to her new, not yet mastered identity of a single mother.
Because of the divorce, the accepted male domination in Sandra’s life, as
practiced throughout the time that she was married, was suddenly absent, leaving
her identity without the known boundaries and limits. This vacuum led her to
reconstruct her identity from housewife to single mother. However, in order 
to accomplish this task, she had to go through stages of learning new practices and
with them new schemes of perception.
Such a period of learning also brings with it many struggles and much
frustration, which can be read off her facial expression, or can be heard in the
music that she is listening to. During this period of learning, Sandra constructs a
semi-new identity, the divorcee identity. This identity formation runs through
phases from housewife to single mother and is in a constant flux; it is a continuum,
which entails part of the single mother identity from the very beginning of change,
and elements of the housewife identity even at the point when the identity of a
single mother is fully constructed.
The stages of the divorcee identity are visible in the long-term study when
taking a closer look at the vertical constructions (Norris, 2002b). While initially
all three levels of a divorcee identity are present almost constantly, the immediate,
and also the continuous construction of this temporary identity fade away with
time, while the general divorcee identity changes and eventually becomes fully
reconstructed as the single mother identity.
The stages of the divorcee identity are also visible when we look around the
apartment. For example, we find a painting that Sandra produced early on in 
the divorce process, which she called ‘Family.’ This painting depicts a mother and
two children. She often looks at the painting and says ‘that is our family.’ She also
depicts one-adult-two-children families in some of her other paintings. Such
repetition appears to have two functions: first, Sandra seems to be trying to come
to terms with her new family structure; and, simultaneously, she is providing her
children with a new scheme of perception, making the new family structure real
in her art and through her verbal declarations.
Sandra’s assurances that a family can exist consisting of one adult and two
children contradict the norms of the nuclear family which are deeply embedded
in the historical social development of the society. And, the depiction of this family
structure in her art supplies this non-normative family structure with permanence,
giving it more reality than the mode of language alone would be able to provide.
Here, Sandra actively constructs a new single mother identity. Her actions,











































manage to do this.’ – emphasizes this agency. Nevertheless, Sandra did not take
a completely agentive role in the higher-level action of constructing her divorcee
identity. This non-agentive side becomes obvious in much of her talk (outside of
this example) and also in the music and the lyrics ‘you’ve cheated on me with half
of this city.’ She had not anticipated having to change her social identity from
housewife to single mother, in fact, and she uses her art to re-construct her own
understanding of a family. Thus, agency, although practiced in the immediate does
not necessarily coincide with agency in higher levels of discourse.
However, the projected agency that Sandra portrays in her immediate actions,
developing new practices, enables her to cultivate new perceptions and to readjust
her habitus. As Sandra moves through the phases from housewife to single mother,
the acquired one-adult-two-children family structure becomes the norm for this
family unit, and Sandra constructs a clear single mother identity.
Conclusion
These two examples demonstrate that habitus, social identity construction, and
perceived male domination are interconnected. While agency and free will are
projections of the individual that are often constructed through the communicative
mode of language, such portrayed agency and free will appear to be deeply
embedded within society and the communities of practice which the individual
belongs to, so that we need to question whether we can speak of agency and free
will at all.
The above excerpts show two seemingly contrasting examples. While Anna’s
excerpt could be taken to illustrate that depicted agency and free will may have
little to do with conscious decision, Sandra’s excerpt could be taken to show 
that agency and free will are linked to choice. We may presume that Sandra could
also have constructed her identity in different ways; she could have held on to 
the perceived imposed limits that she had accepted during marriage, and thus
embraced male domination and the composition of a nuclear family as a given.
There are many imaginable identity constructions that she could have adopted,
yet, she chose this one. However, thinking about Anna once more, we may also
conclude that she chose to take on the identity of a housewife wholeheartedly, to
embrace the norms of society, and not infringe on expectations. We can reason-
ably argue that Anna chose to watch TV during the interview, or we can say 
that she chose to iron the family’s clothing at that very moment. Individuals 
choose many of their actions on a moment-by-moment basis, yet, we can argue
that their choice often is limited by their internalized perceptions, social and
cultural norms, and social histories, which are all intertwined in an individual’s
identity construction. Even though agency and free will may only be possible 
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identity construction, and, as Dostoevsky has pointed out so splendidly, when
arguing in his most poetic way on grounds of agency: ‘One’s own free unfettered
choice, one’s own fancy . . . that is that very “most advantageous advantage” ’
(Dostoevsky, 1960: 23).
In mediated discourse analysis, we take the mediated action as our unit of
analysis, which focuses on the ‘social actors as they are acting’ (R. Scollon, 2001)
and emphasizes the irresolvable dialectic between action and the material means
that mediate social action (Wertsch, 1998; R. Scollon, 2001). Many actions that
an individual performs, or to put it in other terms, most mediated actions, at least
in part, are a result of some choice – however minute – that the social actor
performing the actions has arrived at. This leads to the conclusion that agency and
free will are just as much an aspect of a person’s identity construction, as the habitus
that makes this very choice possible for the individual.
Notes
1 I am using the term ‘male domination’ in this chapter, because the two women focus
on this aspect. However, we could certainly (and maybe more accurately) speak of
female submissiveness in these cases, as Deborah Tannen has kindly pointed out 
to me.
2 I would like to thank Maurice Nevile for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this chapter.
3 While the actual study was completed after a year, I am in contact with Sandra on a
regular basis, and my understanding of her identity construction is informed by this
continuous contact.
4 Also, see some discussion of this moment in Norris, 2004 Analyzing multimodal
interaction: a methodological framework, London: Routledge, p. 55 (where the image was
first published in Plate 2.9) where I discuss the function of proxemics.
5 I continue with the line-numbering to make it easier for the reader to follow the
argument later.
6 Certainly, Anna’s narrative is unavoidably tied up with the trajectory of my relation-
ship with her, with my socio-cultural position and gender; however, in this chapter I
do not focus on this aspect.
7 Please note that Sandra perceives the catering as a profession, while Anna perceives it
as a pastime.
8 This image was first published in Norris, 2004 Analyzing multimodal interaction: A
methodological framework, London: Routledge, p. 85 (Plate 4.1).
9 I claim here that Sandra performs this action as part of the practice of ‘mothering’
while I claim in the above example that Anna performs the very same action of
watching her children as part of the practice of ‘being a housewife,’ as this is the view
that the social actors themselves take.
10 Sandra no longer believes that working on the computer is a ‘male practice.’
11 I speak here of vertical (simultaneous) constructions – which, in fact are hierarchical
constructions – to differentiate them from horizontal (simultaneous) constructions –












































questions and mini projects
Questions for discussion
1 S. Scollon argues that agency is distributed over participants, times,
mediational means and discourses. Give an example of what she means
by this and discuss the implications for this in assigning responsibility
for our own and others’ actions.
2 S. Scollon cites Blommaert in arguing that one way that power is
exercised is by controlling the timescales upon which agency is repre-
sented. Explain how this occurs.
3 Explain the relationship between actions, practices, and social identity
in light of Norris’s argument.
4 Given that agency is deeply embedded in the social practices of the
communities in which individuals participate, do you think that we can
speak of individual agency and free will?
Mini projects
1 Choose an action in your everyday life and analyze how agency is
distributed in this action on three timescales: the longer cultural/
historical timescale of the mediational means, setting and participants,
the intermediate timescale of the personal histories of the individuals
involved, and the timescale of the interaction order.
2 Ask a person you know to record a brief autobiography. Analyze their
account, noting how they assign agency in regard to different aspects
of their lives and how their participation in particular communities of









































































































































































and new directions in MDA
Sigrid Norris and Rodney H. Jones
MDA: methodological principles
The method mediated discourse analysis uses to attempt to answer the theoretical
questions about discourse and social action outlined in the introduction of this
book, is referred to as nexus analysis (Scollon and Scollon, 2004).1 Rather than a
strict methodology, nexus analysis is a set of heuristic tools that aim to guide
researchers as they position themselves in relationship to research participants, to
the questions being asked, and to the actions and discourse that will shape their
data. In fact, as evidenced by the chapters in this volume, MDA makes a point of
eschewing dogmatism when it comes to methodology, making room for the
analyst to introduce any data collection and analytical tools they deem useful
within MDA’s broad focus on social action.
Scollon and Scollon (2004) divide nexus analysis into three basic steps: (1)
engaging the nexus of practice; (2) navigating the nexus of practice; and (3)
changing the nexus of practice. Each of these steps is really a kind of reflective
process, involving a multitude of contingencies and constant interactive decision
making on the part of the researcher. Since each nexus of practice is different,
mediated discourse analysts must, to a large degree, be prepared to chart their
own courses through those they are studying, applying whatever means seem
appropriate given the knowledge that they have at any given point.
The first step, engaging the nexus of practice, requires researchers to come to
a clear understanding of their own relationship with the nexus of practice they aim
to study. Mediated discourse analysis does not presuppose the kind of clinical
objectivity many approaches in the social sciences do but, rather, presupposes the
opposite: that the researcher will always have some kind of stake in what they are
studying and that the research process requires constant reflection on the nature
of this stake and the kinds of perspectives and limitations it gives rise to. Scollon
and Scollon (2004) call this reflective process ‘establishing the zone of identifica-











































Establishing a zone of identification is also the first step to achieving an emic (or
insider’s (Pike, 1967)) point of view on the kinds of actions, mediational means
and discourses that will arise as the focus of the study. From their ‘zone of identi-
fication,’ the researcher gradually enters more into the life-worlds of the partic-
ipants – learning from them which actions are critical to produce certain social
identities and how to bring about social change for that group.
Research in mediated discourse analysis, therefore, is always participatory
(Jones, 2002c; Jones et al., 1997). Participants in the nexus of practice being
studied are not viewed as objects to be studied, but rather as co-researchers who
have a crucial say in deciding what the research is about. For the researcher, this
means being relentless in examining their own interests and biases and prioritizing
the actions, tools and discourses to be studied, not based on those that are of
interest to them, but based on those that are central to the lived experiences 
of the participants.
This initial step of identifying those actions, tools and discourses may include
any number of methods including a review of media texts about the issue or issues
the researcher is interested in, informal observation at relevant sites, individual or
group interviews and surveys of participants. It is important, however, for the
researcher to remember that the purpose of such techniques is not to ‘gather data,’
but rather, to get an idea, in collaboration with participants, about the contours
of the interaction order (Goffman, 1983; Scollon and Scollon, 2004) to be studied
and the kinds of discourses and other mediational means that cycle through it. In
other words, the point of this exercise is not to collect data, but to determine the
kinds of data that will need to be collected.
The second stage, what Scollon and Scollon (2004) call ‘navigating the nexus
of practice,’ is where the researcher begins engaging in data collection and analysis.
Unlike many other approaches where the processes of data collection and data
analysis are seen as discrete, in mediated discourse analysis, data analysis is
ongoing, constantly informing the kinds of data that need to be gathered.
As can be seen in the chapters throughout this volume, what distinguishes data
in mediated discourse analysis is that it is multimodal and multiperspectived ( Jones,
2001c). In other words, data are frequently gathered in a number of different
modes (audio, visual, textual) and from different points of view or subjectivities
(which often correspond to Ruesch and Bateson’s (1968) ‘four kinds of ethno-
graphic data’: members’ generalizations about their behavior at this nexus of
practice; the experiences of individual participants; ‘objective’ observations by 
the researcher; and comparisons between the researcher’s point of view and that
of participants).
The kinds of analytical processes that guide this gathering of data include the
analysis of persons (their histories and habits and the role the actions under
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means (using one or more of the approaches to discourse analysis discussed in the
introduction to this book, with a particular emphasis on how discourse is ‘resemi-
otized’ or transformed into objects and social practices); the analysis of trajectories
and timescales (the ways actions act as points along historical movements of action,
discourse and mediational means); and the analysis of motives (the examination of
how the ‘force’ for actions is distributed among social actors, cultural tools and
discourses over time and space).
This stage also crucially involves participants. In order to verify the usefulness
of the direction in which we are heading with our data collection and analysis, the
researcher stops at incremental points along the way to share their findings in some
form that is accessible to participants and discusses with them how closely the
researcher’s understanding matches their own.
Scollon and Scollon call the final step in nexus analysis ‘changing the nexus 
of practice,’ emphasizing the underlying goal of all mediated discourse analysis to
produce positive social change. It is important to note that ‘changing the nexus 
of practice’ is conceptualized as part of the research process rather than simply as
a byproduct of it, and thus it is to be approached with the same attitude of open-
mindedness, reflexivity and contingency.
Indeed, this process of change is something that actually begins in the first stage.
From the moment researchers enter the nexus of practice, they are changing it in
some way. Their actions, such as recording conversations, taking visual images,
collecting objects and texts and doing discourse analysis, are actions within the
nexus of practice. Mediated discourse analysts are, in a sense, always analyzing
(and inviting participants to analyze) their own actions. Much of what is to be done
in this final stage, therefore, involves exploring how the nexus of practice already
has changed over the course of the research: how the relationships between
researcher and participants and among participants have changed, and how both
researchers and participants approach mediated actions within this nexus given the
kinds of perspectives on those actions that have developed through the research.
Research in mediated discourse analysis is an exercise in resemiotizing or
transforming actions through reflection and analysis. The semiotic transformations
produced by the analysis are subsequently resemiotized into ‘new actions’ or new
ways of doing things or seeing things, both on the part of the researcher, and on
the part of the participants. Thus, for Scollon and Scollon (2004: 178), this final
step is really a reconfiguration of the question with which the researcher begins:
‘What actions can you take as a participant-analyst in this nexus of practice that
will transform discourses into actions and actions into new discourses and
practices?’ This transformation is never a matter of the analyst taking unilateral
action to change the nexus of practice in a way that is more to their liking but,
rather, a matter of working together with participants to produce a heightened
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New directions in MDA
This book has delineated some new directions in mediated discourse analysis,
presenting work by scholars from diverse disciplines such as conversation analysis
and ethnomethodology, linguistic anthropology, psychology, and sociolinguistics.
Such disciplinary diversity illustrates that MDA is not just another narrow
disciplinary subfield but, rather, an approach that links many different perspectives
in the social sciences, allowing for – and even demanding – interdisciplinarity.
While some disciplinary and sub-disciplinary divisions encourage the researcher
to consider their research objectives quite narrowly, MDA – as an overarching
approach to discourse – allows the incorporation of theoretical and methodological
perspectives from any given social discipline or sub-discipline without binding the
researcher to narrow boundaries. With this book, then, we have attempted to
highlight the value of interdisciplinarity in two ways: first, we have included
chapters that draw from diverse disciplines; and second, we have included chapters
from authors who are themselves proponents of an interdisciplinary approach.
When looking back at the preceding 18 chapters, it becomes apparent that all
of the scholars included are particularly concerned with the concepts of time and
place (or space) in their attempts to understand: (1) the everyday mediated actions
people perform; (2) the mediational means that people use; (3) the practices that
become evident through people’s actions; (4) the sites of engagement that are
being constructed through actions, practices and mediational means; and (5) the
agency that is distributed, or sometimes displayed within singular actions. This
focus is doubly important as it represents an important new direction in mediated
discourse analysis. Therefore, we would like to end by reviewing how the authors
have grappled with these issues.
Time
Ron Scollon illustrates (in Chapter 3) that actions are rhythmically entrained to at
least the following six different (but integrated) pace-makers (Zeitgeber): the
cardiac-respiratory cycle: pulsations of the heart and of breathing; the metabolic cycle:
ebbs and flows of ingestion, digestion, and elimination, pain cycles, drowsiness
cycles; the circadian cycle: 24-hour revolution of the earth about its axis; the lunar
cycle: 28-day revolution of the moon about the earth; the solar cycle: 365-day
revolution of the earth about the sun; and entropic cycles: formation and decay of
material substances.
In Chapter 4, Maurice Nevile shows that utterances and manual actions can
simultaneously function in smaller as well as larger action sequences, displaying
timed layering of actions. Consequently, he illustrates how simultaneous actions
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Ingrid de Saint-Georges, on the other hand, looks at anticipatory discourse and
the resulting actions in Chapter 15, delineating a process-oriented view of the
construction of several landmark events – or sites of engagement – conceived as
space/time stations. Thus, she focuses on the trajectories that result from, and are
part of, anticipation and real-time actions.
In Chapter 18, Sigrid Norris illustrates that a person usually performs simul-
taneous actions, which all may have a different starting and end-point and be of a
different duration – picturing actions of different duration as vertical construc-
tions that are partially performed in real-time and partially performed (and
interpreted and re-interpreted) in the histories of the individuals. Furthermore,
she links personal and societal histories with real-time actions.
Place/Space
James V. Wertsch discusses Vygotsky’s two approaches to mediation (in Chapter
6), calling it ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ mediation (i.e. human social versus mental
processes). While we may not be able to speak of place/space in the traditional
sense here, this differentiation is one of space after all: external of a human’s mind,
and therefore explicit; or internal of a human’s mind, and therefore implicit.
While such distinction is never absolute, the distinction between social space and
mental space is of great importance, because these two forms of mediation operate
in different ways and have different implications.
Paul McIlvenny and Pirkko Raudaskosky explore place/space on two levels:
first, they look at virtual space in their chapter on adoption (Chapter 7); and
second, they investigate the actual movement of an adopted child from one place
to another. The place/space distinction, however, between virtual and actual,
quickly becomes blurred as they show how one is not necessarily distinct from 
the other.
Theo van Leeuwen illustrates in Chapter 8 how reading paths are largely
structured by the composition – of a museum room or a CD Rom – showing that
there are specific constraints within the place/space that is available for the
reader’s use.
Laurent Filliettaz also essentially investigates the constraints and affordances of
place/space in Chapter 10, when he discusses a specific service encounter. He
surmises that service encounters are best conceived as a combination of both
typified social knowledge and interpersonal negotiation, in which language
intersects with other mediational means – one of which would be space.
In Chapter 12, Shawn Rowe also concerns himself with affordances and
constraints, investigating hybrid activity spaces and their implications for under-
standing agency in learning. Such hybrid activity spaces – which are not places –
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Time and place/space
Jay Lemke develops a conceptual framework in Chapter 11, within which to give
accounts of how the prior coherence of places and of the discursive imaginaries of
multi-scale projects help to constitute meaning through time. Thus, prior
understanding of time and place make the creation of meaning through time and
place possible without, however, restricting it to the prior experience.
Rodney H. Jones illustrates in Chapter 14 that participants construct sites of
engagement for particular practices through fairly durable patterns of orientation –
or attention structures – towards different places/spaces and different time-
scales. In his argument, attention structures of the participants organize time and
place/space.
Suzie Scollon shows in Chapter 17 how agency is distributed through time and
space. Similar to Norris’s point (above), she integrates the history of the partici-
pants and also incorporates the various places that social actors embody because
of their personal histories. She further combines the times and places of the
mediational means (here the census), illustrating a vast complexity.
A last note
When we set out to put this volume together, we had in mind to write a book
that demonstrates the diversity of scholarship that is essential for MDA. We
further wanted to make the book accessible to a diverse readership without
assuming a prior knowledge of mediated discourse analysis.
Now, looking back, we see that the book has accomplished much more than
we had set out to accomplish: the book illustrates the concern of all authors in
this volume with the concepts of time and place/space – no matter which
disciplinary direction they come from. Such concern with these major concepts
ties each chapter to the others, constructing this book as even more of a complete
whole than we had hoped for.
Note
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20 Postscript
Gunther Kress
In reading Discourse in Action I cannot but feel a near overwhelming sense of 
a mounting ‘wave’ of research and writing signalling the beginning of entirely new
ways of conceiving of meaning and representation, in short, of the significance 
of human social action. Many of the disciplines invoked in the book will be
recognizable to its readers – forms of discourse analysis, Vygotskian psychology,
ethnography of different kinds, semiotics, conversation analysis, multi-modal
analyses, post-modern philosophy. Yet, in this book they appear not as distinct
‘takes’ on an issue, as discrete modes of working in autonomously constituted
fields, but as a new, ‘combined’ means of dealing with the issues raised by a field
newly sketched. As the editors put it in their framing introduction, mediated
discourse analysis approaches the question of how discourse is a matter of social
action by posing two questions: ‘The first question it asks is “What is/are the
action(s) that is/are being taken here?” and only after answering this question does
it go on to ask: “What is the role of discourse in this/those action?” ’
From the perspective of much or most work in the last century, it is to stand
things on their head – or maybe from a present perspective at long last to realize
which way round is the right way up. It makes it possible to treat the question of
representation and communication as one kind of social action among all other
kinds of social action, to see all social action as the making of meaning. That is the
achievement of the editors of the volume. They, clearly, have a sense of a necessary
new framing of the problem-domain. And, clearly, some of the contributors share
that perspective too; and the work of all the contributors is well integrated into
the jigsaw of that new picture.
My own history in the area of representation starts with the battle of Linguistics,
in Australia and in the UK, to gain ‘acceptance’ and ‘respectability’ in the academic
community. In the 1960s this was done – in the mainstream versions of the
discipline – around the question of the autonomy of the discipline through an
assertion of language as a phenomenon, itself, autonomous from the domain of










































disciplines in their different ways. In Discourse in Action the question ‘what is to 
be accounted for’ is radically different to that question posed in the ‘contributor
disciplines’ represented here when acting on their home turf, so to speak. Dis-
course analysis, for all its concern with social environments or psychological
location, remains focused on the abstraction, ‘discourse’; sociolinguistics, for all
its attention to the social, remains, in the end, focused on the linguistic linked to
the social. In this book these approaches are brought together to work jointly, in
multiple overlays, connections and inter-weavings. In other words, a new domain
is being staked out, the domain of human action as meaning.
Domains set the boundaries of the field of enquiry, and in that field those who
do the work develop the means and tools they need for their task. The tools that
are available at any moment are always those that come from domains differently
defined, tools made to do different kinds of jobs, the tools of the past. So if at
times there is a lack of fit of (old) tool to (new) task then that is how it is bound
to be: the old has to furnish the means for dealing with the new. Theories are not
invented in a void; theories are responses by those who face specific problems to
the need to deal with the problem. And if new ways of seeing the world emerge
and they produce new problems, then, here in this book, that is faced head on.
In his early chapter Ron Scollon writes: ‘actions are always complex, never simple,
and, second, the relationships between discourse and non-discursive action are
also complex.’ He, like others in the book, then proceeds to confront that
complexity in pretty uncompromising ways: starting with the – in other theoret-
ical frames unlikely – example of fitting a new wooden floor in their house, he
moves from that to hiring a tool, the floor-nailer, and soon we are in a world
where the social, the biological and the physical worlds all interact and impinge
on this anything but autonomous and isolatable event. But by then we are in a
world in which there are, as yet, no theoretical floor-nailers, ready to hand and
easy to hire.
I am suggesting that we are witnessing a paradigm-shift, and we might as well
be aware of it. This book is one instance among others: it is strongly inspired by
the work of Ron and Suzie Scollon (as, for instance, in their most recent Nexus
Analysis); but it takes inspiration also from the work of those who work in the
‘New Literacy Studies’; from Wertsch’s neo-Vygotskian work; and from Jim
Gee’s ‘expansion’ of work on Discourse, and on representation in conjunction
with digital media. Close to my interests, there is the work around the multiple
means for representation, the work in Multimodality, moving away from the focus
on ‘language’ alone.
All this suggests a kind of Kuhnian paradigm-shift. Yet, what I think is happening
is less the challenge to one paradigm and its final inability to cope, than something
new happening somewhere else. In other words, neither Linguistics nor Discourse











































in the short term. Rather, a new means of working with a new set of issues in a
newly configured field is developing alongside these established, and still domi-
nant, enterprises. There are attempts to set forth new paradigms, at least in
outline, as I have indicated. As yet the modes of working of the contributor
disciplines are still recognizably discrete, not yet unified, not as yet an emergent
new theory. All is yet to play for. This book is laying down some clear markers
of where and how the work should be happening. In that it makes its strong
contribution.
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